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Abstract 
 
The aim of the research is to explore and understand the role of local 
councillors in local government. There are three dimensions that 
influence this role. The first is the tension between central and local 
government and the highly centralised party political system which 
constrains local autonomy. The second is the role of the political party in 
local government, and its dominance in policy making. The third is the 
evolving spatial planning system and the new emphasis on localism and 
collaborative planning. These themes are explored through an 
examination of the spatial planning system, and in particular a case study 
of plan making in a growth sub – region. My reading and reflection have 
helped me formulate three research questions: a) Has the lack of local 
government autonomy inhibited the adoption of innovative forms of 
collaborative planning; b) Have councillors understood the central tenets 
of collaborative planning and acted upon them and c) Can local 
politicians who are not members of the council’s executive play a more 
effective community leadership role by becoming more involved in the 
scrutiny of policies for space and place- making. 
 
 
The study has contributed to knowledge in a number of ways. It provides 
confirmatory evidence for other research exploring the role of the 
councillor in local government. This study has shown how the 
politicisation that has affected local government has also had an 
influence on the role of spatial planning in local government and that the 
dominant role of the political party in local government also involves 
spatial planning. 
 
 
66,000 words (excluding bibliography). 
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      Executive Summary 
 
The aim of the research is to explore and understand the role of local 
councillors in local government. There are three dimensions that 
influence this role. The first dimension is the tension between central and 
local government and the highly centralised party political system which 
constrains local autonomy. The second dimension is the role of the 
political party in local government, and its dominance in policy making. 
The third dimension is the evolving spatial planning system and the new 
emphasis on localism and collaborative planning. These themes are 
explored through an examination of the spatial planning system, and in 
particular a case study of plan making in a growth sub – region where 
these inter-relationships can be observed and explored. A major factor 
influencing the role of councillors is the autonomy they experience, 
whether this be from local political, economic and social pressures or 
from central government.  
 
My reading and reflection have helped me formulate three research 
questions: a) Has the lack of local government autonomy inhibited the 
adoption of innovative forms of collaborative planning; b) Have 
councillors understood the central tenets of collaborative planning and 
acted upon them and c) Can local politicians who are not members of the 
council’s executive play a more effective community leadership role by 
becoming more involved in the scrutiny of policies for space and place- 
making. 
 
The subject is of interest because of the changing styles of governance 
within local government and the role that councillors will have in these 
new forms. The requirement of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase 
Act 2004 that local planning authorities prepare a Core Strategy (CS) for 
their area, and that the CS should comprise a spatial vision and strategic 
objectives for the area, poses enormous challenges for both councillors 
and officers within local government. 
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This study provides an opportunity to consider the role of representative 
democracy in spatial planning, which has evolved through a state – 
centred model focussed on welfare delivery and support for a mixed 
economy to what some academics see as a new mode of governance, 
which recognises the multiplicity of ways which link citizens, business and 
state. Representative democracy is recognised as absolutely necessary 
but not sufficient in itself to respond to the complexity of the issues facing 
contemporary political communities. 
 
 
The major recommendation emerging from this thesis is the need for a 
greater role for the scrutiny and overview committee in the evolution of 
the Core Strategy within councils. When the cabinet or executive 
structure was introduced into local government with its concentration of 
power in the executive, as compared with the earlier committee structure, 
emphasis was placed on the important role of scrutiny as a counter 
balance to this concentration. The case study has demonstrated that 
scrutiny is poorly developed in both Oxford City Council and South 
Oxfordshire District Council. Both councils exhibit the low scrutiny/high 
leadership form described by Gains et al (2005). The Centre for Public 
Scrutiny (2013) points out that public scrutiny is an essential part of 
ensuring that government remains effective and accountable and is now 
moving into another era with community –led scrutiny of local decisions. 
 
 
During the time that I have spent researching this subject and realizing 
the importance of my conclusion that public scrutiny should play a greater 
role in the spatial planning system, I decided to engage again with local 
politics. In May 2013 I was elected a Gloucestershire County Councillor 
for the Stow Division in the North Cotswolds and I am a member of the 
Planning Committee and the Environment and Communities Scrutiny 
Committee as well as the Local Enterprise Partnership Scrutiny 
Committee. Public scrutiny plays a significant role in the work of 
Gloucestershire County Council and in 2012 the county won an award 
from The Centre for Public Scrutiny for the scrutiny by the committee of 
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the Severn Estuary Flood Risk Management Action Plan prepared by the 
Environment Agency. The reflections on scrutiny that I have gained whilst 
researching this subject I will take with me for my work on the council and 
its committees. 
 
 
The study has contributed to knowledge in a number of ways. It provides 
confirmatory evidence for other research exploring the role of the 
councillor in local government. There has however been little work on 
attempting to place in context how the councillor behaves in the 
specialised area of spatial planning, notwithstanding its important role in 
local government. This study has shown how the politicisation that has 
affected local government has also had an influence on the role of spatial 
planning in local government and that the dominant role of the political 
party in local government also involves spatial planning. 
 
A central question concerning the current enthusiasm for a localist 
agenda in spatial planning and local government is to what extent local 
authorities will choose to exercise their residual autonomy so as to 
encourage locally specific policy making. The study has demonstrated 
that the political parties are determined to ensure that the politics of the 
councils are conducted within the political groups before reaching the 
public domain. This pattern of political activity within the councils is 
perhaps inimical to the autonomy that localism or locally specific policy 
making requires, but could be counter-balanced by more effective public 
scrutiny. 
 
The policy importance of this research is three - fold. Firstly,on 
democratic grounds it is important for researchers, policy-makers and 
decision – makers to understand the role of the councillor and the factors 
that influence this role. Secondly, by understanding how and why 
councillors hold the views that they do, there is an opportunity to develop 
approaches to bridge gaps in trust, communication, values and 
democratic accountability. Thirdly, it could lead to more effective policies 
and programmes that could work in partnership with local communities 
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and have a greater positive impact locally and nationally. This is 
particularly true of public scrutiny and the opportunity to introduce 
community – led scrutiny into the policy area of spatial planning. There is 
a very large literature on collaborative planning but I believe that the role 
of the councilor is neglected in much of the writing and research. In my 
conclusions I set out some thoughts on further research in this area. 
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Chapter 1 The aims, objectives and structure of the thesis 
 
Research Aims and Objectives 
 
The aim of the research is to explore and understand the role of local 
councillors in local government. There are three dimensions that 
influence this role. The first dimension is the tension between central and 
local government and this has two aspects. Firstly, the British polity 
expressed as the relationship between central government at 
Westminster and local government in the Town Hall and the changing 
form of governance that has emerged from this relationship. Secondly, 
the highly centralised party political system which constrains local 
autonomy. The second dimension is the role of the political party in local 
government, and its dominance in policy making. 
 
The third dimension is the evolving spatial planning system and the new 
emphasis on localism and collaborative planning. These themes are 
explored through an examination of the spatial planning system, and in 
particular a case study of plan making in a growth sub – region where 
these inter-relationships can be observed and explored. The new spatial 
planning system appears to offer councillors an increased role in place 
making, and the thesis examines to what extent this is taking place. 
Councillors in local government find themselves subject to a whole range 
of forces, which can pull in different directions, and which are 
underpinned by a significant amount of both policy advice and academic 
research. 
 
Influencing the role of councillors is the autonomy they experience 
whether this be from local political, economic and social pressures or 
from central government. My reading and reflection have helped me 
formulate three research questions: a) Has the lack of local government 
autonomy inhibited the adoption of innovative forms of collaborative 
planning; b) Have councillors understood the central tenets of 
collaborative planning and acted upon them and c) Can local politicians 
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who are not members of the council’s executive play a more effective 
community leadership role by becoming more involved in the scrutiny of 
policies for space and place -making. 
 
Research Context and Importance 
 
The author, who has both a professional and political background, 
believes that despite a strong and well nuanced body of academic 
research and literature that promotes a more progressive approach to 
place governance in complex, pluralistic and conflicted western 
democracy (Healey 2011), the “modernising” agenda in local government 
of all recent national governments is bringing about a more centralised, 
less collaborative approach to decision making by local councillors.  
 
In this introductory chapter I aim to provide a context for my research and 
to set out the contemporary relevance of my key findings, claims and 
conclusions. To do this within the areas that I identified at the outset I 
briefly summarise the debates taking place in these areas and their 
implications for the research. My own motive in this area is that for many 
years I have practised as an independent planning consultant providing 
professional advice to a wide range of clients and I have also been a 
local government councillor in South Oxfordshire, although consciously 
not a member of the planning committee to avoid any conflicts of interest. 
I retired as a councillor in 2007 but have retained personal and 
professional links in the area During that time I observed the difficulties 
that accommodating physical growth within local communities can pose 
for local councillors trying to balance the local concerns of their residents 
against strong development pressures from central government and the 
development industry. I hold a significant normative position in that I 
believe in the importance of strong civic and community leadership, for 
example, having been Mayor of Wallingford for two years, but I do intend 
to look at other perspectives as part of my research. 
 
My reason for wishing to become a local government councillor after 
more than thirty years of private practice as a chartered town planner was 
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my belief that local councillors could play a larger role in spatial planning 
and place making. Initially I was elected onto the Wallingford Town 
Council where as Chairman of the Town Plan working party I was 
instrumental in drawing up a plan for the town adopted by the town 
council after extensive public consultation. My first year as Mayor 
increased my public profile in the town and I was elected onto the district 
council. There I was a member of the cabinet responsible for the arts and 
sports /leisure portfolio, and the council embarked on a major investment 
programme of refurbishing the council’s leisure centres and building a 
new cinema and arts centre in the growth town of Didcot. All of these 
projects required a great deal of pre-planning and design time. This 
entailed on my part extensive consultations with stakeholders, 
presentations at scrutiny committee, cabinet and full Council meetings. I 
was in the fortunate position that I had wound down my private practice 
for that period, and was able to devote myself to council activities on 
almost a full time basis, and I rented an office in the town hall. I retired 
from local government to work on this thesis and also to resume private 
practice, as I have found this the most practical way of keeping in touch 
with current legislation. 
 
My experience strengthened my normative position that local councillors 
can play a more pronounced role in both place making and civic 
leadership. I had the advantage over some others councillors, particularly 
those who had not spent many years as a councillor, that my experience 
as a planning consultant had given me a familiarity with local government 
practice and planning law as well as presenting proposals in a public 
arena. Subsequently after completing the first draft of this thesis I stood 
for election for Gloucestershire County Council in May 2013 and was 
elected as a County Councillor for the Stow division that includes a large 
area of the North Cotswolds. I am a member of the Environment and 
Communities Scrutiny Committee. During the course of working on the 
thesis I became convinced of the greater role that scrutiny could play in 
the development of spatial planning policy in local government. Scrutiny 
plays a large role in the governance of the county council at Gloucester. 
There are five scrutiny committees that cover all of the services provided 
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by the council as well as health and care which also involve other 
agencies. Although the council is led by the largest party, the 
Conservatives, they do not have a voting majority and the chairmanship 
of scrutiny and planning committees include the opposition parties. This 
enables scrutiny to hold the council’s executive to account and to assist 
in the improvement and development of council policies. In 2012 the 
council won the Centre for Public Scrutiny’s prize for the review that was 
carried out of the Environment Agency’s proposed strategy for managing 
flood risk on the Severn Estuary and ensured a redesigned approach that 
engaged the community. Gloucestershire conforms to the separation of 
powers model of leadership and scrutiny that has both well – defined 
leadership structures and strong forms of scrutiny and review identified 
by Gains et al (2005). 
 
The scope of planning has broadened in recent years and the concept of 
spatial planning has been introduced to reflect an approach that 
embraces a wider social and cultural environment than land use control. 
However land use planning in England has had a legislative basis for 
more than one hundred years. Throughout that period politics has been 
part of planning, which is distinguished from other professional and 
technical services provided through local government by displaying a 
political – professional spectrum that continually exhibits a tension 
between these two traits. Throughout the period since 1909 the 
management of growth has been an area of competing political 
approaches, and both central and local government have adopted 
different forms of legislation to try to regulate and direct development. 
From the end of the Second World War local authorities had 
responsibilities for a very wide range of services including planning and at 
the end of the 1970’s a number of reports appeared which stressed the 
need for improved managerial efficiency and effectiveness within larger 
authorities, such as the Redcliffe – Maud (1969) and Bains (1972) 
reports. These proposals were part of a wider programme of state – 
backed social and economic modernisation, shared by governments of 
both parties. 
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Towards the end of that decade recession and the slowdown of economic 
growth weakened the post war consensus and opened the way for new 
political and economic ideas to take place. The 1980`s was characterised 
by the internal reorganisation of the public sector along quasi – market 
lines in line with the Thatcherite political agenda and the emergence of 
new rules for private business as a supplier of public services. The 
1990`s and continuing through to the 2010 General Election were 
characterised by a continuation of these themes but modes of 
governance were extended and widened to link public, private, 
community and voluntary sectors .The new Coalition Government 
,however, has repudiated much of the ideological basis that underpinned 
this governance and the Conservative leader David Cameron promises 
(Cameron 2009) a new “localism“ which will promote modes of 
governance more grounded in local communities. In Chapter 2 I describe 
the literature review that I have conducted in order to examine the 
debates that have take place around the research topic that I have 
identified. These debates can be brought together within five broad 
themes that help to illuminate the overarching subject of the role of the 
councillor in local government. In this introductory chapter I briefly 
summarise these debates.  
 
The changing relationship between government and governance in 
local government 
 
Parallel with these changes has been an upsurge of academic interest in 
governance. Cowell & Murdoch (1997) describe the concept as indicating 
a move away from the bureaucratic hierarchies towards looser, more 
interactive administrative arrangements, such as coalitions, partnerships 
or networks. Rhodes (1997) has described the emergence of a 
“differentiated polity “, the notion of which is a recognition that in order to 
achieve any substantive outcome, political agencies and actors need to 
pool their resources. Governance implies (Goodwin and Painter 1996) a 
focus on a wide range of institutions, encompassing not just the formal 
   
 14 
agencies of the state but the whole raft of actors that can influence policy 
and its implementation at a variety of spatial scales 
 
The role of political parties in local government 
 
Gyford (1989) summarised the long-term process of what is known as the 
party politicisation of local government, identifying five distinct changes, 
the fifth of which, entitled “reappraisal”, took place in 1974. Contributions 
made by Gyford (1989), Bulpitt (1967) and Jones (1983) throw light on 
the development of the party group as generating a loyalty- demanding 
pull on the councillor’s representative activities. Cochrane (1991) argued 
that changes within local government have to be understood in the 
context of wider restructuring in the UK state. Chandler (2001) thought 
that the Local Government Bill (2000) might institutionalise new links 
between government and community groups and individuals, but would 
provide little local control over policy making. Coulson (2004) suggests 
that the government has a choice: it could either accept that the era of 
multi-skilled councillors responsible for the multi-purpose local authorities 
is ending, or it could radically rationalise the present quangos, 
partnerships and other local government structures to re-create it.  
 
Leach and Copus (2004) saw the introduction via the Local Government 
Act 2000 of political executives held to account by influential overview 
and scrutiny committees as challenging fundamentally the traditional 
operations of the party political system. Fenwick, McMillan & Elcock 
(2009) thought that the various proposed formal and “institutional” 
solutions to English governance would be bound to fail, and that the 
fragmentation of local governance in England might be resolved through 
the building of effective patterns of governance from the bottom up. In his 
examination of democratic theory and its relevance to local politics, 
Copus (2004) had earlier come to a similar conclusion. 
 
Taylor and Wheeler (2001) emphasised the importance of political parties 
in organising choices in local elections. Bochel.C & Bochel H.M. (2000) in 
reviewing the literature on local government councillors comment that 
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political groupings are now important on most councils. They were 
recognised in England and Wales by the Local Government and Housing 
Act 1989 which gave them specific rights, such as committee 
representation and the right to appoint political assistants. The authors 
summarise the roles and responsibilities of councillors. Councils fulfil an 
executive function in that they implement legislation and policies made by 
central government, although they also make policies that may be 
contrary to those of central government.  Where a party has an overall 
majority the decision of the ruling group will generally effectively decide 
the position of the council. Party discipline is therefore an important factor 
in the effectiveness of party groupings. Where no party is in overall 
control, coalitions are required which may shift according to the issues. 
 
Since the introduction of cabinet government and the abolition of 
committees other than for licensing and planning, power in local 
government has been concentrated in a small group of councillors. The 
need to prepare a Core Strategy under the new planning system provides 
this small group with an opportunity to articulate and progress a clear 
vision for their district based on their own values and ideology. In 
particular I want to explore the tensions between on the one hand 
representing local interests, which other than the local business 
community, are rarely in favour of growth, and on the other responding to 
central government initiatives which reward efficient councils who 
respond positively to the growth agenda. As the system of governance 
changes after the 2010 election, local councillors will be faced by the 
need to formulate new forms of governance, and this provides a cut off 
point to examine how the system has functioned since the 1997 election. 
I also want to explore whether there are political differences in whether to 
accept growth, particularly as there appears little discretion at an overall 
national level to significantly alter the predicted scale of growth, or 
whether the political differences are in the forms of governance, for 
example the need for local accountability and local acceptance of growth.  
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The differing role of councillors in local government 
 
Decision - making ultimately lies with the planning councillors, who 
directly face the whole range of conflicting demands. More recently there 
has been parliamentary support for the role of councillors. A recent report 
of the House Of Commons Committee on Communities & Local 
Government (2008) supports the role of councillors on the basis that the 
technical specialist can be challenged by a non-specialist, so that there 
are checks and balances and that the decisions being made reflect the 
needs and desires of the wider community. The determination of planning 
applications made to the Council has survived as a committee activity 
although a much larger number of decisions are now delegated to officers 
Despite the increased politicisation within local government, the 
regulatory activities of the planning committee are regarded as being 
quasi - judicial and are not “ whipped.“ In my experience where local 
opposition to applications is severe, political influences can play a part in 
decisions on applications.  
 
The planning committee system is criticised, particularly by business 
interests, as being unpredictable and slow. Councillors are criticised as 
being ill informed and requiring more training. Planning policy is no longer 
largely determined by committee but by the cabinet taking decisions on 
recommendations made by the senior management team. The Core 
Strategies being produced under the new Local Development Framework 
system are more over – arching than the local plans, previously 
published, which were more concerned with land use allocation, and are 
seen as being a key part of the community leadership role of local 
government. However these documents may be officer – led, thus 
reducing their local legitimacy.  
 
Moves towards more locally focussed decision - making were apparent 
under the previous government with its advocacy of local area decision-
making,but are likely to become more pronounced given the declared 
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policies of the new Coalition Government. Concerns about a conflict 
between “ localism “ and a growth agenda requiring increased delivery of 
housing and employment land and infrastructure are now regularly 
expressed by business and development lobbies in the national and 
professional press. Lastly the growth of “managerialism” in local 
government has meant that not only have more and more planning 
applications been determined by officers acting under delegated powers 
but the role of the senior management team in the preparation of the 
various documents: The Community Strategy, The Core Spatial Strategy 
and Local Economic Partnership Strategies has become very 
pronounced, raising concerns about political legitimacy. 
 
Lepine and Sullivan (2010) assert that if councillors are to contribute to 
the good governance of communities, then the restoration of the political 
function to councillors is needed, and this will have implications for the 
role of councillors in both preparing spatial plans and making decisions 
on planning applications. The shift from local government to local 
governance has conflicting implications for the role of councillors, 
particularly their role in the spatial planning system. One implication is 
that it reinforces the role of councillors as community leaders, and their 
responsibility to represent the interests of constituents within the broader 
networks of governance. 
 
However governance and the associated inter-dependence with other 
organisations working through local partnerships can lead to a de-
politicisation of local government as representatives from other public 
organisations can be intolerant of party politicking in these partnerships. 
This de-politicisation may be encouraged by officers who may take the 
lead in these partnerships. The planning system has a critical role to play 
in mediating between different interests, often between groups opposed 
to, and groups supporting, new development proposals. Because of their 
political legitimacy, having been elected to their role, councillors may 
have an important contribution to make in this task of mediation. 
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The administrative reform sought in local government by national 
government usually referred to as known as “ Modernising “ 
 
Alongside these legislative changes, the New Labour government 
introduced what it termed a “modernising“agenda (2001) for spatial 
planning. The Green Paper “Planning: delivering a fundamental 
change“(2001) comprised a critique of the whole spatial planning system. 
Central to these administrative changes is the autonomy of local 
government. Hall (1993) has explored these debates and suggested a 
basic duality in the development of local government autonomy that is 
expressed in a twofold typology that is typified by autonomy from local 
political, economic and social pressures alongside autonomy from central 
government. 
 
 
The move towards a more collaborative approach to place- making 
 
Healey (2007) demonstrated in her examination of the Cambridge Sub – 
region how, although there is no formal organisation to represent it, it has 
evolved a substantial local capacity to manage development processes in 
a situation where there are always conflicting values and claims about 
development options and trajectories. This capacity uses formal 
government arenas, but activates these through the informal networks 
that connect different groups to politicians and officials, and link local 
actors to national politicians and civil servants Gallent (2008) 
demonstrates that legislative changes to the administration of local 
government and planning introduced since 1997 by the New Labour 
Government have led to a continuing tension between strategic decision 
making on the one hand, and participative approaches that aim to build 
consensus, reduce conflict and empower communities. I have been 
working on a historical review of the politics of planning (Moor 2010). This 
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together with my literature search has provided a background to the 
research and helped identify three research questions. 
 
 
Three Research Questions 
 
- Has the lack of local government autonomy inhibited the adoption 
of innovative forms of collaborative planning? 
 
I explore why the strategic/local tension between central government and 
local government persists and how this reflects on local politicians, and 
why this continues. Planning policy is still very strongly grounded in the 
national government and its priorities. Local discretion is limited and this 
has probably always been the case since the inception of the 1947 Act. 
 
- Have councillors understood the central tenets of collaborative 
planning and acted upon them? 
 
I record the evolution of spatial planning from a regulatory function 
controlling land use to the concept of mediating space and place making, 
and ask to what extent local politicians understand this change and 
empathise with it.  
 
-    Can local politicians who are not members of the council’s executive   
play a more effective community leadership role by becoming more 
involved in the scrutiny of policies for space and place- making? 
 
I consider the nature of the political constituency for local politicians. To 
what extent are they embedded in a party political hierarchy that may 
prove inimical to community leadership.  
 
The dependent variable is the influence of political affiliation on decision 
making in the governance of spatial planning, and the independent 
variables are membership of a political party, the length of service of the 
councillor, the role of the councillor in local government and the 
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relationship between the councillor and the ward that he or she 
represents. Everything else that makes up the social, economic and 
political context and backdrop of the dependent and independent 
variables fits into a third category, known as intervening variables.  
 
Research Strategy 
 
Blaikie (2000) discusses four research strategies each linked with 
different philosophical and theoretical traditions. Based on my literature 
review I propose to use an abductive research strategy which is to 
examine within a growth area the approaches that local planning 
authorities devise in their response to growth pressures and to what 
extent these approaches reflect the roles and views of councillors. The 
starting point is the political world of the councillors, their construction of 
reality, their way of conceptualising and giving meaning to their social 
world. This can only be discovered from the accounts that they provide. 
Individual motives and activities have to be abstracted into typical 
motives for typical actions in typical situations and these typifications 
provide an understanding of the activities and provide a basis for a more 
systematic explanatory account. The final stage is to bring together these 
strands and analyses the role of councillors in the planning decision 
making process and the ideological, other ideas and values that influence 
them. The use of a case study requires explanation and justification. 
Comparative studies often do not include enough cases to allow the 
research question to be generically formulated. Sampling is introduced 
when a researcher selects a number of cases for study, rather than 
including the whole universe of possible cases in a study. Quantitative 
research often deals very explicitly with sampling, but in qualitative 
research this is less common. Earlier I identified three research questions 
concerning spatial planning and councillors. To investigate and pursue 
these questions I need to identify a situation or case, where councillors 
are confronted with these issues, which can be observed and which is 
progressing towards resolution of these issues, and where analysis of 
this process can be carried out. I earlier drew attention to the tension 
between networked forms of governance and the continuing importance 
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of hierarchical relations in the governance of planning, which is the 
central theme of my research. 
 
By reference to a case study of the Central Oxfordshire Sub – region 
which is proving to be one of the fastest growing localities in the country, 
where the case for and against further growth is now strongly contested, I 
conducted a series of structured interviews with councillors, officers and 
other stake holders so as to identify the role of councillors, and their 
interpretation of their role in decision making and to assess the extent to 
which ideological, other ideas and values influence their decision making.  
 
Resources, timing and familiarity with the area have led me to choose the 
Central Oxfordshire Sub- region as a case study, and I will elaborate on 
this further in this chapter and more substantially in my research method 
chapter. At this stage, I would refer to Skocpol (1984) who justified such 
an approach in the following way: “In contrast to the probabilistic 
techniques of statistical analysis – techniques that are used when there 
are very large numbers of cases and continuously quantified variables to 
analyse – comparative historical analyses proceed through logical 
juxtapositions of aspects of small numbers of cases. They attempt to 
identify invariant causal configurations that necessarily (rather than 
probably) combine to account for outcomes of interest.”  This has been 
my approach to this research.  
 
The subject is of interest because of the changing styles of governance 
within local government and the role that councillors will have in these 
new forms. The requirement of the Planning and Compulsory Purchase 
Act 2004 that local planning authorities prepare a Core Strategy (CS) for 
their area, and that the CS must have regard to the Regional Spatial 
Strategy prepared for that area, and that the CS should comprise a 
spatial vision and strategic objectives for the area, a spatial strategy, core 
policies, and a monitoring and implementation framework with clear 
objectives for achieving delivery (para. 2.9) poses enormous challenges 
for both councillors and officers within local government. My research by 
means of a case study seeks to examine the manner in which the CS is 
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prepared and advanced, the extent to which councillors are involved in 
the process, the relationships with officers and the local community, and 
the political tensions that are generated by the mediation required to 
adopt a CS, prior to its examination by an independent Inspector. I 
explore the three research questions that I have identified, and I examine 
decision-making in depth in the Central Oxfordshire Sub- region. 
 
 A clearer understanding of the role of ideological and other ideas and 
values that influence spatial planning will help all those involved to 
understand better the evolution of policy and practice and the changing 
direction that  is now taking place This examination provides an 
opportunity to consider the role of representative democracy in spatial 
planning, which has evolved through a state – centred model focussed on 
welfare delivery and support for a mixed economy to what some 
academics see as a new mode of governance, which recognises the 
multiplicity of ways which link citizens, business and state, and that 
representative democracy is recognised as absolutely necessary but not 
sufficient in itself to respond to the complexity of the issues facing 
contemporary political communities ( Healey 2011). Inevitably in a subject 
of a political nature there are ethical issues involved. Full consideration is 
given to the six key principles of ethical research that the ESRC expects 
to be addressed, and in devising the questionnaire and the interviews to 
be conducted, the confidentiality and anonymity of respondents is 
respected. 
 
Research Questions and conceptual framework 
 
The planning system has a critical role to play in mediating between 
different interests. The over – arching research question is how and to 
what extent do local elected members exercise political leadership where 
spatial strategies are contested. The secondary questions or independent 
variables are: 
In formulating this role are councillors influenced by any of the following 
factors: a) their membership (or not) of a political party and its manifesto 
and objectives. 
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b) their length of time as a member of the Council and their 
responsibilities within the Council. 
c) their involvement in the issues and events associated with : i) their 
electoral ward and ii) the wider community. 
 
An associated issue is their relationship with officers and to what extent 
councillors depend on officers` advice. 
 
The Central Oxfordshire Growth Sub – region 
 
This area was first identified in the draft South East Regional Spatial 
Strategy published in 2004 and stretches from Bicester in the north with 
Oxford City at its centre to Wallingford and Didcot in the south and west 
(Plan 1). Hitherto for more than forty years Oxford ringed by a Green Belt 
and its hinterland had been categorised as a area of restraint in a 
succession of regional plans. I have experience of the sub – region both 
professionally as a consultant town planner based in the area and as a 
local politician 1997 – 2007. In Central Oxfordshire there are pressures 
for additional housing and employment development around Oxford that 
have been supported by an independent panel (2007). The riparian 
councils, which were then governed either by the Conservatives or the 
Liberal Democrats, opposed expansion of the city, which is Labour 
controlled. The city is surrounded by a Green Belt, the majority of which 
is located in the riparian council areas. For thirty years the urban 
containment of Oxford has been an approved objective of national, 
regional and local planning, and the recommendations of the panel 
represented a significant shift in planning policy that was opposed by 
many councillors in the area. 
 
Key findings, claims and conclusions 
 
I would summarise these as follows: 
 
a)  De-politicisation in local government  
Although councillors welcomed greater collaboration with stakeholders, 
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there was nonetheless, particularly amongst junior councillors, a desire to 
ensure that their political role was not minimised. The need to prepare 
and adopt a Core Strategy for a district council had, on the one hand, 
encouraged the collaborative approach, but on the other had politicised 
policy and plan making to a significantly new degree. My main finding is 
that the Core Strategy is a clear expression of the aims of the Council 
and its ruling group.  
 
b)  Core Strategies as expressions of political aspirations for the district   
The Leader of South Oxfordshire District Council, who was also a 
member of the Local Enterprise Partnership and the County Spatial 
Planning and Infrastructure Planning Liaison Group (SPIP) had a clear 
idea of the Core Strategy as a document setting out the political vision for 
the future development of the district. This, together with collaboration 
with other councils and agencies, involved senior officers and members, 
and it was difficult to engage backbenchers in policy formulation. There 
was likely to be an increased emphasis on economic development, and 
within the council senior management was trying to re-focus professional 
planners to become more aware of the overall activities of the council, 
and not just development control.  
 
c)  Do councillors welcome the opportunities afforded by the Localism Act 
to determine their own requirements for housing and employment within 
the district?  
From the questionnaire results we have seen the support for this 
approach, and a number of interviews (Appendix 1) revealed support and 
evidenced concern that Sub-regional targets had been too prominent in 
the production of the Core Strategy. Evidently localism in Oxford had 
proved uncomfortable for the political leadership of the Council: “They are 
over-influenced by local people”. The new approach was welcomed by a 
local developer who thought the “area committees were very parochial 
and inexperienced, and lost a lot of appeals”.  
d) In addition to membership of the planning committee, are there               
opportunities for councillors to become involved in “place- making” ? 
Senior councillors had more confidence in the opportunities to be 
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involved in place making, but overall nearly all councillors were positive 
about these opportunities. Junior councillors were slightly more emphatic 
that councillors should still be those who should make the major planning 
decisions, but were also more positive about playing a collaborative role 
in bringing stakeholders together. For the Leaders it could hopefully 
empower councillors who otherwise might either not become engaged in 
policy formulation, or alternatively challenge it.  
 
e)  Councillors are the people who should make the major decisions, and 
collaboration with stakeholders  
Councillors are supportive of a more collaborative role, but the junior 
councillors particularly are also concerned to ensure that their traditional 
role as decision makers in planning is not diminished. Senior members, 
through their involvement in external organisations and consortia, already 
play a collaborative, role and it is in this way that these agencies exert 
their influence on the councils.  
 
f)  Community Leadership  
The most pronounced difference in attitudes between senior and junior 
councillors was evident in their responses to this issue. Junior councillors 
indicated both their willingness to go against their party’s policies and 
their wish for a more flexible approach to Local Plan policies. This follows 
a familiar pattern noted by Gyford (1984)) who cites Newton (1974) who 
found that the delegate role appealed particularly to the member for a 
marginal ward, whilst trustees were more likely to come from safe wards.  
 
g)  The value of the preparation of Core Strategies within the planning 
system  
There were significant differences between junior and senior councillors 
in their perception of the helpfulness or otherwise of the Core Strategy 
system and the opportunity to contribute. For a number of ward 
councillors the process had been particularly difficult. Chairmanship of 
the Council meetings had also been difficult. For both Oxford City Council 
and the South Oxfordshire District Council, the preparation and adoption 
of their Core Strategy had pre-occupied them for more than five years. 
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Such a protracted process invites all sorts of dangers, particularly that of 
being overtaken by events.  
 
h)  Institutional mechanisms for local authority and public agency 
collaboration  
The Leader of the South Oxfordshire District Council referred to a number 
of cross-boundary issues affecting the District and, given the 
geographical context of the District, this is hardly surprising. For the 
South Oxfordshire Sub-region there are now institutional mechanisms in 
place. For their effectiveness these rely heavily on collaboration between 
the political leaders and, other than Oxford City, these all now come from 
the same political party.   
 
The Organisation of the Thesis 
 
Following this introduction the chapters are organised as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 The Literature Review 
Reviews the literature on the role of the councillor in local government 
and the three dimensions that influence this role. This is to be explored 
through an examination of the spatial planning system. 
 
Chapter 3 Research Methodology and Design 
Details the design of the study, the qualitative methods used, the 
analytical approach, the measures taken to ensure rigour and the ethical 
issues faced. 
 
 
Chapter 4 The emergence of a growth agenda in the Central Oxfordshire 
Sub-region 
Provides a profile of the study area using census and demographic 
information as well as social, historical and cultural information, together 
with a review of the local party political structure. 
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Chapter 5 The evolution of the South Oxfordshire Core Strategy and the 
associated political and governance issues  
Describes the evolution of the strategy through a series of iterations 
including initial officer involvement, public consultation, responses of 
stakeholders and progression through scrutiny committee, cabinet and 
full council and the political and governance issues associated with this. 
The interviews and questionnaire analysis of councillors are summarised 
and some reflections on this material are presented. 
 
Chapter 6 Reflections on the three research questions 
Draws out and synthesises the key themes emerging from the case study 
and sets out what the case study of the Central Oxfordshire Sub – region 
tells us about the key research questions set out in the literature review. 
 
Chapter 7 Conclusions 
Discusses the key conclusions, develops some practical and policy 
recommendations from this study, looks at the limitations of this study, its 
contribution to knowledge and the body of academic literature and future 
areas for research. 
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Chapter 2 The Literature Review  
 
Introduction 
 
Three dimensions were identified in Chapter 1 that influenced the role of 
local councillors in local government, and these are to be explored 
through an examination of the spatial planning system. There has been 
considerable debate about this research subject and five broad themes 
were identified that help to illuminate the overarching subject of the role 
of the councillor in local government. These are: a) the changing 
relationship between government and governance in local government, b) 
the role of political parties in local government, c) the differing roles of 
councillors in local government, d) the administrative reform sought in 
local government by national government, usually referred to as “ 
modernising “ and e) the move towards a more collaborative approach to 
place- making.  
 
The purpose of this literature review is to explore the significant amount 
of academic literature and research that exists so as to present a 
contemporary assessment of the understanding of the role of the 
councillor in spatial planning, and to what extent the existing research 
and literature fully explains the range of forces, that can pull in different 
directions, and which influence the councillor’s role in the specific field of 
spatial planning. Furthermore to what extent academic literature has 
examined the role of the political party in local government and its 
influence on the role of the councillor. At the outset some reflections are 
required on the relationship between government and governance in local 
government.  
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a) The changing relationship between government and governance 
in local government 
 
Changing views towards local government 
 
As Walker (2008) has pointed out, local government in England 
traditionally undertakes activities on behalf of central government; it does 
not possess power over its own affairs and this situation contrasts with 
the majority of European systems where local government has power 
under the doctrine of general competence and is less subject to 
interference from the centre, provided that they are able to undertake 
their functions. In England local government is an agent of central 
government and its roles and responsibilities change over time reflecting 
political changes and the political objectives of the central government. 
Chandler (2010) submits that current justifications for local government in 
the country are expediential in that they consider the value of local 
government largely in the context of how the institution can contribute to 
the better governance of the nation as a whole, rather than providing a 
rationale for the presence of local government per se. 
 
There has been a wide- ranging academic debate about the factors that 
have contributed to this particular framework for local government in 
England. Finch (2007) suggests that during its years in power New 
Labour remained undecided on the future shape of local government 
reform in England. Decentralised government had been realised in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland but in England, other than London, 
progress on devolution had been very limited. The emphatic “no vote“ in 
the 2004 North East elected assembly referendum ended any realistic 
early prospect of elected regional government in England, and Finch 
identifies a number of barriers to devolution. The first has been the 
centrist tendencies of governing parties and those of the civil service, as 
well as concerns about the capacity of local government. The second 
relates to political ideologies. Within New Labour there has been the view 
that the pursuit of equality requires a strong centre and equality cannot 
be delivered by local government, whilst Goss (2001) suggests that 
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during the 1980s local government was perceived by the Conservatives 
as being nothing more than an “executive“ or administrative arm of 
central government. The third issue is the amount of disconnection with 
the public. Despite wanting a greater voice in how services and local 
councils are run, the public appear switched off by the local government 
debate. Fourthly, the opposition of the Treasury, which is concerned that 
local revenue – raising powers would compromise the overall fiscal 
picture.  
 
This paradox has been resolved, Skelcher asserts (2004), through the 
empirical and normative stance that there has been (and should be) a 
move from local government to local governance. Local government is 
conceptualised in terms of a politico – bureaucratic apparatus that 
dominates the public policy space and service delivery experience of 
citizens. Local governance in contrast, expresses the notion that councils 
should “steer“  rather than “ row “. Finch  (2007) describes how under 
New Labour power has been transferred to local institutions such as 
schools, hospital trusts, housing bodies and community regeneration 
partnerships, outside the traditional channels of local government, but 
has not delivered a radical shift of power from the centre to localities, 
especially for key functions such as economic development, transport 
and skill training. 
 
Therefore a key concern in the study of local politics has become 
governance, which Stoker (2000) suggests can be broadly defined as a 
concern with governing, achieving collective action in the realm of public 
affairs, in conditions where it is not possible to rest on recourse to the 
authority of the state. Governance involves working across boundaries 
within the public sector or between the public sector and private or 
voluntary sectors. 
 
The system of local governance that has emerged in the last decades is 
very important as part of the context within which the role of councillors 
needs to be understood, and therefore in this chapter the debates 
concerning local governance are reviewed so as to understand better the 
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role of elected councillors in local government. Local governance as a 
process through which a range of organisations are involved in the 
running of local areas has attracted considerable attention in recent years 
as part of an overall discussion of governance in a context where the 
capacity of state government to plan, fund and manage social, economic 
and environmental change has diminished, and the role and function of 
local government to plan locally and deliver local services has been 
eroded (Sweeting 2005). Stoker (1998) has argued that the use of the 
term governance signifies a change in the meaning of government, 
referring to a new process of governing; or a changed condition of 
ordered rule.  
 
 
With this interest in governance has come in tandem a concern for public 
scrutiny. The Centre for Public Scrutiny asserts (2013) that this is an 
essential part of ensuring that government remains effective and 
accountable. Public scrutiny can be defined as the activity by one elected 
or appointed organisation examining and monitoring all or part of the 
activity of a public sector body with the aim of improving the quality of 
public services. Scrutiny ensures that executives are held accountable for 
their decisions, that their decision – making process is clear and 
accessible to the public and that there are opportunities for the public and 
their representatives to influence and improve public policy. 
 
The shift from local government to local governance  
 
This shift has specific implications for the role of local councillors. One 
implication is that it reinforces the role of councillors as community 
leaders, discussed later, and their responsibility to represent the interests 
of constituents within the broader networks of governance. There is also 
a view (Goss 2005) that governance and the associated 
institutionalisation of partnership working through Local Strategic 
Partnerships (LSPs) leads to de-politicisation of local government in that 
representatives from other public organisations or the voluntary or 
business sectors are intolerant of party politicking in partnerships. This 
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point overlaps with the growing phenomenon of managerialism that is 
also discussed later.  Murdoch & Abram (2002) provide a wide ranging 
discussion of governance and its implications for spatial planning. They 
characterise the debate that follows from the participation of various 
interests in planning processes as a contest between discourses of 
“development” and “environment”. In the context of planning for housing, 
there is a wide range of interests, programmes, policies and proposals 
that seek to assert a developmental agenda, whilst on the other hand 
there are a number of actors and interests that push an environmentalist 
or protectionist agenda. 
 
In making an assessment, planning is not neutral: it has its own goals, 
policies and modes of operation. The authors examine how the two 
discourses have been framed by government. During the 1980s the 
system was streamlined by the Thatcher Conservative governments in 
the hope that it could become more responsive to the market, thereby 
emphasising the system’s inherent “developmentalism”. However in 
response to a groundswell of opposition that emerged against this more 
market-led approach, a gradual strengthening of planning took place, so 
that by the end of the 1990s environmental protection was once again a 
key concern. At the present time, the balance between developmental 
and environmental considerations is to be achieved through the pursuit of 
“sustainable” development.  
 
Some theoretical guidelines  
 
This concept of governance has emerged in political science in order to 
account for a move away from the top-down, bureaucratic styles of policy 
making associated with “government”. Recent studies of the policy 
process have recognised that, in the formulation and implementation of 
policy, the state’s various agencies may be loosely co-ordinated so that 
policy emerges from a variety of governmental sites. Analysts of the 
policy process have thus begun to adopt a multi-agency perspective in 
order to uncover how the various policy actors both co-ordinate their 
actions and compete with one another. This has led to an interest in both 
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“policy networks” – that is, the coalitions between actors (Rhodes, 1997) 
– and “multi-level governance” – that is, the way policy ties together the 
different tiers of the state (Marks, 1996). In short, the “governance” 
perspective sees political action emerging from a host of governmental 
and non-governmental agencies (Goodwin, 1998; Stoker, 1998).  
 
According to Goodwin (1998) “governance” now refers to the complex set 
of institutions and actors that are drawn from within, but also beyond, 
government in the process of policy formulation and implementation. The 
term thus suggests a blurring of boundaries and responsibilities between 
state and non-state actors, and a recognition that the capacity to get 
things done does not rest solely on the power of government authority 
(see also Stoker, 2000). Thus, old-style government - that is top-down, 
hierarchical decision-making in the context of the policy process – is 
thought to be much less effective in carrying through state programmes 
and policies, and it gives way to a form of policy making that works 
through networks and partnerships.  
 
The governance literature stems from a number of (not always 
commensurate) theoretical positions (see Vigor et. al. 2000 for an 
alternative review to that provided below). Smith (2000) mentions two as 
being of particular interest: policy network analysis and the advocacy 
coalition framework. As Smith shows, both of these theoretical 
perspectives emphasise the importance of inter-organisational 
relationships within policy sectors. 
 
Policy network analysis  
 
This assumes that “policy making” is sectoralized and takes place within 
networks of public and private actors (Smith, 2000, p 76). This approach 
places these networks on a continuum, one that extends from tightly-knit 
“policy communities” - which contain a limited number of well-resourced 
members enjoying a common appreciative system and exhibiting regular 
interaction and exchange between members (Smith, 2000, p 97) – to 
loosely aligned “issue networks” - where “membership encompasses a 
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wide range of interests even though members may have limited 
resources” (Ibid). The differing network types impact upon policy in 
different ways and ensure that quite different policy formulation and 
implementation processes exist within any given political formulation 
(John, 1998). 
 
Advocacy Coalition 
 
This approach also examines the structure of governance systems, but 
points to shared beliefs and policy- orientated learning processes as the 
salient features of political coalitions. Smith (2000, p98) summarises the 
position where policy making occurs in a policy sub-system inhabited by 
several multi-actor advocacy coalitions which compete to influence policy 
in line with the policy beliefs which bind each coalition together, and 
which is a relatively open and competitive process between belief 
systems. Theories of “governance” hold that the state has shifted from 
being both the formulator and deliverer of policy; it is now an 
“orchestrator” (or “conductor”) of networks. While state agencies may 
arbitrate over policy, they can only act in relations with others.  
 
Governmentality 
 
Foucault (1991) used the term to refer to the collective ways of thinking 
that underpin particular governmental strategies and the means by which 
such strategies are implemented. Foucault believed that the state can 
only govern in and through networks and coalitions. 
 
Miller and Rose (1990, p 6) argue that the governmentality approach 
allows government to be analysed as the composite of differing practices 
and discourses. Firstly political rationalities are the field of statements, 
claims and prescriptions that set out the objects and objectives of 
government. These are accompanied by the production of discursive 
matrices that define a common vocabulary and thus specify the 
appropriate bases for the organisation and mobilisation of social and 
political actors. What distinguishes governmentality from the policy 
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network and advocacy coalition frameworks is the emphasis it places on 
a second aspect of political network building- the mechanisms or 
technologies which permit discourses to be stabilised in particular sets of 
political relations (Dean, 1999; Rose, 1999). In sum, governmentality 
describes the means by which government both “represents” and 
“intervenes” in the world (Hacking, 1981). 
 
Murdoch and Abram are drawn to this approach because it seems that 
key modes of governmentality are instrumental in linking together the 
various tiers of the planning hierarchy. Policy can be characterised as 
subject to a constant struggle between, on the one hand, the construction 
of tightly regulated networks that permit central agencies to determine the 
actions of all network members, and, on the other, loosely connected 
agencies that reshape policy in line with their own locally constructed 
preferences. And in planning this struggle emerges not just around the 
powers to be attributed to the various governmental tiers, but also around 
the amount of spatial sensitivity to be permitted in the system.  
 
If there is now a baseline agreement that governance refers to the 
development of governing styles in which boundaries between and within 
public and private sectors have become blurred and that the value of the 
governance perspective rests in its capacity to provide a framework for 
understanding changing processes of governing, then this trajectory 
contrasts strongly with the system of local government that emerged after 
the end of the Second World War and within which the town and country 
planning system introduced by the Labour Government in 1947 has been 
so firmly embedded. Therefore it is appropriate to review these 
developments so as to gain a perspective on the degree of change now 
envisaged. 
 
Central – Local relations and Changes to local government in the last 
decades 
In England from the end of the Second World War to the 1970`s 
education and housing dominated local authority budgets but in addition 
local authorities had responsibilities for refuse collection, environmental 
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health , county and local planning, transport, personal social services, 
and leisure as well as fire and police services. These services were 
administered by committees, and the committee system was the 
dominant organising principle for local government from the mid – 
nineteenth century until the reforms of New Labour from 2000 onwards. It 
ensured that all members were formally involved in decision- making 
through their membership of committees. From at least the 1930`s until 
the mid 1970`s this decentralised form of political management Snape 
(2004) suggests was shaped by the forces of functionalism, 
professionalism of officers and departmentalism. In this way committee 
structures usually reflected the major services delivered by authorities 
and the dominance of key professionals in shaping the boundaries of 
their functions and departments. In town and country planning well 
resourced and powerful, professional, planning departments emerged 
that survived relatively unscathed until 2000, and which have had a major 
impact on the growth and shape of development across England. Murie 
(2004), Bulpitt (1983) and Rhodes (1988) suggest that in the 1960`s a “ 
dual policy “ emerged whereby central government concentrated on 
managing the economy and foreign affairs and set broad parameters for 
local administration leaving the detail to be worked out and delivered by 
local authorities. However the publication of the Maud Report in 1969 and 
the Bains Report in 1972, and the catalyst of reorganisation in 1974, 
produced a trend towards streamlining committees at the same time as 
strengthening the corporate centre through the creation of policy and 
resource committees.  
 
The Layfield Report on Local Government Finance published in 1976 
argued that a choice had to be made between a system of local 
government finance based on local responsibility, and hence local 
accountability, for local government expenditure, and one based on 
central responsibility. If the choice were for local accountability, then it 
was necessary for local authorities to be responsible to their electorate 
for local taxation to fund the greater part of local government expenditure. 
The report suggested that to sustain local democracy there was a need to 
enlarge the share of local taxation in total local revenue and make 
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councillors more directly accountable to local electorates for their 
expenditure and taxation decisions, and this could be achieved by a local 
income tax. Jones & Stewart (2002) suggest that despite the relentless 
flow of consultation papers, the nature of the Central – Local relations 
has still not been tackled and the main recommendations of the Layfield 
Report and its analysis have been ignored by all governments. 
 
Although there has been criticism that the changes to local governance 
expressed as a series of epochs risks oversimplification, there is a 
general agreement in the relevant literature that the 1970’s was 
characterised by a hierarchical mode of governance based on large 
monopolistic public agencies, local authorities and government 
departments. As we have seen a number of reports appeared at this time 
that stressed the need for improved managerial efficiency and 
effectiveness within larger authorities. These proposals were part of a 
wider programme of state - backed social and economic modernisation, 
shared by governments of both parties. 
 
Towards the end of the decade recession and the slowdown of economic 
growth weakened the post-war consensus and opened the way for new 
political and economic ideas to emerge. The 1980’s were characterised 
by the internal reorganisation of the public sector along quasi - market 
lines in tune with the Thatcherite political agenda and the emergence of 
new rules for private business as a supplier of public services. The 
emphasis in local government shifted away from the provision of services 
towards a new role of service enablers. This function involved 
encouraging outside organisations normally from the private and 
voluntary sectors to become involved in service delivery, with a 
consequent reduction in local authority operations. Changes such as thus 
shifted the emphasis away from day- to- day involvement in the delivery 
of services towards a role in overseeing service provision. Town and 
Country planning was still represented in local government by large 
professionally led departments, responsible to a regulatory committee, 
but reflecting these changes, there was increased use of consultants. 
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The 1990’s and continuing through to the present day are characterised 
by modes of governance that link public, private, community and 
voluntary sectors, which Tony Blair when leader of New Labour, using a 
phrase originally employed by Anthony Giddons (1998), called a “third 
way“. From 1997 until its electoral defeat in 2010, the New Labour 
administration in England had been enthusiastically committed to what 
Blair called “joined up government.  
 
In conclusion, over this period since the 1970`s there was a movement 
towards centralisation marked by the growth of control over local 
government expenditure, the intensification of intervention in the internal 
working of local authorities and the removal of functions from local 
authorities to bodies responsible to central government. 
 
What were the objectives behind these changes and what were the 
outcomes? Leat, Seltzer & Stoker (1999) concluded that the 1990’s did 
see a real improvement in the quality of management, important 
advances in the measurement of costs and outputs and some efficiency 
savings, but that these gains were bought at a high price. The authors 
point out that the first job of government is not to administer transactions 
but to solve problems. The problems that people care about are not 
defined or shaped in the same way in which departments and agencies 
are. Real problems fall between the gaps and people get shunted 
between agencies that are trying to manage budgets rather than tackle 
problems. The authors conclude that the reforms of this Thatcherite era 
exacerbated the scale of poor co-ordination and the dumping of costs 
and problems. 
 
Other researchers have pointed to the need for changes to be monitored 
over a longer period of time. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2004) point out that 
the full benefits of major changes in the processes and structures of 
public agencies normally cannot be obtained until several years after a 
reform programme has been launched. They point to the discrepancy 
between the politician’s need for “something to show now“and the 
organisation reformer’s need for time, commitment and continuity. This 
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interest in participatory governance recognises that community can make 
valuable contributions to governance, but attempts to strengthen 
community participation encounter obstacles theorised as failures or 
incompleteness of participatory governance. The research suggests a 
need to rethink participatory governance, not as a single process with 
multiple participants, but as the juxtaposition of different ways of 
governing.  
 
The governance literature stems from a number of not always 
commensurate theoretical positions. We have considered two as being of 
particular interest: policy network analysis and the advocacy coalition 
framework. As Smith has (2000) shown, both these theoretical 
perspectives emphasise the importance of inter - organisational 
relationships within policy sectors. In assessing the significance of the 
governance approach for planning theory, Vigor et. al. (2000) propose 
that it has led to the development of an “institutionalist“ perspective where 
stakeholders come together to discuss the meaning and shape of policy, 
and that planning strategies can be developed which reflect their 
aspirations. Vigor et al (2000) explicitly link this “institutionalist“ 
perspective to a more territorially - sensitive form of planning. The 
objective is to enable disparate actors in dispersed governance contexts 
to come together to build consensus around difficult local and 
development issues. However Vigor suggests the current structure of the 
planning system, until legislative changes are approved, works against 
such a shift, because of the continuing power of vertical relations. A 
significant influence on these are the political parties in local government.  
 
b) The role of political parties in local government  
 
Until the 1970`s much of local politics was non - partisan in the sense that 
many councillors did not represent political parties (Bochel 2000), and in 
addition there were substantial numbers of uncontested divisions. 
However reorganisation in 1974 prompted a step change in the party 
politicisation of local government (Holliday 2000).  Gyford (1989) 
summarises the long-term process of what is known as the party 
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politicisation of local government, identifying five distinct changes, and 
the fifth “reappraisal” from 1974 onwards. Jones (1983) identified four 
“broad types” of local political systems:”non- party”, “partially party”, 
“emergent party” and “wholly party” systems. He highlights the 
importance of the political party to the process of bonding councillors 
together and for focusing their loyalty in a specific direction – that of the 
group itself. In addition, the financial squeeze imposed on local councils 
by national governments from the mid 1970s onwards meant that hard 
choices had to be made about service cuts, rather than service growth 
which had hitherto been the post - war norm.  
 
One of the few recommendations from the 1986 Widdicombe Report on 
local government councillors that the Thatcher government chose to 
legislate on was for the formation of political groups and their 
proportionate representation on committees in local government. The 
relationship between national and local political parties also has a bearing 
on the role of councillors. National parties may wish to influence-or, in 
extremis, control – the activities of a local council party group (Hall & 
Leach 2000) for two primary reasons: policy and procedure. In relation to 
the former, the national party will be concerned about party groups that 
are clearly flouting national party priorities, through omission as wall as 
commission. In understanding intra- party relationships it is helpful to 
bear in mind the distinction between three concepts of democracy (and 
accountability) .At the local level there is the familiar tension between 
representative democracy, which underpins the legitimacy of the party 
group on council, and delegate democracy that underpins the legitimacy 
of the local party to mandate the party group. Both these concepts have 
been challenged by a growing interest in and commitment to participatory 
democracy, which is manifest in a concern to develop a wide range of 
ways of involving local stakeholders, through greater use of public – 
private sector partnerships, decentralised decision – making committees 
and similar devices. 
 
Contributions made by Gyford (1989), Bulpitt (1967) and Jones (1983) 
throw light on the development of the party group as generating a loyalty-
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demanding pull on the councillor’s representative activities. Jones noted 
that the party group filled the vacuum left by the absence of a political 
executive in British local government and came to be seen as “the place 
where council decisions were taken”. With political executives now a 
reality in local government, the party group fills the vacuum between that 
executive and the rest of the majority party, and remains the place where 
council decisions are made. When it comes to acting as a representative, 
the councillor is confronted by at least three separate and distinct 
demands on his or her focus and loyalty: the party group, the wider party 
and the citizens of the electoral area.  
 
Whilst political parties do rest on networks of influence and 
communication, they are also the setting within which a number of what 
may be termed kindreds exist and operate; these consist of groups or 
closely associated party people drawn together by some shared political 
agenda or beliefs. They serve to disrupt the working of local political 
parties.  
 
Each political party displays a distinctive approach to local government. 
As at Westminster the party manifesto provides a legitimisation for 
subsequent action and the expectation in public arenas of group loyalty to 
party policy. However it is only in the Labour Party `s constitution (Leach 
2004) that the right of the local party (as opposed to the party groups on 
council) to draw up the manifesto has been established. There is no 
parallel right in the Conservative Party constitution, nor in that of the 
Liberal Democrats, who however are much more likely to consult widely 
with local party members in drawing up a manifesto. Holliday (2004) has 
examined the record of the Conservative Party in local government 1979 
– 1997 and identified three doctrines that have characterised their 
approach. These are “apoliticism” in that politics should not be allowed to 
intrude in local matters and that councils should focus on prudent 
administration rather than on political conflict. This tradition is most 
observed in suburban and rural areas where memories of social 
leadership by a local elite have not been entirely forgotten. “Mainstream 
Conservatism “espouses the party loyalty which is such an important part 
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of the parliamentary party. “ Radicalism“is explicitly political in that it holds 
political change to be essential to the realisation of vision, but is not 
Mainstream Conservatism because it is not incremental, consensual or 
reliably loyal. Holliday comments that by the mid 1990`s many 
Conservative councillors were only too ready to pin responsibility for the 
collapse of party representation at local level on a party hierarchy which 
was not interested in local government even, in some cases, when it had 
direct experience of it. 
 
Local elections determine who controls local authorities and this remains 
important despite the erosion of the powers of local government over the 
past two decades or so. Political control of councils can affect how well 
services are delivered and the policies pursued at local level. Local 
elections are central to the health of local democracy and are the 
mechanism by which the electorate can hold local representatives 
accountable and provide a channel for political participation in local 
affairs on the part of ordinary voters. They also often reflect wider trends 
in politics such as the pattern of contestation and competition and the 
comparative performance of the political parties. Rallings,Thrasher and 
Denver (2005) have examined trends in local elections in Britain and 
concluded that in urban areas party politics had evolved long before 
reorganisation in 1974 but elsewhere , particularly in the English shires, 
Scotland and Wales, changes to the local government structure appeared 
to offer opportunities for national parties to extend their influence at the 
local level, which has increased competition and challenge and promoted 
electoral choice. 
 
Vecchio (2000) draws attention to the characteristics of political leaders 
who are elected, not selected, and their authority is as a representative 
who governs with consent. Their authority is also frequently under threat, 
whether from within their own party (if elected on that basis), from 
opposition members, from the electorate, or from other agencies (eg: the 
media). Challenges from one or more of these bodies can mean that 
political leaders lose their authority overnight; consequently they are 
continuously engaged in having to win and maintain support through 
   
 43 
mobilising coalitions. This is a far cry from leaders in the private sector 
who are appointed, rather than elected, often with a clear command 
structure. Moore (1995) points out that leadership by local politicians 
involves both a service role, and a regulatory role that further complicates 
leadership roles. 
 
From 1979 to 1997 the Conservative Government, determined to ensure 
that local politicians were kept within a tightly controlled financial 
framework, reformed the funding system to provide central government 
with a considerable, which Coulson (2004) maintains is unprecedented, 
level of control over spending. Local authorities were required to work in 
partnership with other public and private agencies in carrying out their 
functions. The Labour Government 1997 - 2010 took more interest in the 
performance of local councils in the delivery of their core services than 
any previous government (Coulson 2004), and the Audit Commission 
was required to grade councils on their performance, which provided 
powerful incentives for councils to improve the performance of any poor 
or weak services, which in many councils included the planning service. 
The Labour Government introduced the cabinet or executive system to 
local government which meant that other councillors would serve on 
Overview and Scrutiny Committees (intended both to hold the executives 
to account and to review and develop policy), Regulatory Committees 
(taking quasi-judicial decisions with regard to planning proposals, licence 
applications, or environmental health) or Area Committees which would 
be given delegated powers to take decisions appertaining to specific local 
areas. We will review these roles subsequently but the Labour 
Government, despite its apparent support for local government 
councillors, also invested heavily in quangos and government agencies. 
Sullivan and Skelcher (2002) estimate that there were at least 5,500 
quangos in 2001, with more board members in total than there are 
elected councillors, and pointed out that this raised profound issues about 
how they were accountable, and how open to the public and to scrutiny. 
 
Leach (2010) examined the Comprehensive Performance Assessment 
(CPA) process introduced in the wake of the Local Government Act 2000, 
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which was in essence a managerial tool applied to a political 
environment. This analysis reveals a degree of political naivety and a 
failure to recognise the differences between political and managerial 
logic. The role of the CPA process in contributing to the government-led 
pressures for de-politicisation of local decision-making is examined, with 
a particular concern about the substitution of “the good of the area” for 
the different priorities and visions of different parties.  
 
Bochel (H) and Bochel (C) point out (2010) that political leadership has 
been a key element of central government’s attempts to “modernise” local 
government over the past decade, within a discourse that emphasised 
“strong” and “visible” leadership, and the role of leaders and leadership in 
driving change within local authorities. The research suggests that whilst 
there is a broad convergence between the aspirations of government and 
the narratives that emerge from these leaders on some aspects of local 
political leadership, there are also differences, perhaps most notably over 
the relationship between changes to decision-making structures and the 
loci of political power.  Research by Rallings et al (2010) suggests that 
the recruitment networks used by parties are relatively closed, with many 
candidates reporting prior experience as local party office holders or as 
members of charitable organisations and local public bodies.  
 
Leach and Copus (2004) examine the introduction, via the Local 
Government Act 2000, of political executives held to account by 
influential overview and scrutiny committees, which challenges 
fundamentally the traditional operations of the party political group 
system. The researchers concluded that the success of the overview and 
scrutiny experiment is by no means assured, and faced with the 
intransigent nature of most party group behaviour, the future of effective 
scrutiny hangs in the balance. However the increasing number of 
councils where no party has an overall majority could point to an 
increased role for scrutiny as chairmanship of the committees cannot be 
reserved for a single party. 
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Gyford (1984) had stressed the positive aspects of political parties in 
local government as representing genuine divergences of view, and 
giving coherence to the work of local authorities. They function as a 
means of political recruitment and election organisation, and they 
represent the demands and interests of differing social groups both 
organised and unorganised. Twenty years later Copus (2004) concluded 
that although the presence of parties had long been recognised as 
introducing new elements to local authority decision – making, what 
political parties do to local representation and wider local politics is less 
well understood .Moreover the role of the party group – the cohesive 
organisation of councillors from a single party – has received scant 
attention by comparison with that given to the political party generally. His 
research, which we will discuss later, strove to show that both party and 
the party group play an important and discrete part in the representative 
processes, interposing themselves between the electors and their 
representatives and generating their own distinctive claims to 
commitment. Vital to the interplay of politics locally is the fact that party 
members and councillors interpret representation and democracy 
differently from those they are elected to represent. They also have very 
distinct ideas about the role of the citizen and the party in local political 
activity and decision -making. 
 
Copus concluded that political parties have little or no loyalty to 
recognisable local communities as such. Rather they are concerned with 
capturing control of a council – a specific local government unit – the 
boundaries of which are more likely to be drawn for administrative 
convenience and to meet technocratic and managerial needs rather than 
reflect communities of place. The focus political parties have on capturing 
control of, or securing representation in any council chamber, results in 
the loosening of the bond between the councillor and the community and 
a strengthening of the ties between the councillor and his or her political 
party, for it is the party that can guarantee or withhold election to the 
council. This contrasts with Ostrogorski`s view that political parties should 
be replaced by single issue or multiple objective temporary bodies that 
seek to deal with a particular problem and then remove themselves from 
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the political arena. It introduces the notion of  “event – driven democracy “ 
recognising that local issues and events may energise the community, or 
sections of it, to seek an enhanced input into local political decision – 
making only episodically. 
 
Copus also touches on the question of autonomy. If political parties do 
have any meaningful role in the process of political decision – making, it 
is essential that the elected representative has some considerable 
autonomy from the electorate within his or her constituency. In Chapter 1 
a twofold typology of local government (Gurr and King 1987) was 
described: Type 1 Autonomy :Autonomy from local political, economic 
and social pressures and Type 2 Autonomy : Autonomy from central 
government. Hall (1993) suggests a definition of autonomy – the ability of 
local government to maximise its policy making powers and 
implementation capacities. It is important he continues to distinguish 
between local government autonomy and “localism“. Localism, which we 
will be reviewing subsequently in the context of new approaches to 
spatial planning, represents the means by which and the extent to which 
local authorities choose to exercise their residual autonomy. There is 
therefore, Hall suggests, a clear distinction between the two concepts, 
and that the autonomy of local government develops along two axes of 
influence: local and national factors but these are inter– related. As Gurr 
and King argue (1987) “The two dimensions of local state autonomy are, 
thus, closely related and it falls to the local state to formulate an effective 
set of public policies within the constraints each imposes.” This provides 
a useful model by which to evaluate the role of councillors and there is a 
cross reference to the earlier work of Gyford (1984) which is discussed in 
the next section where he found that the increasing seniority of local 
councillors allowed them a degree of autonomy from local ward 
influences. 
 
The concluding reflections of Copus (2004) on his research, after a long 
career as an academic, party member and local government councillor, 
are that local politics and local democracy are too valuable to be left to 
parties alone, and that party domination locally will not change without 
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parties being prepared to share political space, influence and power with 
those outside the world of party and with those who view politics with 
different perspectives and interpretations. These conclusions will find a 
resonance with those looking for a more collaborative approach to 
decision taking in place making, which we discuss later. 
 
c) The Differing Role of Councillors 
 
There is a large academic literature on the roles of local councillors (see, 
for example, Helco,1969; Dearlove,1973; and Newton 1976). In 
exercising his role the councillor has a number of options available to him 
in terms of how he performs in relation not merely towards his 
constituents, or towards the workload of the local authority, but also 
towards his party (if any), the local pressure groups, the officers and the 
community outside his particular ward (Gyford 1984). A number of 
attempts have been made to investigate and to summarise the wide 
variety of role orientations that a councillor may assume.  
 
Gyford (1984) attempted to draw these together and identified one 
general conclusion that did emerge from the various studies: that the 
choice of role orientation by councillors is not particularly associated with 
age, sex or social class, but rather with such factors as seniority and 
length of service on the council, the character of the councillor’s ward and 
party political allegiance.These orientations link with each other, forming 
“clusters” which provide differing emphases to the varying aspects of a 
councillor’s role. Gyford concluded that the available evidence supported 
the hypothesis that two internally consistent clusters of role orientations 
characterising junior and senior councillors could be identified, and he 
described these as the “tribune” and the “statesman”. Like other 
classifications, this is not wholly watertight, and individual councillors will 
not always fall into place within it, but my empirical research explores 
whether in terms of the preparation and adoption of the Core Strategy, 
this is a particularly helpful classification. Gyford set out a graphical 
presentation of these orientations, which is reproduced at Appendix 10. 
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      The columns show: 
 
Column 1:  Status, Senior or Junior, refers to the councillor’s length of 
service and also to the nature of that service, e.g. as back-bencher or 
chairman of a committee or officer of a party group. 
 
Column 2:  Ward Type distinguishes between wards where the 
incumbent may anticipate re-election and those where the contest is 
highly competitive. 
 
Column 3:  Style refers to the manner in which the councillor relates his 
own views to those he represents. The trustee is one who relies on his 
own sense of what is correct and just, the delegate accepts a mandate 
from his constituents regardless of his own views, whilst the politico may 
either adopt a combination of the other two styles or alternate between 
them (Eulau et. al., 1959, pp. 749- 51). 
 
Column 4:  ‘Focus’ distinguishes between the two communities to which 
the councillor owes his loyalties, the smaller unit of the ward or the larger 
local community as a whole. 
 
Column 5:  Distinguishes between three ways of serving constituents – 
the ‘welfare officer’ helping out with their problems; the communicator 
keeping them informed about official plans and proposals; and the mentor 
giving a lead on the issues of the day (Wahlke et al., 1962, pp. 304-8). 
 
Column 6:  In terms of dealing with local pressure groups, the councillor 
may befriend them, facilitate their access to authority, and even act as 
their spokesman, or conversely resist them, keep them at arms length, 
and adjudicate between their demands on the basis of his own 
perceptions of the public good. 
 
Columns 7, 8 & 9: These have to do with the distinction between 
checking decisions and making decisions: some councillors will act as 
watchdogs over the officers, taking up individual problems, over a wide 
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range of policy areas: others, after perhaps a period of single-service 
policy making, will be working with the officers on across-the-board policy 
issues in the role Lee (1963) calls the public person. 
 
Columns 10 & 11: These refer to how the councillor goes about acquiring 
his information, some of them searching it out often from external 
sources, others waiting for information from the official machine 
(Dearlove, 1973, ch. 9; Pate and Stephenson, 1979, pp.69-70). 
 
Finally, Columns 12 & 13 refer to the ideological zeal of the councillor and 
his degree of loyalty to party decisions. 
 
 A more contemporary view, but developing this earlier analysis, is that 
provided by Cole (2002) who examined the role of county councillors in 
Devon within the context of new structures of political management 
including executive and scrutiny committees introduced in the county in 
1999.Two areas of his work are relevant here. The first concerns ward 
representation and the second the role of party groups. A key role for 
councillors is the representation of their electoral division. Newton (1976) 
distinguished between trustees, delegates and politicos. Trustees 
regarded themselves as a “relatively free and independent agent who is 
elected to follow his or her own conscience”. In contrast delegates give 
“greater weight to the wishes and views of the electorate“ (Newton 1976: 
118). Politicos tried to balance delegate and trustee orientations. First - 
time councillors tended to endorse ward commitments more heavily than 
other councillors. Turning to party groups Cole (2002) points out that 
most local councillors in the country are elected under a party label and 
serve a local authority in which party groups have a major role in 
determining policy and the allocation of portfolios. The tensions between 
the roles of councillors as ward representatives and party politicians have 
been an important theme for much academic commentary. Clarke and 
Stewart (1998) commenting on the “Modernising Agenda “ in local 
government of New Labour suggest that community governance required 
councillors to focus attention on the “ communities of interest, 
background and concern“ and to assume “ an important role in 
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developing contacts and establishing forums with and for such 
communities.“  
 
Cole (2002) found public dissention from the party group position rare 
and often a reflection of the electoral realities of specific wards. Two 
councillors had been allowed by the group to oppose publicly the building 
of new settlements in their electoral divisions. One member admitted that 
the planned development was so unpopular that acquiescing to the party 
group position (which supported the developments) would have risked 
electoral defeat in both seats and jeopardised control of the authority. 
Such public opposition was dependant on the agreement of the whips 
and forbidden unless the leadership was sure that they retained majority 
support on the relevant issue. Opposition to the leadership’s policies was 
normally restricted to private meetings of the group. However the Cabinet 
or Executive structure of local government management, as opposed to a 
directly elected mayor, which allocates different portfolios to councillors 
can pose strains within the leadership. Subsequently we shall see how a 
portfolio holder responsible for the growth town in a district, with different 
views from those councillors who represent wards within the town, is 
forced to resign from the cabinet. Trying to reconcile the electoral realities 
of specific wards becomes a major challenge for the political party in 
control, and involves councillors from unaffected wards who may have to 
decide where their allegiance lies.  
 
Gains et al (2009) point out that the idea that leadership makes a 
difference is a truism in the study of urban politics, and the idea that 
leadership matters is well established as part of the legends of successful 
cities. What is less explored is how an institutional form may influence the 
style of leadership an organisation receives, and whether this in turn has 
an impact on organisational performance and on policy outcomes. Using 
evidence from English urban government they show in terms of 
organisational performance and citizen satisfaction stronger forms of 
leadership appear to deliver more than weaker forms. They also refer to 
the changes introduced in the Local Government and Public Involvement 
in Health Act 2007 that permitted council leaders to make decisions, 
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appoint their cabinet and choose the portfolios of their colleagues. These 
reforms however have not yet succeeded in transforming   political 
leadership from a concentration on internal structures of the council and 
drawing in citizens and stakeholders to the decision-making process. 
 
Local government has provided a recruiting ground for MPs for whom 
valuable experience in leadership and decision-making can develop. 
Around 40% of MPs in the 1997 - 2001 Parliament had had relatively 
recent experience as local councillors. (Leach 2004). Two years after its 
election victory, the Labour government published in March 1999 a paper 
on modernising local government. There was a generally held view at 
that time that local government was demoralised and lacking in ambition, 
and this was well articulated by commentators such as Jenkins 
subsequently (2006). Wide ranging change was proposed to the structure 
of local government including directly elected mayors, and a cabinet 
structure to replace traditional committees. 
 
Lee (1963) suggested that for a committed few at least, the attraction of 
local government lay in becoming part of an “inner ring “with chief officers 
enjoying their confidence in a complicated network of formal officer and 
member relationships. This tradition it has been argued has shaped a 
view of local authorities as responsible for spending local money rather 
than developing their own unique political and public policy solutions to 
local needs and issues (Copus 2004). 
 
Following a major review of the planning system by the government 
(2001) which led to the publication of a Green Paper on Planning, 
followed by the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004, a new 
approach to spatial planning was introduced in the form of a local 
development framework (LDF). The new spatial planning system is 
intended to go beyond traditional land use planning so as to bring 
together and integrate policies for the development and use of land with 
other policies and programmes which influence the nature of places and 
how they function. Advice to local planning authorities (2004) was that 
they should take account of the principles and characteristics of other 
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relevant strategies and programmes when preparing local development 
documents, and in particular the Core Strategy introduced within the LDF. 
 
However within this new governance, the role of councillors was 
questioned, and to speed up decision-making, the government 
encouraged authorities to delegate planning decisions to officers as far 
as practicable. This is only one example of the changes in governance 
taking place, but Manns and Wood (2002), who had carried out a survey 
of local authorities that had allowed the public to address the 
development control committees, described the critical role that these 
committees play in the British town and country planning system, by 
providing the opportunity for democratically elected councillors to 
scrutinise development proposals, balance a wide range of material 
factors and reach a decision. These committees provide a degree of local 
accountability and are the only point at which members of the public can 
physically witness and in some cases contribute their views in person to 
these decisions. Manns and Wood pointed to a tension in the planning 
process. On the one hand the government was keen to speed up the 
determination of planning applications to assist business interests and 
encourage investment. On the other, it wished to open up local 
government and make decision making more open, transparent and 
democratic. The authors thought these forces were pulling in opposite 
directions and they concluded in 2002 that indications then were that 
speed and efficiency may triumph over openness and accountability. 
 
In 2002 all local authorities in England and Wales had delegated decision 
- making powers from full council to some form of development control 
committee, and most delegated further powers to officers. At that time the  
“Best Value“ target of 70 per cent of decisions on planning applications to 
be dealt with under delegated powers to chief planning officers was the 
guide line, but some 90 percent of planning decisions was proposed for 
delegation in the 2001 Green Paper. The government indicated that local 
planning authorities that met these targets would receive a substantial 
amount of Planning Delivery Grant, and avoid intervention by the 
government. The cost of not meeting the targets was that the council was 
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considered to be an under -performer, and that the government had 
powers to intervene with measures for improvement. Consequently since 
2003 some 90 per cent of planning decisions are now mainly taken by 
officers in many councils. 
 
In addition there are other pressures that limit the discretion of councillors 
in the planning process. In recent years, a discourse has emerged 
amongst professional and business interests,that the spatial planning 
system, and particularly the local councillors who sit on the planning 
committees, are a brake on Britain improving its competitive position in 
the global economy, and that councillors take decisions in a negative and 
obstructive manner. The Barker (2006) Review of Planning 
commissioned by the Chancellor of the Exchequer was critical of the role 
of councillors, and advocated that training be made compulsory for 
councillors on planning committees. A further report (2007) from the 
Department of Communities and Local Government saw divergence 
between officers and elected members in their decisions on planning 
applications as a threat to the integrity of the planning system.  
 
Alternative views, particularly from the legal and political perspectives, 
are also expressed. The Committee on Standards In Public Life (1997) 
led by Lord Nolan, whilst looking at the whole spectrum of local 
government, specifically offered positive support to the role of councillors 
in planning decision- making, whilst a recent report of the House of 
Commons Committee on Communities and Local Government (2008) 
supported the role of councillors on the basis that the technical specialist 
can be challenged by a non - specialist, so that there are checks and 
balances and that the decisions being made reflect the needs and 
desires of the wider community. It was well summed up by the Committee 
in their report. “The system rests on the basis that the technical specialist 
can be challenged by a non – specialist, so that there are checks and 
balances and that the decisions being made reflect the needs and 
desires of the wider community.“ 
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The Nolan Report stimulated a strong debate on the role of councillors 
following its publication, and in 2001 Matthew Taylor (formerly a senior 
adviser to Tony Blair, and then Director of the Institute For Public Policy 
and now Chief Executive of the Royal Society of Arts), and Paul Wheeler, 
Head of Member Development at the Improvement and Development 
Agency, published a pamphlet, echoing Bernard Cricks` “ In Defence Of 
Politics”,  published forty years earlier, and entitled  “In Defence of 
Councillors”. Taylor and Wheeler asserted that successive governments 
have minimised the capacity of councillors to make decisions or wield 
power. As well as the executive reforms in the 2000 Local Government 
Act, the government has on the one hand tied up local authorities in a 
web of central regulations, targets and inspections, whilst on the other 
hand it has removed local authority functions and set up new bodies to 
drive priorities such as neighbourhood renewal, and a variety of action 
zones. In addition there is the emergence of the quango state in which 
local decisions are made by executives and non – executives appointed 
by central government. The critique of councillors tends to focus on two 
managerial attributes said to be lacking in councillors, namely impartiality 
and expertise. It is argued that while the decisions made by councillors 
would be clouded by political ambition, inflexible beliefs, and internecine 
conflicts, the judgement of managers is evidence based, objective and 
disinterested. Councillors are seen as part-time amateurs, while 
managers are seen as full - time professionals. 
 
Taylor and Wheeler maintain that there are two main expressions of the 
rise of managerialism. These are a consumerist approach to service 
delivery, and the requirements of Best Value targets together with the 
greater use of external management consultants. There is clearly a case 
for managerialism, for councillors not to be taking detailed operational 
decisions or using irrelevant or inappropriate political criteria to determine 
the allocation of local resources. However, much of the business of local 
government is about the political reconciliation of competing interests, 
and hence political parties have a vital function in organising choices in 
elections, and in ensuring that political accountability relates to the pursuit 
of broad values. 
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Central to the role of councillors in spatial planning is the notion that 
planning is a “quasi - judicial “ process in which councillors are akin to 
judges handling a court case, and must therefore avoid expressing 
opinions about planning generally or particular applications in case they 
are seen to be pre - judging an issue. Lord Nolan (1997) robustly 
dismissed these concerns. The process of arriving at a planning decision 
has similarities to a legal process but the differences between judges and 
councillors is that councillors are leading local political figures who have 
strong views on development proposals affecting their council, and may 
have been elected for that reason. Provided elected members are fully, 
and properly briefed, they are particularly well – equipped to make 
planning decisions because of their representative role, and not despite 
it. He concluded that attempting to divorce the political role of councillors 
from their planning function is unlikely to succeed. It is also undemocratic 
and impractical to try to prevent councillors from discussing applications 
with whomever they want. Local democracy depends on councillors 
becoming available to people who want to speak to them. He thought that 
the likely outcome of a prohibition would be that lobbying would continue 
but in an underhand and covert way. (The Localism Act 2011 has relaxed 
considerably the previous inhibitions on councillors discussing 
controversial local development schemes). 
 
A valuable attempt to synthesise these contrasting themes was 
attempted by Gains et al (2005). The Labour government elected in the 
UK in 1997 chose to introduce a major change in the way that English 
local authorities carried out their decision-making, establishing a formal 
separate executive and giving it limited authority. A system in which 
formal decision-making power rested with the whole council gave way to 
one where, within a broad policy and budget framework agreed by all 
councillors, the executive of the council may make decisions, although 
these are subject to challenge and scrutiny by non-executive councillors. 
In western democracies, systems that allow for a separate executive are 
commonplace in local government systems (Norton 1994), but the policy 
of establishing a separate formal executive was long resisted by the local 
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government policy community in England, and so the legislation, the 
Local Government Act 2000, makes a radical break from previous policy.  
 
As we have seen the period from the post-war period onwards saw the 
accommodation of the system to the rise of party politics. If a party was in 
the majority it took the leadership of all the committees of the council, and 
the majority of its members and party members were expected and 
generally did vote en bloc (Gyford et al 1989 p 37 Table 7). In many 
authorities an informal executive of senior councillors did operate, but 
they were held in check to varying degrees by the wider party group or 
groups of which they were part.  
 
The Widdicombe Committee (1986 pp 78- 82) concluded that adaptation 
of the system to the role of party politics in decision-making was entirely 
legitimate. The Conservative government of the period accepted the 
broad thrust of Widdicombe that was against national interventions in 
local decision-making structures, and instead simply installed a 
requirement in legislation passed in 1989 that representation on all 
committees should be proportionate to share of seats held by different 
political groups. When Michael Heseltine returned to take charge of local 
government in John Major’s cabinet in late 1990, he floated the idea of 
strengthening local leadership through the introduction of elected mayors 
(Stoker and Wolman 1992).  
 
Gains, John and Stoker (2005) point out that the new system introduced 
by the Blair government could alter the power and accountability 
relationships within local councils in two ways. First there are different 
possibilities for the leaders in the new system. The second is through 
overview and scrutiny. Local councils could decide to implement this 
element to their constitutions in different ways either strongly or weakly. 
Some may endorse independent scrutiny; others ensure that parties that 
run the executive also control the scrutiny committees through whipping 
procedures and that a member of the ruling party chairs the committees. 
The operation of scrutiny committees may also be limited by considering 
a narrow range of issues. The potential exists for local authorities to be 
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independently strong and weak on the two dimensions of leadership and 
scrutiny. This in turn leads to the identification of four broad paths for 
implementation:  
 
Low scrutiny/ low leadership: collectivist patterns of leadership and 
decision-making, fusion model in which neither leadership nor scrutiny is 
given a clear role. 
 
Low leadership/ high scrutiny: maintains collectivist patterns of leadership 
but introduces patterns of control and review, collective accountability 
model.  
 
Low scrutiny/ high leadership: have either transferred existing patterns of 
new leadership without introducing strong patterns of review, or have 
moved from collectivist patterns of leadership to a focussed executive 
without adopting the other parts of the reforms, executive autonomy 
model.  
 
The separation of powers model is the fourth model, which has both well-
defined leadership structures and strong forms of scrutiny and review.  
 
As identified by Gyford et al (1989) and Leach and Wilson (2000), party is 
often the main driver of leadership style, though it is less clear that it 
drives the extent of scrutiny activities. About 60% of majority party 
Conservative authorities have adopted a high leadership model, with both 
strong and weak forms of scrutiny, compared with about 30% Labour and 
No Overall Control, and 40% Liberal Democrat. Labour tends to have 
more authorities with a collectivist style, which have high levels of 
scrutiny and weaker leadership, although it does not have more fusion 
authorities than the Conservatives. Labour authorities are, it appears, 
least likely to provide the kind of strong leadership/ strong scrutiny 
approach favoured by the then Labour government.  
 
Copus (2004) examined five case studies taken from councils across the 
country, which explored the patterns of political activity within these 
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councils and the way in which the organisation and activities of the 
political party group influence councillor activity. The research was 
designed to ensure that all the three main parties were represented. In 
each case the council had adopted the leader and cabinet executive 
arrangements. The common theme was that the politics of the councils 
are conducted within the political party groups before it reaches the public 
domain. Whilst the groups in each council cohere publicly with varying 
degrees of rigidity, they do cohere and are identifiable as distinct blocs of 
councillors with a clear political identity and sets of objectives. 
 
Political affiliation makes little difference to the way councillors approach 
council politics and how they interact with councillors from the same party 
or from the other party groups. Internal dissent finds little outlet and 
where it does occur it falls broadly into two categories: that concerned 
with ideology or policy and that related to issues stemming from the ward 
or division the councillor represents. Labour members were least likely to 
allow these internal disputes to spill over into the public arena and Liberal 
Democrats most likely, whilst Conservative groups shared Labour’s 
approach to public discipline and loyalty but were less inclined to admit 
how this cohesion was achieved. 
 
d) Administrative reform of local government sought by national 
government, usually referred to as “modernising. “ 
 
Cochrane (1991) examined the changing state of local government 
restructuring anticipated in the 1990s. In the recent past, he commented 
that local government had largely been analysed as if its very existence 
were in danger from centrally inspired legislative reforms and financial 
controls. Such a starting point might make it difficult to assess the 
changes which were taking place and which were likely to dominate in 
the 1990s. He considered three other possibilities. The first is the notion 
of an “enabling” authority; the second, the possibility of a shift towards 
post- Fordist local government; and the third, the possibility of more 
corporative or neo- corporative forms of politics at local level. He 
suggested that the third is the most helpful approach for understanding 
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the likely duration of change in the 1990s, and argued that changes 
within local government have to be understood in the context of wider 
restructuring of the UK state.  
 
A decade later Leach (2010) observed that in looking over the Labour 
government’s agenda for local government (1997- 2009) six key themes 
could be identified. These were: the move to local executive government; 
the emphasis on strong individual local leadership; the cumulative 
enhancement of the focus on partnership working; the strengthening of 
the performance/ inspection culture; a concern with public engagement 
and community cohesion (particularly at neighbourhood level); and a 
further move towards a unitary structure of local government in England.  
 
Leach concluded that although the first raft of measures did have a 
degree of coherence, over time the coherence of the government’s vision 
disintegrated. The overall effect of this pattern of central initiative and 
intervention on member- officer relations is examined. It is argued that 
whereas the impact of the enhancement of the performance / inspection 
culture has been to strengthen the position of Chief Executive (vis-à-vis 
council leaders), the move to local executive government has not resulted 
in the shift of power from leading officers to leading members that might 
have been anticipated. In addition, the challenge to the unified officer 
structure implicit in the division between the executive and scrutiny roles 
has remained latent.  
 
Chandler (2001) had earlier examined the Local Government Bill and the 
White and Green Papers informing it which claim to deliver an agenda of 
democratic renewal. The reforms promised to reconnect local councils 
with local communities through a process of political renewal, a new 
statutory duty of community-wide consultation, and the encouragement of 
active citizenship. Chandler assesses whether the plans for increased 
popular engagement in consultation processes actually develop 
democratic accountability, and suggests that, although the then current 
proposals may institutionalise new links between government and 
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community groups and individuals, they will provide little local control 
over policy making.  
 
But by 2004 (Coulson 2004) when Labour’s modernising agenda had 
begun to have effect, a complex geography of partnerships and networks 
had developed which required small numbers of executives and salaried 
councillors, far fewer than the large numbers needed by the committee 
system. But turnout in local elections remained low, and membership of 
both Labour and Conservative parties declined. Councillors and local 
activists were marginalised. This suggests that the government had a 
choice: it could either accept that the era of multi-skilled councillors 
responsible for the multi-purpose local authorities is ending, or it could 
radically rationalise the present quangos, partnerships and other local 
government structures to re-create it. 
 
Leach (2009) suggests there has been a common theme which links the 
reorganisation initiatives of successive Conservative (1979 - 1997) and 
Labour (1997-2010) governments which is that a unitary system of local 
government (town and parish councils excluded) is to be preferred to a 
two (or multi) tiered system. Despite the anomalies in the current 
patchwork structure the new Coalition Government has indicated that it 
does not wish to encourage further reorganisation (Pickles 2010). 
Fenwick et al (2009) conclude that currently there is no prospect of 
regional governance in England being subject to direct or indirect public 
accountability and regional governance is no longer politically attractive to 
mainstream politicians of any party: it holds few political rewards and 
there is no longer any grassroots pressure to place it on the agenda. The 
most likely development is the further growth of regional business - led 
development directly sanctioned from central government, with funds 
provided from central government with a strong regeneration emphasis. 
 
New Labour were determined to deal with what they perceived as the 
damage done to local government during the Conservative administration 
1979 – 1997, and moved quickly so that in July 2000, the Local 
Government Act 2000 reached the statute books giving councils some 
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real space to develop entirely new approaches to community leadership 
and management innovation. The duty to produce a Community Strategy, 
combined with the establishment of local strategic partnerships, provided 
a vehicle for establishing and delivering a shared vision for local areas 
(Moor 2004). Sullivan et al (2006) conclude that it is hard to overstate the 
importance of community leadership in the Labour Government`s 
programme of local government reform. The 1998 White Paper, Modern 
Local Government: In Touch with the People (DETR, 1998) presented the 
idea of community leadership as symbolising the transformation from an 
old fashioned institution to a “modern “one. The White Paper explained 
the rationale for giving the community leadership brief to local 
government because amongst all the public institutions councils have a 
special status and authority as local, directly - elected bodies. 
 
The Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM)`s evaluation of Local 
Strategic Partnerships (LSP’s) and the ongoing evaluation of community 
strategies (DPM 2005, ODPM/ Dft 2006) highlighted the involvement of 
officers and senior or executive councillors and the relative disconnection 
from both initiatives of non - executive councillors and of political parties 
outside the ruling group(s). This marginalisation of councillors is 
compounded where the LSP has its own links with communities eg: 
through area arrangements and where the councils` scrutiny 
arrangements are poor. (Goss, 2005; Sullivan & Howard, 2005, 
ODPM/DfT, 2006). Sullivan et al concluded that their results from an 
empirical survey of a number of councils support a relatively positive 
account of local authority leadership; they confirm the findings of other 
research by describing leadership as coming more from officers than 
elected members. This gives cause for concern as it devalues the 
democratic legitimacy for local authority. Their work also points to the 
marginalisation of non - executive members, but they optimistically point 
out that the introduction of new area or neighbourhood based 
arrangements may provide new fields for the exercise of community 
leadership by members outside the councils` ruling executive. 
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The 2007 Councillors Commission, driven by persistent issues about the 
representativeness of councillors and their public standing, described a 
climate in which people are disengaged from politics, do not trust 
politicians, and yet have higher expectations of service delivery. Lepine 
and Sullivan (2010) following a wide ranging debate about the 
effectiveness and accountability of local government in England suggest 
that if councillors are to contribute to the good governance of 
communities, this does require the restoration of the political function of 
the councillor, which involves the management and resolution of conflict, 
the exercise of judgement and, in all this, engagement with citizens. 
 
Researchers have shown that the emerging system in which 
responsibilities are shared between local authorities and a range of other 
public and private providers lacks strong normative underpinning in public 
opinion (Miller and Dickson 1996). The public demonstrated a strong 
preference for organisation and control of local services to be in the 
hands of an elected council as against appointed bodies or private 
sectors providers. A more positive view of the benefits of changing 
systems of local governance emerges from Sullivan and Skelcher (2003). 
Building on their earlier work examining City Challenge succession 
strategies, which showed that network - style relationships often 
associated with partnership working, were threatened or undermined by 
the imperative to compete, the authors contend that there exists a 
continued potential for collaboration in pursuit of public purposes, which 
also expands the stock of social capital. 
 
Nick Raynsford, a Labour MP who had been a planning and housing 
minister, in a paper (2008) to The Centre for Public Scrutiny advocates 
that scrutiny is fundamental to the rebuilding of public trust and 
confidence in government, and that scrutiny and democracy are mutually 
reinforcing. Furthermore the public must have full access to all relevant 
information if they are to make informed decisions either on whom to 
elect to represent them or which option to support. Reflecting on the 
introduction of Cabinet or Executive styles of leadership to local 
government, he suggested that within local government the key challenge 
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for council leaders and cabinet members is to identify areas of work 
where there is scope for constructive engagement by back - benchers, 
rather than seeing the overview and scrutiny function as an irritant. My 
own recent involvement in Gloucestershire County Council emphatically 
endorses these conclusions and also provides a working example of a 
council that has enthusiastically embraced scrutiny. 
 
During their time in opposition the Conservatives had reflected on the 
changes to local government introduced by New Labour, and in February 
2009 David Cameron launched a major review of planning and local 
government as part of the Conservative Party’s policy debate for the 
forthcoming election in 2010. The document entitled “Control Shift:  
Returning Power To Local Communities“ was a wide ranging 
commentary on New Labour’s modernising programme for local 
government and planning, and promised a radical decentralisation. 
Pointing out that over the last century Britain had become one of the most 
centralised countries in the developed world, and that this trend had 
accelerated under New Labour, the document contrasted this top down, 
central control with the technological advances of the “post – bureaucratic 
age“that had placed greater power with the citizen who could now share 
information and knowledge freely without constraint. 
 
 The changes would involve abolishing regional planning, revoking all 
regional spatial strategies, including regional building targets, and 
repealing the national planning guidance that relates to regional planning. 
Except in London, the Tories would abolish regional development 
agencies and transfer all regional, housing, and planning powers back to 
local authorities. Councils would be encouraged to form their own “local 
enterprise partnerships”. The Conservatives committed themselves to 
scrapping the housing and planning delivery grant, and replacing this by 
matching the council tax raised by each council for each new house built 
for each of the six years after that house was built in order to incentivise 
councils to meet housing needs.  A major change would be to scrap the 
power of central government to cap rates that had been introduced by 
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Chris Patten in the last Conservative government, and give local people 
the power to veto large Council tax rises through local referenda. 
 
The paper also confirmed the Conservatives` plan to abolish the 
Infrastructure Planning Commission (IPC) introduced by the Labour 
Government and instead speed up planning inquiries. These would focus 
on material planning considerations instead of questioning the project in 
principle. National policy statements would remain for major 
infrastructure. One of the key features was to hold a referendum on the 
introduction of a mayoral system in twelve of the largest English cities. 
The London Development Agency already run by the Mayor of London 
would be kept, but the Government Office for London would be 
abolished, and its powers transferred to the mayor or boroughs. The 
review provided a platform for the Conservatives manifesto for the next 
general election that took place in May 2010, but was also well timed for 
the English county elections in June 2009. 
 
e) Emerging theory about the purpose of spatial planning and the 
opportunity for a more collaborative approach to place making 
 
Introduction 
 
The spatial planning system has a critical role to play in mediating 
between different interests, often between groups opposed to, and 
groups supporting, new development proposals, and this role Elson 
(1986) suggests has been scrutinised since the creation of the land use 
planning system in 1947. In recent times these conflicts have centred on 
proposals for new housing, particularly in areas of the urban fringe 
(Gallent 2008), but in earlier years Healey and colleagues (1988) in a 
research project sponsored by the Department of the Environment, 
examined the way the British planning system had been put to work 
during the period from the mid 1970`s to the mid 1980`s in a variety of 
locations and involving a range of proposed land uses, at a time when the 
Thatcher administration was challenging areas of public policy. This 
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research reflected the policy and legislative changes that have 
characterised the planning system during the last thirty years. 
 
The changing rationalities of planning policy 
 
During the 1980's there was an emphasis in planning policy on market 
led development whilst during the 1990's under the governments of John 
Major there was the emergence of a plan led system. From 1997 under 
New Labour,sustainability became an issue and planning became more 
attuned to environmental and spatial complexity. Since May 2010 and the 
emergence of the Coalition Government, a new trajectory is emerging 
which will remove the regional planning strategies and promote a more 
locally focused approach to development. These changes have had 
implications for local governance, both in the way in which the spatial 
planning system has responded to growth pressures, and the role of 
councillors. Many senior councillors have served in local government 
throughout these periods of change, and have witnessed these 
fluctuations of direction and emphasis, which are likely to have influenced 
their own attitudes to the governance of spatial planning, and their 
expectations of the results of yet further changes. 
 
      Planning in the 1980s: Thatcherite Planning 
 
Murdoch and Abram (2002) assert that essentially the Thatcher 
governments were of the view that competitive markets guarantee the 
best outcomes and therefore these markets should, wherever possible, 
be substituted for state activity. Thus planning, which was viewed as both 
a local government activity and a potential hindrance to market 
operations, required fundamental change. Planning should play a role in 
the regulation of development, but it should act as an interpreter of 
market signals rather than as a prescriptive regulator, and it should 
ensure the smooth functioning of markets. The Local Government, 
Planning and Land Act of 1980 outlined early Thatcherite changes to the 
system and the expected direction of policy development. There were 
three main themes: 
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1) The position of County Councils and the status of structure plans 
would be reduced so that, other than for minerals and waste disposal, 
development control powers would be consolidated at the district level. 
2) Plans should be prepared more quickly and simplified, and 
participation pruned to assist this. 
3) Procedures would be introduced that by-passed the statutory system 
altogether. The Secretary of State was given the power to designate 
certain inner city areas as “urban development zones”, with their own 
Urban Development Corporations (UDCs), which would have full 
development control powers in these areas so that local authorities 
lost jurisdiction over planning. 
 
In 1985 the White Paper “Lifting the Burden” was published by Lord David 
Young, a business minister (Moor 2010). Planning was viewed as a 
constraint on market operations and should be simplified. Development 
Plans were useful to guide development, but were one, but only one, of 
the material considerations that must be taken into account in determining 
planning applications. Thornley (1993) argues that Thatcherite changes to 
planning can be summarized as a re-orientation of the purpose of 
planning towards greater acceptance of market forces, selective 
application of environmental criteria and the removal of social concerns 
from planning policy. However these changes encountered opposition 
within the Conservative party from back-benchers whose constituents 
were alarmed at the pace of development (Moor 2010), and at the end of 
the Thatcherite era, the introduction of neo-liberal philosophy into central 
government and planning came up against a maturing popular 
understanding of, and concern about, environmental issues (Murdoch & 
Abram 2002) which led subsequently to a movement for sustainable 
development. 
 
These significant changes stimulated research into these issues. 
Examining this re-orientation of the purpose of planning during the 
Thatcherite era, Healey and her colleagues (1988) posed their research 
question in the following way: Land use planning has always had to 
balance the often conflicting demands of urban growth and those 
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concerned with the quality of the environment. An important issue is 
whether the system has the flexibility to adapt to new circumstances and 
the demands those bring, or whether it acts as a constraint on the spatial 
transformations demanded by economic and political change. This 
question continues to be relevant notwithstanding the series of 
administrative changes to the planning system that have taken place 
since the 1970`s and has attracted a considerable amount of research 
attention. 
 
Healey et al (1988), at the outset of their research, point to the original 
conception of the post war planning system as embodied in the 1947 Act 
which assumed that the public sector would be the major initiator and 
funder of development. Despite the shift towards reliance on private 
initiative from the 1950`s, the case studies show that the public sector 
continued to play an active role in the development process, as 
landowner, land assembler, developer, builder, financier and service – 
provider. However despite this wide range of tools, their use is 
constrained by procedures that tend to reinforce the position of 
landownership, investment and development interests, and by central 
governments` policies towards local authority finance and urban 
regeneration initiatives. The researchers perceived a tension between the 
public sector`s role as developer, where it is often promoting a very 
particular interpretation of “community interest“, and its function as 
regulator where a major consideration should in theory be assessing the 
implications of a project in relation to the varied “communities of interest” 
present in a locality. 
 
Development control was examined by the researchers. The principle 
behind the development control process is that local authority politicians 
and officers should make discretionary judgements on development 
proposals. These are made on the basis of considerations formulated in 
plans and other supporting material, both in the light of precedent and in 
relation to the specific circumstances of a case. Accountability is provided 
for by the plans and the formal authority of local politicians in decision – 
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making. Central government, via plan approval, call - in procedure and 
the appeal machinery, keeps a watchful eye on the process. 
 
The researchers concluded that even at the local level politicians in the 
case studies rarely played a decisive role in development control. 
Planning officers structured the agenda of issues raised by a case and 
organised the various consultations. Where cases were controversial, or 
where councillors or local interests had strong views, this agenda might 
be substantially revised, or overthrown by councillors. More usually, 
planners` judgements about the range of issues involved and their relative 
significance went unchallenged. Planners thus had considerable power to 
filter issues and interests, although they did this in the knowledge of their 
politicians` priorities. This emphasis on officers at the local level is largely 
they concluded a function of the case – load involved and the traditions of 
local government organisation. The power of central government, 
however, has its authority in the procedures it is able to use to influence 
local decisions. 
 
Notwithstanding these conclusions the researchers make an important 
point that those without a legally defined interest in a site are generally 
disadvantaged in that they have no formal rights to object to a planning 
decision. There is no machinery with which to challenge planning 
permissions other than the process of local politics, and in a few cases, 
the possibility of persuading central government to call - in an application. 
Thus a fundamental structuring role of the planning system is that 
landowners and developers have legal and political rights in the 
development control process. Everyone else has only political rights. The 
researchers do not mention the possibility of judicial challenge by third 
parties to a planning decision but this procedure is so costly and so 
uncertain in its outcome, that it serves only to add emphasis to their point 
about political rights and the importance of objectors lobbying their ward 
member. 
 
The concept of the development plan in the planning system is in part a 
vehicle for providing the rationale for specific decisions. Healey et al 
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(1988) point out that to do this effectively, a plan should state the 
principles or strategies which are to guide a local authority`s decision - 
making on land use changes in an area, provide some indication of the 
way these will be combined and traded - off in particular instances, and 
ensure that conflicts are addressed and positions arrived at which can be 
sustained. However central government has sought to constrain local 
discretion by limiting both the scope and content of plans, and has sought 
both to simplify preparation procedures and to ensure that local 
authorities prepare all their planning policy statements according to these 
procedures. The researchers conclude that the selective use of statutory 
plans and the proliferation of other forms of policy framework, are an 
appropriate response to the variability of localities. 
 
In assessing the role of politicians in both plan making and decisions on 
applications the researchers saw councillor involvement as a pro - active 
stance, politicians considering the promotion of the city centre or the 
renewal of inner city environments as key tasks in their programme. But in 
many instances, local councillors reacted to demands from constituents, 
for they were often the first points of reference for local people concerned 
about environmental issues. In this way, their interests might be carried 
through into the consideration of policies and projects. However, Healey 
et al (1988) concluded that it may require a sustained and widespread 
critical opposition to change the priorities of politicians, for whom ideology 
and party may in practice take precedence over the specific demands of 
constituents. The machinery of representative democracy and the party 
apparatus that serviced it were evolving in response to new interest 
groupings and political demands. Concern with the quality of the 
residential environment in particular they thought had tended to foster a 
more overtly pluralist politics with diverse pressure groups focusing their 
campaigns around issues and places. 
 
Further research on the role of local planning authorities and councillors 
in mediating the impacts of urban change was carried out by Short 
(1996). He examined the competing pressures and different actors in the 
growth area of Central Berkshire in the late 1980`s. Stimulated by the 
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growth of Reading as an office centre and the inward movement of high – 
tech industry, the area had become the focus of attention by the volume 
house builders to build large housing estates on the outskirts of Reading 
at areas such as Woodley – Earley. In the introduction to his work Short 
points out that in mixed economies the production of the built environment 
is rarely either the simple unfolding of market forces or the pure outcome 
of state actions. Rather, there is conflict, negotiation, and tension between 
sets of agents working with different principles, goals and strategies. The 
state represents the arena for the competition between these sets of 
agents and between the accumulation and consumption demands that 
they represent. The state itself, however is neither neutral nor a single 
body, and the conflict between house builders and community groups 
through the planning system produces conflict between central and local 
government. Short`s overarching theme was that the planning system 
introduced in 1947 had primarily been intended to regulate and direct 
development but had since been transformed into a system of 
negotiation.  
 
Planning authorities responded to the conflicting pressures in a number of 
ways, and Short evolved a typology of responses by planning authorities 
to growth management and this typology provided a conceptual 
framework within which the various approaches of councillors could be 
analysed. As a basis for this approach he identified three elements that 
were important. The first was the increasing use of planning gain, by 
which local planning authorities secured some public advantage from the 
granting of planning permission. The second was public participation both 
in plan making and development control and the third was developer 
participation in the identification of developable land and policies for 
delivery and implementation. 
 
Dealing with the role of local planning authorities Short pointed out that 
the authorities consist of two sets of agents: elected councillors and 
salaried officers. These two groups work together but have different 
organisational structures, perspectives, priorities, and roles. While the 
salaried officials have to serve the elected representatives, they also have 
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reference to an ideology of professional planning practice. Decision -
making ultimately lies with the planning councillors, who directly face the 
whole range of conflicting demands. The competing pressures of 
accumulation and legitimation noted earlier are crystallised in and through 
the actions and roles of planning councillors. 
 
Planning authorities respond to the conflicting pressures in a number of 
ways, and Short identified five distinct approaches, although these would 
usually occur in combination rather than isolation. These approaches 
were: 
a) Outright rejection of growth pressures provides a delaying tactic before 
central government intervenes, as ultimately the Secretary of State has 
the power to overturn refusal decisions. 
b) Deflection of development in that development can often take the line 
of least resistance, and the intensity of local opposition can influence the 
location of new development. 
c) Deflection of blame. A choice between principle and the realities of 
central government power must be explained via speeches reported by 
the local press to affected residents and the local electorates alike. The 
blame is transferred totally to “Whitehall “. Ultimately a public relations 
exercise to disguise local political impotence. 
d) Control over development. If it cannot be refused it must be planned. 
Negotiation with applicants over details is a standard feature of the 
modern planning system. The key factor is the extent of committee 
involvement and the accompanying publicity. Planning gain involves a 
legal agreement between an applicant and the local authority to provide 
certain benefits or financial contributions as part of the planning consent. 
 
Short identified planning gain as the means by which councillors could on 
the one hand support a scheme, despite local opposition, whilst on the 
other legitimize their position by drawing attention to the benefits that 
would accrue to the local community. This is effectively a strengthening of 
the pro – active role noted by Healey at al (1988) but transferred to the 
development control arm of the local planning authority as opposed to its 
role as a developer. Short concluded that the pursuit of planning gain has 
   
 72 
a number of consequences. These are: a) In seeking to maximise it, local 
planning authorities tended to look favourably upon large sites including a 
few major developers where planning gain can be more easily achieved 
and implemented. b) The extent of a planning gain and the conviction with 
which it is pursued by a planning authority often depends upon the 
influence of the local lobby by elected representatives, community groups 
and parish councils. c) Successful pursuit of planning gain to some extent 
legitimizes the position of the local authorities, especially the councillors. 
And d) Such gains neatly mesh local political interests with central 
government macroeconomic policies. 
 
Post-Thatcherite Planning 
 
Economic growth in the south east region in the middle years of the 
decade had brought a growth in the demand for housing and other forms 
of development, which was focused on the outer suburban and rural 
areas of the region. As Ward (1994) suggested, the problem, especially 
severe for a Conservative government whose main support came from 
those very areas, was how to accommodate all this growth. Some 
concentration of growth became necessary because gradual, unplanned 
incremental growth spread the misery and political damage. 
 
Reflecting these changes, Chris Patten, later to become Chairman of the 
Conservative Party and responsible for the unexpected Conservative 
general election success in 1992, replaced the Thatcherite Nicholas 
Ridley as Environment Secretary (Moor 2010), and piloted the 1991 
Planning and Compensation Act through parliament. This stipulated that 
all development control decisions were now to be made in accordance 
with the development plan. The plan was no longer just one material 
consideration, but became the prime consideration. There was also a 
strengthening of central government direction as an increasing number of 
Planning Policy Guidance documents were published by central 
government, which sought not only to introduce national strategic 
direction, but also to ensure uniformity in planning practice. As Vigor 
(2000) put it, the PPG approach works through the specification of largely 
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decontextualised planning principles. These detach sites and projects 
from their local situations. They situate them in an institutional 
environment, often at odds with the perspectives of stakeholders in the 
local conflicts. 
 
During the latter part of the second Major government, there was an 
important debate about the scale and location of new housing, when it 
was forecast in 1995 that 4.4 million new households would emerge in the 
years 1991- 2016. The new Labour government inherited this debate and 
in 1998 published “Planning for Sustainable Development: Towards 
Better Practice”, which demonstrated that both Conservative and Labour 
governments had moved to a consensus on the meaning of “sustainable 
planning”, with both placing considerable emphasis on urban regeneration 
and the concentration of development. The next decade would show 
whether the new sustainable development agenda provided a new 
rationality for planning, or simply an excuse for the continuation of old, 
well established policies. 
 
As we have seen, Short`s research was conducted before the New 
Labour Government came into power in 1997 and when the neo - liberal, 
“anti-statist “stance of the early Thatcher governments noted by Taylor 
(2009) was at its peak. Since that time on the one hand under John Major 
the Conservatives re - installed the “plan led” system of controlling 
development in the Planning and Compensation Act of 1991, and on the 
other under New Labour there has been a double process of reform – the 
devolution and regional agenda and the continuing revisions to the 
planning system in search of efficiency and effectiveness. Research since 
then by Healey (2007) and others including Allmendinger (2007) argues 
that collaborative spatial planning practices can facilitate collective action 
with progressive purpose, contrasting with more established public 
jurisdictional authorities, such as those observed so far where planning is 
understood as mediation in the public interest. However before reviewing 
this more recent research literature, it is appropriate to review some 
specific research on the role of elected members in plan making and 
development control published in 1997 just prior to the election of the 
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New Labour Government. This research had been prompted by the new 
focus of central government that there should be much more consistency 
in planning decision making, based on up to date, adopted development 
plans. 
 
The Role Of Elected Members In Plan Making And Development Control 
 
This research published by the RTPI in March 1997 was commissioned 
from the School of Planning Oxford Brookes University and the study 
team comprised Professor Roger Zetter MRTPI, Dr Roy Darkes MRTPI 
and Roger Mason MRTPI Barrister. The reasons behind the commission 
were the concerns of the RTPI that the well- publicised reports into the 
planning decisions of a number of local authorities had reduced public 
confidence in the planning system, and the Institute wished to report best 
practice to its members. The final report was submitted by the RTPI to 
Lord Nolan`s Committee on standards in public life which reported later 
that year. The terms of reference for the study were: a) The role of 
elected members in formulating planning policy and translating that policy  
into development plans and the methods of reaching decisions on these 
matters. b) The extent to which elected members` discretion is limited by 
legislation and central government policy and advice. c) The role of 
elected members in development control matters. d) The different 
perspectives of elected members as members of planning committees 
and as ward members. e) The degree of involvement by elected 
members in negotiations on planning applications including such matters 
as any associated planning agreements. f) The time taken to determine 
planning applications.  g) The role of elected members relating to 
appeals, with specific reference to decisions taken against officer advice. 
h) The relationship with officers and the weight given to professional 
advice in evolving policy and decision- making; and i) The need for 
further practice advice on these matters. 
 
The study was conducted in two main phases and comprised a postal 
questionnaire survey of a 10% stratified sample of chief planning officers 
and elected members serving on planning committees in English and 
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Welsh local authorities and follow up interviews with a small sample 
drawn from the first phase. 
 
Officers in 24 councils (59%) noted that councillor working parties were 
used in their authorities in order to develop debate and guidance on 
major planning policy. Most councils set up officer working groups as a 
preliminary to developing major policies or initiating policy changes. All of 
these arrangements drew elected members into a close working 
relationship with officers for policy review and development. Another 
question asked of officers was about the origins of policy debate on 
planning (seeking to find where the initiative for policy development and 
review came from). The results showed that in 22 authorities (50%) policy 
debate originated from joint officer/member discussions. In 19 councils 
(46%), officers said they took the lead in bringing forward major policy 
items, but in 3 other councils (7%) chief officers said that members were 
pro - active in raising key issues and initiating policy review. The main 
forum for policy development and review was planning committee 
according to 18 chief officers (44% of councils in the sample). 
 
Another area of research concerned the impact of Section 54a of the 
1990 Town and Country Planning Act and the role of the development 
plan in development control decisions. Over two thirds of councillors 
considered that S.54a of the 1990 Act, which strengthened the place of 
the development plan as the basis for making decisions on applications 
for development, had been a change for the better. There was a 
tendency for backbenchers to be less likely to agree this than senior 
members. On the other hand, over half of the councillors mentioned that 
there had been occasions since 1991 when members` views had 
prevailed over the policies found in the development plan. 
 
Specifically pressed on whether they felt that party political 
considerations influenced members` decision - making on planning 
matters, 23 chief officers (52%) thought that sometimes this was the 
case, 17 (39%) felt this was never the case and only 2 respondents felt 
that party politics were regularly invoked. At a more specific level, 13 
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officers (30%) said that there were some issues where party politics did 
come into play. These included travellers/gypsies, football fields and 
sports facilities in general, nursery schools, council - owned land, 
dwellings in the countryside, applications involving job creation, infill 
development in “ better” areas, conservation issues, social housing, inner 
city house extensions and takeaways. Party politics also came into play 
in the run–up to local elections and in marginal wards. Member 
involvement in s106 negotiations was also canvassed Most chief 
planning officers (68%) felt that member involvement in s106 negotiations 
was unhelpful and only 7 officers (16%) were positive about direct 
councillor involvement in the detail of s106 matters. 
 
The researchers made no recommendations to the RTPI regarding policy 
formulation and concluded that this was not regarded as a problematic 
issue. They endorsed best practice identified in the study: that is where a 
good working relationship is developed between members and officers, 
especially chief officers. This they thought ensured consistency in policy 
development and implementation, helps to move the policy making 
process forward effectively, and assists member and officials in dealing 
with contentious planning applications. 
 
This report was commissioned prior to the changes introduced by New 
Labour that introduced the cabinet or executive structure to policy 
formulation, and the period covered by the report may have represented 
the apogee of the chief officer and planning committee structure for 
planning policy in local government. In that structure the chief planning 
officer had a pre-eminent role in policy formulation amongst officers, but 
the new cabinet structure introduced a senior management team led by 
the chief executive reporting to cabinet, where a head of planning 
services was not necessarily included. 
 
One of the first academics to comment on the implications of the new 
political management arrangements for local government was Fox (2004)  
who identified the main issues on which divisions were apparent as being 
those of the politicisation of chief executives and their role in respect of 
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community leadership activities. Some predict that they will in future play 
more of an internal co-ordinating role and spend less time externally 
promoting community. Others believe that they will need to devote even 
more time to partnerships and networking because of the weight of 
executive business for leading members. We have noted the concern of 
Sullivan et al (2006) that leadership was coming more from officers than 
elected members. 
 
  The Modernisation Agenda 
 
Concerns that the modernisation agenda introduced to the planning 
system by the New Labour Government would reduce its political 
accountability were voiced by Cowell and Owens (2006). They observed 
that the model for the new planning system is the technical - rational one 
in which sustainability is to be pursued through new objectives such as 
higher densities and mixed - use development, new tools such as 
sustainability appraisals and the involvement of local communities, 
primarily within local contexts. The more overtly political process through 
which planning has actually served the agenda of environmental 
sustainability is effectively ignored. Indeed, they conclude that the 
subversive functions of planning – particularly its capacity to obstruct  
“essential projects“ and raise awkward questions about social purpose – 
are seen by government as part of the problem and as a key target for 
modernisation. The authors argue that rescaling planning will disrupt 
established lines of communication between planning and wider public 
policy, and that the deliberative function of planning continues to be 
unevenly developed at the regional level. 
 
 At the local level the modernisation agenda aspires that “ front - loading“ 
public involvement could simultaneously achieve better outcomes 
(ODPM 2005 para 11, 2004 page 110), but critics think government too 
optimistic in assuming that these innovations would significantly 
ameliorate the real conflicts of interest that arise from planning issues. 
Leach, S et al (2003) had suggested that the danger of an over - 
emphasis on public involvement is that it may slow down the decision - 
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making process, and the effectiveness of decisions may be compromised 
(especially coherence and inter - relationships). Cowell and Owens 
(2006) conclude that the importance of planning lies not simply in its 
instrumental capacity to deliver environmental sustainability, but in its 
relative openness to influence by environmental interests and concerned 
communities, which enable connections to be drawn between projects, 
plans and wider policies, and these structures are threatened by the 
proposals for planning reform. Nonetheless they note the work of 
Murdoch and Norton (2001) who had shown how environmental 
organisations vary in their abilities to access regional and local planning 
avenues, and to drive forward their favoured conceptions of sustainable 
development. Peel and Lloyd (2007) suggest that a new approach to land 
use planning is being constructed which although neo -traditional in its 
policy design (a reassertion of the underlying rationale for the traditional 
land – use planning system) aims to be more pluralistic and diverse in its 
objectives, reflecting the agenda and context of modernisation.  
 
A more positive view of these planning reforms is offered by Allmendinger 
and Haughton (2007), and Allmendinger again with Tewdwr-Jones 
(2009). A particular attraction of these papers is that they set these 
changes against the evolution of the planning system since the 1970`s. 
Since the election of a New Labour Government in 1997 Allmendinger 
and Haughton point out there has been a fundamental reassessment and 
rearrangement of the UK regulatory planning system and, in particular, 
the approach to spatial planning. This involved two significant and 
integrally related shifts. Firstly there has been an insertion of stronger 
regional planning systems, clearer European Union objectives and 
practices for planning, and a reworking of post devolutionary 
relationships between central government and sub national governance 
structures. Secondly, there has been a broadening of the concept and 
practice of planning away from the “ land use “ or physically dominated 
approach of the 1980`s and early 1990`s to a broader scope of planning 
involving land development, environmental concerns, resource use, 
transport, economic development, social infrastructure etc. The Planning 
& Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 replaced Regional Planning Guidance 
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(RPG) and county structure plans with a single tier of strategy called 
Regional Spatial Strategies (RSSs). 
 
Summarising recent changes the authors describe how the “ top - down “ 
blueprint nature of post - war planning driven by the need for massive 
redevelopment gave way to demands for more public–sector–led 
approaches during the 1970`s, whereas the market - led orthodoxy of the 
1980`s dominated until the “ plan led “ era of the 1990`s. The current 
doctrine is focused on “place making “which emphasises an uneasy 
tension between economic development, policy integration, design 
quality, and the notion of sustainable places. Allmendinger and Tewdwr - 
Jones (2009) conclude that a uniform planning process nationally, 
originally developed in the aftermath of the 1939 – 1945 war years is 
incompatible with current government policies intended to foster regional 
economic competitiveness, sustainable communities and local 
distinctiveness. They suggest that spatial planning is not a delivery 
process per se in the style of planning under the welfare state or in the 
Thatcher years, but rather as a strategic capacity and political integration 
mechanism intended to cement the increasingly fragmented agencies of 
the state working within often inappropriate institutional and government 
silos. Planning is being expected to ensure compatible working and 
strategic coordination within government, between government and 
citizens, and government and the market, alongside its more traditional 
role of land - use planning within the town and country planning system. 
The objective of this transformation is to widen the trajectory of planning, 
or spatial strategy making, in the modernisation and governance agenda 
at both the regional level and the local level within the UK. 
 
In her further writing Healey (2009), a leading exponent of this approach, 
suggests that spatial strategy-making demands a capacity for judgement 
which is situated within and sensitive to, the contingencies of particular 
times and places, rather than drawing on generalised theories of urban 
change or accepted methodological protocols. Strategic initiatives also 
have to face the political challenge of mobilising attention to, and creating 
a “public“around, such an activity. In the public sphere, they are thus 
   
 80 
political acts, challenging established power dynamics and mobilising 
energy to move in different directions. In her book Urban Complexity and 
Spatial Strategies published in 2007 Healey used as one of her case 
studies the Cambridge Sub - Region in Southern England which had 
experienced dynamic growth in recent years driven by the expansion of 
both new - technology industries and the London metropolitan region. In 
the case study Healey illustrates the practices of a regulatory approach to 
managing urban development and the difficulties these have faced in 
switching from a growth – restraint strategy to a growth - orientated 
strategy. It exemplifies the wider struggle in southern England to develop 
an integrated approach to urban development in a highly centralised state 
with a strong cultural resistance to development in rural areas and a 
perception of urban areas as “problem places“ in need of regeneration 
rather than growth management. 
 
 Healey draws a wide canvas when describing the actors and agents in 
the Sub – Region but has little to say about the activities of elected 
members other than that they struggled to fund a full range of 
sustainability arguments (from reducing resource use and the impact of 
climate change to provision for walking and cycling, and an emphasis on 
high quality design) to support growth management. However as Short 
(1996) had observed in Central Berkshire elected members sought to 
ensure a strong connection between the allocation of sites for 
development and the provision of physical and community infrastructure. 
 
 Healey draws some important conclusions from her case study about the 
difficulties of managing growth in such a large urban agglomeration, and 
because this complex is so important and near to national government, 
any conflicts are played out up and down all the levels of government, 
and encounter the contradictions over planning, development and 
infrastructure policy at inter - regional and national levels. The result is an 
unstable wider governance context, with the potential to undermine the 
stability and local support that the growth coalition in the Cambridge area 
has sought in order to achieve a new development trajectory. The 
researcher concludes that much depends on the capacity of national 
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government both to encourage integration between land - allocation 
strategies through the planning system and investment in infrastructure 
and services in areas of substantial change, and to decentralise itself, to 
give institutional space for the development of local capacity for the 
governance of place. 
 
 Councillor Involvement In Planning Decisions 
 
Continuing the theme explored by the RTPI Study Team in 1997, of the   
role of elected members in formulating planning policy, a contemporary 
assessment of elected member involvement in planning decisions is 
contained in a report published by Arup consultants and commissioned 
by the Communities and Local Government Department in 2007.The 
research sought to obtain a better understanding of the relationships 
between planning committees, officers and cabinet members in local 
authority planning decision making and also to consider whether current 
arrangements and procedures are leading to the most effective 
governance of planning within local authorities. The findings can be 
summarised under four headings: 
a) early Member involvement 
b) democratic decision – making 
c) decisions contrary to officer recommendation; and  
d) links between policy and decision – making 
 
 
Early Member Involvement 
 
It was hypothesised that early member involvement (formal or informal) 
maximises the value of member input to the decision – making process. 
There are a wide variety of approaches to member involvement and a 
considerable volume of good practice guidance available but much of it 
encourages caution and this has been heeded to such an extent that 
some authorities and /or individual members are now reluctant to get 
involved in discussions prior to the planning committee meeting. 
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Democratic Decision – Making 
 
It was hypothesised that: 
 the application of a democratic decision – making process produces a 
predictable planning decision; and 
 “good“ democracy creates more predictable decisions , by allowing a 
better understanding of the process and providing opportunities to 
influence it. 
The influence of party politics was found to be less significant than the 
individual committee members` skills, knowledge and experience and the 
research findings did not support the hypothesis that a democratic 
decision making process produces a predictable planning decision. The 
fine balance between the relevant planning issues simply makes it 
difficult to predict the outcome of some applications. 
 
Decisions Contrary To Officer Recommendations 
 
It was hypothesised that decisions contrary to officer recommendation 
arise due to: 
 members and officers not communicating during the application and 
determination process, 
 absent or ineffective stakeholder meditation during the application and 
determination process, 
 change in the decision – making structure during the application and 
determination process, 
 an unpredictable political balance, 
 planning issues which are finely balanced, 
 members lacking ownership of plan policies, 
 members lacking training, and  
 authorities which encourage early member involvement experience 
fewer decisions contrary to officer recommendation. 
 
The researchers found that decisions contrary to officer recommendation 
account for a very small proportion of the overall determinations each 
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year and concluded that there should always be scope for members to 
express a different view from their officers. 
 
Links Between Policy And Decision – Making 
 
It was hypothesised that closer linkages between policy and development 
control result in better (more predictable) planning decisions. It was found 
that although around 45% of elected members are actively involved in 
development control decisions, few members of the planning committee 
are involved in forward planning to any meaningful extent. This has a 
potentially negative impact on the extent to which members feel they 
have “ownership“ of the policies that they are expected to implement 
through the granting or refusal of planning permission. The researchers 
conclude that the promotion of closer links between policy and 
development control would help to foster more consistent, plan - led, 
decision - making and potentially increase the scope for elected members 
to get involved in planning. 
 
Strategic – Local Tensions and The Spatial Planning Approach 
 
Throughout this review strategic – local tensions have emerged as a 
recurrent problem area in the spatial planning process. Gallent (2008) in 
a wide- ranging paper attempts to summarise the basis for these tensions 
and the implications for the future of the planning system. Since the 
election of New Labour in 1997 he perceives a division between a local 
approach based on the idea of “ holistic planning and governance “ and a 
regional and national approach emphasising the importance of faster and 
leaner decision making. Government in England struggles to balance a 
devolution of power to communities with a need to retain strategic 
oversight, and to exercise central authority where necessary. Expanding 
on this theme Gallent (2008) points out that the land – use planning 
system that emerged after the second world war was predicated on the 
basis that effective policy controls had to be guided by strategic 
principles, and that local communities needed to be convinced of the 
appropriateness of particular courses of action by mandated politicians 
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and professional planning officers. Participation in the planning system 
often involved the presentation of different development options, followed 
up by consultation exercises, and the subsequent receipt of feedback. If 
the feedback was particularly negative a planning authority (and its 
partners) could either re- think the proposal, or defend it with “strategic 
necessity”arguments. 
 
Since the Labour Government in 1977 a programme of local government 
modernisation has revisited the division between local choice and 
strategic necessity. This is an attempt to renew local democracy and give 
communities greater power in decision making through a process of 
governance that seeks a transfer of responsibility for decision making 
from the public to the personal domain. (Newman 2007) through 
collaboration and participation, emphasising very local actions and 
interactions, and generating a “ network power “ shared by participants 
across a wide process in which planners retain a critical role.   
 
Booher & Innes (2002) argue that this local empowerment ultimately 
generates greater ownership of the process, avoiding a situation where 
communities simply react – often negatively – to intervention and projects 
that are imposed upon them by higher level bodies. 
 
Gallent points out that direct reform of the statutory planning system has 
focused largely on strategic priority. The 2001 Planning Green Paper 
promoted the need for a system that would work for communities and 
business (DTLR 2001) but concerns about the speed and efficiency of the 
process resulted in reforms that emphasised a strategic perspective that 
sits uneasily with the community ambition of Labour`s reform of local 
democracy. These ambitions had been set out in the Local Government 
White Paper 2006 and the Local Government and Public Involvement in 
Health Act 2007, whilst the Planning & Compensation Act 2004 
introduced the strategic element. 
 
We have already referred to collaborative planning, and Gallent refers to 
the work of Wates (2000) who perceived the concept as diffusing conflict 
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between professionals and communities by opening up decisions and by 
easing tensions between different community members or groups by 
bringing planning into a community domain and by trying to ease the 
tension between different representations and rationales. However for 
much of the 1990`s these tools did not deal with the fundamental problem 
of planning remaining fixed within the public domain, with real power 
remaining firmly in the hands of professionals, politicians and local 
government. 
 
An alternative view is provided by Taylor (2009) who describes the 
initiatives within both the 2004 Planning & Compulsory Purchase Act and 
the government guidance note PPS12 to replace old – style “town and 
country “or “land use “ planning by spatial planning described in PPS12 
as going beyond these traditional plans so as to take account of the 
strategies and plans of other agencies not traditionally involved in land 
use planning but who also have an impact on spatial development. Taylor 
comments that what was missing in the 2004 Act were any new powers to 
enable state planning authorities to realise these aspirations, and the 
power of implementation lies with developers and the market. 
 
Gallent (2008) had observed this dichotomy. Spatial planning had 
emerged from two parallel but distinctly different policy streams. It must 
operate at two different levels: at the community level and at a strategic 
level defined, most recently in the Barker Review of Land – Use Planning 
(Barker 2006) which described parochialism as a constraint on 
development and advised that the planning system become more attuned 
to market signals, allocating more land for housing, more space for 
growth and becoming more strategic in its outlook. 
 
Barker`s recommendations were incorporated into government advice 
(PPS3 Housing 2006) which advocated a Housing Market Assessment 
approach to housing land allocation and the 2008 Planning Act, which 
established the Infrastructure Planning Commission. Gallent noted that 
some elements of the planning process are being transformed into the 
community domain whilst others are being clawed back. He concludes, 
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“Communities are empowered to express aspirations, and local planning 
is conceived as part of a holistic planning and governance model in which 
local planning decisions can be subservient to a broader better – 
coordinated local policy agenda. But when it comes to the big issues – 
economic growth, international competitiveness, tackling climate change, 
energy security and improving quality of life (DCLG 2007) or indeed, 
strategic housing development – the clear message is that planning 
should remain firmly within the public domain” His conclusion is that from 
the early 2000`s the Labour Government allowed the process of holistic 
planning and governance and strategic planning linked to distinct policy 
streams to drift apart and ultimately form distinct systems. 
 
Some confirmation of this view emerged in a MA thesis by Richard 
Walker (2008) who examined whether the new system of plan – making 
strengthens or weakens the position of local planning authorities in 
relation to regional bodies and central government in Bristol and the 
South West. His broad conclusion is that because sub–regional 
strategies are no longer constructed, tested, consulted on and examined 
sub–regionally, local planning authorities are experiencing reduced scope 
to formulate and take ownership of locally distinctive strategies for the 
distribution of housing growth. Whilst there remain concerns about the 
level of growth to be accommodated, this has always been an issue. 
What is new is the tightening of the room for manoeuvre in terms of 
deciding where growth will go. He concludes that the role of local 
planning authorities has shifted towards the co – ordination and delivery 
of strategies made at a higher level than the role of local authority 
members, particularly those elected to represent wards that are directly 
affected by the growth agenda. The aim of the study was to gather 
empirical evidence on the experiences and perceptions of institutional 
actors involved closely with planning reform. Unfortunately only one 
councillor was contacted and in the main the participants were sourced 
largely from local government officers and central government officials. A 
failure to properly evaluate the role of councillors in the planning system 
has been a common thread of the research literature reviewed in this 
working paper. 
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Thames Gateway as a test bed for the emergence of flexible multilevel 
networks of government agencies 
 
The largest of the growth areas, this extensive area extending from the 
eastern borders of Greater London on both sides of the Thames estuary 
to the North Sea has been identified as a growth area by successive 
governments and has proved a test bed for the emergence of flexible 
multilevel networks of governance agencies involved in functions 
previously the domain of central and local government. It has also been 
subject to a number of research inquiries by academics interested in the 
relationship between evolving forms of governance and particular 
approaches to the planning and creation of places. Brownill and 
Carpenter (2009) conclude that the experience of the Thames Gateway 
provides compelling evidence of the emerging complexity in the 
governance of planning, particularly the tension between networked 
forms of governance and the continuing importance of hierarchical 
relations.  
 
This theme was examined by Greenwood and Newman (2010), who 
considered traditional and new planning practices in the Thames 
Gateway and their case study suggests that the emphasis on the move to 
new, collaborative practices underestimates the influence of traditional 
government structures. This provides cause for questioning the capacity 
of the current planning system to address the challenge of sustainable 
development, a central concern of the new planning. The double process 
of reform – the devolution and regional agenda of the Labour 
administration since 1997, and the continuing reform of the planning 
system in search of efficiency, effectiveness and the community focus of 
spatial planning – has created a framework for planning that is 
increasingly complex. The policy making process was criticised by the 
Conservative opposition (2006) as confused and lacking in accountability, 
and Greenwood and Newman conclude that this complexity is very 
evident in the regeneration of Thames Gateway. They point out that the 
new planning system draws its legitimacy from the effectiveness of such 
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multi - scale and cross – sector co -ordination, from engaging local 
communities and achieving sustainable development objectives written 
into recent reforms. Their conclusions are that there are two, potentially 
conflicting planning processes deploying old and new ideologies in 
search of legitimacy for the Thames Gateway project as a whole. We 
might see traditional planning as slowly being replaced by new practices, 
but the continuation of a separate decision process for large projects 
suggests that definitions of sustainable development, participation and 
good planning are unlikely to become stabilised. 
 
Further reflections on the impact of growth on specific areas and 
implications for local governance are contained in the book by Boddy, 
Lambert and Snape (1997), “City for the 21st Century: Globalisation, 
planning and urban change in contemporary Britain”, which examined the 
growth town of Swindon. The authors suggested that Swindon might 
illustrate something of the changing nature of city and urban living as we 
move into the next millennium. Economic success and physical 
expansion have been accompanied by major shifts in terms of 
community, identity and ways of life. Corporate structures, economic 
progress and labour markets locally are increasingly tied in with wider 
processes operating at regional, national and international levels. Places 
such as Swindon on the fringes of the South East growth region are 
increasingly satellites of London as national capital and of the broader, 
global economy. Images of economic excellence are challenged by 
significant and possibly increasing polarisation in terms of the economic 
and social benefits of success. Both the social and physical structure of 
the urban area are quite strongly characterized by the fragmentation and 
lack of focus which seems increasingly to characterize urban life.  
 
The growth of Swindon was planned from the nineteen sixties onwards, 
and during this time, the Central Oxfordshire Sub-Region was 
characterized by a strategy of restraint and containment. We shall see in 
the case study how this policy was challenged towards the end of the 
millennium and the Sub-Region began to display some of the growth 
characteristics noted by the authors in their Swindon study.  
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      Reform Proposals of the Coalition Government 
 
The conclusion of Greenwood and Newman that the reform of the 
planning system was not yet settled was particularly apt.  The policy 
paper published in 2009 in advance of the general election by the 
Conservative Party: Control Shift: Returning Power to Local Communities 
and which summarised their approach to the planning system has been 
examined. Subsequently a pre-election green paper was published, 
“Open Source Planning”, written by John Howell MP who was to become 
PPS to the Decentralisation Minister Greg Clark MP, and this provided 
the basis for Conservative planning policy. What was noticeable about 
the Conservative and Liberal Democrat political parties during the 
election campaign was a broad agreement on the objectives and 
purposes for the planning system. The Coalition Government has 
published (July 2010) A Draft Structural Reform Plan for the Department 
for Communities and Local Government. The aims of which were to 
devolve power closer to neighbourhoods, increase citizen participation, 
promote community ownership, lift inspection burdens on councils and 
remove regional government. As far as the planning system is concerned 
the draft plan indicated that the Coalition would introduce a new Bill in 
November 2010 and this would be predicated on the policy paper 
referred to above. 
 
The Localism Act 2011  
 
The scope of the Act is hugely ambitious and represents arguably the 
greatest change to the planning system since its inception in Attlee’s post 
war government in 1947. It ranges over a wide range of local government 
and housing issues in addition to planning. The innovation that will have 
the biggest impact is the first clause of the Act that introduces a new 
general power of competence that will give local authorities an explicit 
freedom to act in the best interests of their voters, unhindered by the 
absence of specific legislation supporting their actions. No action- except 
raising taxes, which requires specific parliamentary approval- will any 
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longer be beyond the powers of local government in England unless the 
local authority is prevented from taking that action by the common law, 
specific legislation or statutory guidance. 
 
 
Councillors will be given more freedom to become involved in local issues 
as predetermination rules introduced by new Labour, which prevented 
councillors voting on issues where they had previously expressed a view, 
are relaxed, but criminal sanctions are introduced to ensure that 
councillors do not deliberately withhold a personal interest. Councils, 
whatever their size, will be given the opportunity, if they prefer, to have a 
committee structure of governance rather than the cabinet model 
introduced by New Labour. Referenda were to be held in May 2012 on 
the principle of directly elected mayors in areas that request them and, if 
approved, elections would be held a year later.  The abolition of regional 
strategies, as long expected, was proposed in the Act, but alongside this 
abolition there is now a statutory duty to co-operate on planning matters 
that will apply to local authorities and other public bodies. 
 
Prime Minister David Cameron and his policy advisor Oliver Letwin see 
the “Howell” reforms as an important first step in the move towards the 
“Big Society”. A key innovation is the opportunity for neighbourhoods and 
parish councils to become involved in the planning of their own localities. 
Until now these bodies have been consulted by local planning authorities, 
but not always listened to. The new legislation enables them – provided 
they have more than 50 per cent local support for a development 
proposal – to press the local planning authority to issue a 
“Neighbourhood Development Order” which will effectively grant planning 
permission. The threshold has been substantially reduced from the 75 
per cent originally set. 
 
The Coalition Government had already announced that it intended to 
keep the Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) introduced by the last 
government, and the Act indicates that some receipts from the levy will 
be transferred to neighbourhoods. Detailed regulations will be published 
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but the mechanism will allow community groups to specify how they want 
their share of the proceeds to be spent, and that these can be spent on 
the costs of running services as well as the initial costs of provision. 
 
The Act confirms that the Infrastructure Planning Commission (IPC) will 
be merged into a major infrastructure planning unit at the Planning 
Inspectorate and the statutory framework to reach decisions will be the 
same as the current regime, but with Ministers taking the final decisions. 
The Coalition has faced significant opposition to its proposals from the 
development and construction industry and its professional advisors, who 
fear that localism will usher in even more local objection to development. 
These critics point to those local authorities which cancelled 189,000 new 
homes from their local plans following the letter to local authorities written 
on 27th May 2010 by Eric Pickles, Secretary of State for Communities, 
advising them that the Coalition Government would go ahead and abolish 
the Regional Strategies, which was subsequently done on 6th July 2010. 
That decision was successfully challenged by Cala Homes (South) in the 
High Court. The Judge decided that the Secretary of State acted 
unlawfully by purporting to revoke the strategies without at least 
conducting an environmental assessment as required by regulation.  On 
the same day, 10th November 2010, as the judge’s decision was 
announced, the Government’s Chief Planner wrote to local authorities 
pointing out that the regional strategies would nonetheless be abolished 
in the forthcoming Localism Bill, and that the new homes bonus, which 
rewards councils for approving new homes in their areas, would come 
into effect in April 2011, but would act retrospectively and cover homes 
permitted from the date of the letter. Subsequently this was successfully 
challenged and a compromise agreed with the Planning Inspectorate for 
Inspectors determining planning appeals and conducting public 
examinations of Core Strategies, which had the effect of staying the 
government’s statement and letter, and regional strategies continuing to 
be part of the statutory development plan. 
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Sustainability and Development 
 
The notion of sustainable development was popularized by the Bruntland 
Report in 1987. During this first phase there was a move away from the 
more traditional reactive methods of solving environmental problems 
towards the prevention of harm. By the middle of this decade there was a 
realization of the need for a more holistic approach, but this has only 
taken place on a wide-ranging group of policies since 2005. We can 
therefore distinguish two stages. There was an initial stage which drew 
extensively on the 1987 Bruntland Report of the World Commission on 
Environment and Development and culminated in the 1995 Environment 
Act going on to the statute book and the setting up of the Environment 
Agency. There then followed increasing pressure from environmental 
groups for a more over-arching policy across all arms of government.  
 
 Government saw the planning system as an effective way of 
implementing sustainable policies, and published in 2005 a paper that set 
a framework for incorporating sustainable development within the 
planning system. Further advice followed on climate change, and since 
then there has been considerable legislative activity to ensure that a 
sustainable approach is taken across all sectors of planning, construction 
and development. Environmental groups have been instrumental in 
pressing for legislative changes and once all-party political support was 
broadly obtained, the legislative pressure has increased. The second 
phase has been marked by an acceleration of legislative changes so as 
to achieve an integrated approach to sustainable development. Over the 
period 2005- 07 there was a wealth of policy advice that is now 
consolidated in a series of documents.  
 
In February 2005, PPS1 “Delivering Sustainable Development” set out 
the government’s objectives for the planning system, whilst in March the 
policy document “Securing the Future” was published, aimed at an 
integrated approach to protect and enhance the physical and natural 
environment, and to use resources and energy as efficiently as possible. 
   
 93 
These documents were accompanied by planning policy statements on 
key issues such as the protection of biodiversity and geological 
conservation, sustainable development in rural areas, waste 
management, renewable energy and flood risk. The May 2007 White 
Paper, “Planning for a Sustainable Future”, was followed in December of 
that year by the Supplement to Planning Policy Statement 1 entitled 
“Planning and Climate Change”, and sets out how planning should 
contribute to reducing emissions and stabilizing climate change, taking 
into account the unavoidable consequences. Tackling climate change is a 
key government priority for the spatial planning system, and there is now 
a firm basis of planning policy to guide local planning authorities and 
developers. The new Coalition Government committed itself to these 
policies in the Coalition Programme published on 20th May 2010. 
 
Conclusions 
 
This review of emerging theory about the purpose of spatial planning and 
the opportunity for a more collaborative approach to place making has 
indicated a number of themes, which together with earlier debates, I 
would identify as follows. 
 
The role of planning committee 
The role of the planning committee in local government has been 
endorsed, principally because of its importance to the public 
accountability of the planning system, but its role in both policy making 
and development control decisions has been heavily constrained by 
officers. Decisions where planning committee members reject the advice 
of officers are not regarded nationally as significant and implicitly are 
perceived as a safety valve, and a further demonstration of the public 
accountability of the planning system. Within the new local government 
governance structure the role of the committee is regarded as regulatory 
rather than policy making. Being regarded as “quasi – judicial“, it is 
thought to be exempt from politicisation. 
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The making of planning policy 
The majority of the literature supports the role of the planning system, 
and that of planning policy as mediating between different interests 
involved in development and urban growth. Notwithstanding the 
considerable changes in the planning system since the 1970`s that role 
has not been challenged, but the extent to which the planning system is 
able to adapt to new circumstances or alternatively acts as a constraint 
on spatial transformations required by economic and political change has 
been a recurring question. Plan making continues to play a role as a 
vehicle for providing the rationale for specific planning decisions, but 
there has been wide debate on the scope of these plans and the manner 
in which they are prepared. Healey (2007) and others argue that spatial 
planning practices can facilitate collective action with progressive 
purpose, contrasting with the more established public jurisdictional 
approach, but experience in Thames Gateway suggests that the 
emphasis upon the move to new, collaborative practices under estimates 
the influence of traditional government structures, and that the tension 
between these two systems of governance has hindered the 
development of local capacity to manage development processes. 
 
Moves towards more locally focused decision- making 
Since 1997 when the New Labour Government was elected there have 
been moves towards more locally focused decision making, but Gallent 
(2008) has observed that from the early 2000`s the Labour Government 
allowed the process of holistic planning and governance and strategic 
planning to drift apart and ultimately form distinct systems. The new 
Coalition Government has already taken steps to abolish regional spatial 
strategies but the dichotomy between “localism “ and the need for a 
strategic perspective remains. 
 
The role of officers 
Hall (1993) draws attention to the influence of professionalism in the 
development of policy within the traditional welfare domain of local 
government, for example in social services and land use planning. These 
services epitomised the service administration nature of post war local 
   
 95 
government and consequently were conducive to the application of 
uniform best practice. Both in the committee system that existed in local 
government prior to 2000, where the head of planning had an important 
role in both policy making and decisions on applications, and in the new 
cabinet system, the role of officers has been dominant and is probably 
increasing as officers play a role in the community leadership role 
required by the new governance. This has given rise to concerns about 
democratic legitimacy. 
 
Local party politics in local government 
Both as a developer and as a regulator, local government has been 
heavily constrained by central government policies whether in respect of 
the planning system or local authority finance. Governance changes, 
particularly the move towards a more collaborative approach could 
suggest an even more diminished role for local party politics. Some 
researchers (Lepine and Sullivan 2010) suggest that if councillors are to 
contribute to the good governance of communities, this does require the 
restoration of the political function of the councillor, which involves the 
management and resolution of conflict, the exercise of judgement and, in 
all this, engagement with citizens.  
 
Reflections for the research project 
There is no dispute that the councillor is an institutional actor in the 
management of urban growth and the conflicts between participants that 
arise in these territories. However the extent to which councillors pay a 
role in the mediation provided by the planning system in these conflicts is 
by no means certain, and regarded by some researchers as negligible or 
of no significance. Others without challenging this conclusion, suggest 
this is worrying and there are implications for democratic legitimacy and 
the good governance of communities. Councillors can play a role in the 
spatial planning system within local government in a number of ways. 
Firstly, as a portfolio holder for planning in the Cabinet or Executive; 
secondly, as a member of the Scrutiny Committee examining planning 
documents intended for Cabinet approval; thirdly as a member of the 
regulatory planning committee which determines planning applications 
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submitted to the Council, and finally as a ward member representing local 
constituents at the planning committee. Clearly based on the literature 
review, this under- estimates the many and varied roles that councillors 
do, can or could play in the management of urban growth. Some 
researchers have noted a pro – active role played by councillors but 
others are concerned that councillors may be over shadowed in 
community leadership roles by officers. These are worrying issues and 
contemporary research is only now beginning to reflect on these problem 
areas. 
 
The implications of the new governance in local government for the 
spatial planning system 
This review has identified a number of important changes to local 
government since the major reorganisation in 1974. These include the 
increased role of political parties and their importance in forming a 
governing administration within councils, the diminished role for the 
committee structure and that a number of services are now delivered 
outside the local government system, a concentration of power within the 
cabinet or executive and a diminished role for non - executive members, 
the importance of community leadership and the principal role accorded 
to local government in this. 
 
There have also been changes in the system of town and country 
planning with the move towards the more over - arching concept of 
spatial planning, but against the background of changes in local 
government and governance, the following three basic questions form a 
context for the research: 
 
a) Has the lack of local government autonomy inhibited the adoption 
of innovative forms of collaborative planning; 
b) Have councillors understood the central tenets of collaborative 
planning and acted upon them and  
c) Can local politicians who are not members of the council’s 
executive play a more effective community leadership role by 
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becoming more involved in the scrutiny of policies for space and place 
making. 
  
Reflecting on these three questions the following observations are 
offered: 
 
a) Planning as a regulatory activity i.e: the determination of planning 
applications made to the Council has survived as a committee activity 
although a much larger number of decisions are now delegated to 
officers. 
 
b) Despite the increased politicisation within local government, the 
regulatory activities of the planning committee which are regarded as 
being “quasi – judicial” are not “whipped“ and decisions are made by 
members based on planning law and officers` recommendations. 
However, where local opposition to applications is severe, political 
influences can play a part in decisions on applications. 
  
c) The planning committee system is criticised, particularly by business 
interests, as being unpredictable and slow. Councillors are criticised as 
being ill informed and requiring more training. The CPA system has been 
used to improve the efficiency of planning committees and the planning 
service generally. 
  
     d) Planning policy is no longer largely determined by committee but by 
the cabinet taking decisions on recommendations made by the senior 
management team. The Core Strategies being produced under the new 
LDF system are more over - arching than the local plans, previously 
published, which were more concerned with land use allocation, and are 
seen as being a key part of the community leadership role of local 
government. However these documents may be officer- led, thereby 
reducing their local legitimacy. 
 
e) Moves towards more locally focussed decision- making were apparent 
under the previous government with its advocacy of local area decision- 
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making but are likely to become more pronounced given the declared 
policies of the new Coalition Government. Concerns about a conflict 
between “localism“ and a growth agenda requiring increased delivery of 
housing and employment land and infrastructure are now regularly 
expressed by business and development lobbies in the national and 
professional press. 
 
f) The growth of “managerialism“ in local government has meant that not    
only are more and more planning applications being determined by 
officers acting under delegated powers but the role of the senior 
management team in the preparation of the various documents: The 
Community Strategy, The Core Strategy and Economic Partnership 
strategies has become very pronounced, raising concerns about political 
legitimacy. 
 
g) The restoration of the political function to councillors as advocated by 
Lepine and Sullivan (2010) in order to make local governance more 
accountable will have implications for the role of councillors in both 
preparing spatial plans and making decisions on planning applications. 
 
Given what has been discussed in this chapter about the position or role of 
councillors in local government, what are the secondary or subsidiary 
questions that help to elaborate the major questions that can be tested 
through the research?  The following is an attempt to summarise these: 
 
1) Does the move from government to governance signify a de-
politicisation in local government, and a reduced role for councillors, 
particularly those neither in cabinet nor having committee leadership 
roles? To what extent do councillors conform to the typology of roles 
ascribed to them by academic research? 
 
2) Are Core Strategies that are intended to be over-arching in terms of the   
governance of the district, and not just land-use allocation documents, 
essentially expressions of political aspirations for the district? In these 
circumstances, should the strategies be politically “whipped”, and what 
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scope is there for councillors to dissent whose wards may be critically 
affected? Can the Core Strategies be used to share political space, 
influence and power with those outside the world of the party? 
 
3) Do councillors welcome the opportunity afforded by the Localism Bill to 
determine their own requirements for housing and employment within the 
district and to what extent are they influenced by considerations of ward 
and re-election? 
 
4) In addition to membership of the planning committee, are there 
opportunities for councillors to become involved in place making and does 
party membership impede this?  
 
5)  Does the traditional argument that views councillors as the people who 
should make the major decisions within the planning system still hold, or 
should the councillor play a more collaborative role in bringing 
stakeholders together and broaden the area for decision taking in place 
making? 
 
6)  In order to exercise community leadership within their wards, will there 
be occasions when councillors may have to go against the policies of the 
party of which they are a member, and will there be occasions when there 
may be the need for a more flexible approach to the application of adopted 
Local Plan policies? To what extent does party leadership tolerate 
divergent views at the ward level? 
 
7) How do councillors rate the value of the preparation of Core Strategies 
within the planning system, and do they feel that they have had an 
opportunity to contribute to the evolution of the Core Strategy? To what 
extent are policies proposed by senior councillors and officers and what is 
the scope for back- bench involvement? 
 
8) Given that a whole range of issues, eg: employment and the journey to 
work area, affordable housing needs, waste, transport and infrastructure 
needs etc, transcend district-wide boundaries, what institutional 
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mechanisms are there for local authority and public agency collaboration, 
now that regional spatial strategies are being revoked by the Coalition 
Government? To what extent is such collaboration hampered by party 
political differences? 
 
In my next chapter I set out my methodological approach as to how I 
pursue my three research questions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 101 
Chapter 3 Research Methodology and Design 
 
An Introduction to the Research Strategy and Research Questions 
 
An abductive research strategy has been adopted, concentrating on a 
case study of the Central Oxfordshire Sub – region, in which to pursue 
the three major research questions that were identified from the literature 
review. The secondary or subsidiary questions that were also identified 
help to elaborate the major questions and provide a context for the 
research. In drafting this chapter which aims to deploy a theoretical 
framework for the research, the author has found helpful Blaikie (2000) 
Designing Social Research Policy, particularly Chapter 1 which deals with 
preparing research proposals and research design, and Peter Burnham, 
el al (2008) Research Methods in Politics. Blaikie stresses that the 
preparation of a research design is likely to involve many iterations, and 
is a cyclical rather than a linear process.  Burnham et al make a similar 
point but emphasise that nonetheless the linear model has the great 
advantage of clarity. It specifies the various stages in the research 
process in a logical and coherent way even if there are setbacks as 
mistakes are discovered or the hypotheses refuted by the evidence. The 
main stages of this research process that have been followed are: 
 
1. Theory Specification 
2. Development of hypotheses and model 
3. Data specification 
4. a) Design of data collection instrument 
b) Sample design 
5. Pilot Study 
6. a) Design of final data collection instrument 
b) Design of final sample 
7. Data collection 
8. Coding and checking 
9. Data analysis 
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Blaikie also emphasises the importance of stating what the research is 
designed to achieve, and that most social research projects will 
contribute to one or more of the following: 
 
 the development of a particular area of theory or methodology; 
 the collection or accumulation of a new body of information or data; 
 the development of research methods or techniques; 
 knowledge about or understanding of an issue or problem; and /or 
 policy and practice in a particular area 
 
The author hopes from the particular perspective of spatial planning to 
contribute to all of these objectives .In Chapter 1 the aims, objectives and 
structure of the thesis were set out, whilst from the literature review 
conducted in Chapter 2 three major research questions were identified. 
Blaikie suggests that it is useful to separate major research questions 
from secondary or subsidiary questions. The latter are either related to 
the background and context of the research, or help to elaborate the 
major questions. Major research questions presuppose other questions; 
they can sometimes also be broken down into a series of questions. The 
major questions are: 
 
a) Has the lack of local government autonomy inhibited the adoption 
of innovative forms of collaborative planning; 
b) Have councillors understood the central tenets of collaborative 
planning and acted upon them and  
c) Can local politicians who are not members of the council`s 
executive play a more effective community leadership role by 
becoming more involved in the scrutiny of policies for space and place 
-making. 
 
The dependent variable is the influence of political affiliation on decision - 
making in the governance of spatial planning, and the independent 
variables are membership of a political party, the length of service of the 
councillor, the role of the councillor in local government and the 
relationship between the councillor and the ward that he or she 
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represents. Everything else that makes up the social, economic and 
political context and backdrop of the dependent and independent 
variables fits into a third category, known as intervening variables. The 
literature review identified the attempts of academics over a thirty - year 
time span to produce typifications that would help to explain the actions 
of local politicians and the decisions that they took, and to conceptualise 
the particular world of local government politics. Although this research is  
looking at a specific area of local government, namely spatial planning, 
as demonstrated in the literature review, it is subject to the same factors 
of governance, the politicisation of local government, the differing roles of 
councillors and the “ modernising “ ambitions of national government. 
 
The secondary or subsidiary questions that help to elaborate the major 
questions were identified as follows: 
 
1) Does the move from government to governance signify a de-
politicisation in local government, and a reduced role for councillors, 
particularly those neither in cabinet nor having committee leadership 
roles? To what extent do councillors conform to the typology of roles 
ascribed to them by academic research? 
 
2) Are Core Strategies that are intended to be over-arching in terms of the   
governance of the district, and not just land-use allocation documents, 
essentially expressions of political aspirations for the district? In these 
circumstances, should the strategies be politically “whipped”, and what 
scope is there for councillors to dissent whose wards may be critically 
affected? Can the Core Strategies be used to share political space, 
influence and power with those outside the world of the party? 
 
3) Do councillors welcome the opportunity afforded by the Localism Act to 
determine their own requirements for housing and employment within the 
district, and to what extent are they influenced by considerations of ward 
and re-election? 
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4) In addition to membership of the planning committee, are there 
opportunities for councillors to become involved in place making and does 
party membership impede this?  
 
5) Does the traditional argument that views councillors as the people who 
should make the major decisions within the planning system still hold, or 
should the councillor play a more collaborative role in bringing 
stakeholders together and broaden the area for decision taking in place -
making?  
 
6) In order to exercise community leadership within their wards, will there 
be occasions when councillors may have to go against the policies of the 
party of which they are a member, and will there be occasions when 
there may be the need for a more flexible approach to the application of 
adopted Local Plan policies? To what extent does party leadership 
tolerate divergent views at the ward level? 
 
7) How do councillors rate the value of the preparation of Core Strategies 
within the planning system, and do they feel that they have had an 
opportunity to contribute to the evolution of the Core Strategy? To what 
extent are policies proposed by senior councillors and officers and what 
is the scope for back bench involvement? 
 
8) A whole range of issues including employment and the journey to work 
area, housing needs, waste, transport and infrastructure needs, 
transcend district-wide boundaries and what institutional mechanisms are 
there for local authority and public agency collaboration, now that 
regional spatial strategies are being revoked by the Coalition 
Government? To what extent is such collaboration hampered by party 
political differences? 
 The aim of the research, the objectives, the primary research questions 
and the subsidiary research questions are set out in tabular form at Table 
1 so as to assist the reader better link the research questions with the 
methods and to indicate within the structure of the thesis where the 
research questions are discussed and explored. 
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Insert Table 1 
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An Abductive Research Strategy 
 
Blaikie (2000) discusses four research strategies, each linked with 
different philosophical and theoretical traditions. These are the inductive, 
deductive, retroductive and abductive, and each provides distinctly 
different ways of answering research questions. The inductive approach 
tries to derive from collected data generalisations using inductive logic 
and once established they can be used to explain the occurrence of 
specific events. This strategy is useful for answering “what “questions but 
rather limited in its capacity to answer “why “questions. The deductive 
approach begins with some regularity that has been discovered and  
begs an explanation. The task is then to test that theory by deducting one 
or more hypotheses from it, and then to collect appropriate data. By this 
method knowledge of the social worlds is advanced by means of a trial 
and error process. The retroductive research strategy also starts with an 
observed regularity but seeks a different type of explanation and uses 
creative imagination and analogy to work back from data to an 
explanation. The abductive research strategy has a very different logic 
from the other three. The starting point is the social world of the social 
actors being investigated: their construction of reality, their way of 
conceptualising and giving meaning to their social world, and their tacit 
knowledge. We have seen how Gyford (1984), Copus (2004), Gains 
(2005) and others have used this approach so as to provide a systematic   
explanatory account of local politics. 
 
It was decided to use an abductive research strategy which is to examine 
within a growth area the approaches that local planning authorities devise 
in their response to growth pressures and to what extent these 
approaches reflect the roles and views of councillors and the political 
parties of which they are members. The starting point is the political world 
of the councillors, their construction of reality, their way of conceptualising 
and giving meaning to their social world. This can only be discovered 
from the accounts that they provide. Individual motives and activities have 
to be abstracted into typical motives for typical actions in typical situations 
and these typifications provide an understanding of the activities and 
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provide a basis for a more systematic explanatory account. In this 
research the author also reflected on his own party political activity as a 
party member and party worker, councillor and council executive and the 
insights this has provided to the world of local government. 
 
By reference to a case study of the Central Oxfordshire Sub – region 
which is proving to be one of the fastest growing localities in the country, 
where the case for and against further growth is now strongly contested, 
the author conducted a series of structured interviews with councillors, 
officers and other stake holders so as to identify the role of councillors, 
and their interpretation of their role in decision making, and to assess the 
extent to which ideological, other ideas and values influence their 
decision making. The final stage is to bring together these strands and 
analyses the role of councillors in the planning decision making process 
and the ideological, other ideas and values that influence them. 
 
Research Questions and Conceptual Framework 
 
The planning system has a critical role to play in mediating between 
different interests. The over – arching research question is how and to 
what extent do local elected members exercise political leadership where 
spatial strategies are contested. The secondary or subsidiary questions 
(or independent variables) are: In formulating this role are councillors 
influenced by any of the following factors: 
a) their membership ( or not ) of a political party and its manifesto and 
objectives. 
b) their length of time as a member of the Council and their 
responsibilities within the Council. 
c) their involvement in the issues and events associated with : i) their 
electoral ward and ii) the wider community. 
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Conceptualising the role of councillor and the role of party politics in local 
government  
 
In exercising his or her role the councillor has a number of options 
available in terms of how he or she performs in relation not merely 
towards constituents, or towards the workload of the local authority, but 
also towards party (if any), the local pressure groups, the officers and the 
community outside the particular ward. A number of attempts have been 
made to investigate and to summarise the wide variety of role 
orientations that a councillor may assume. Gyford (1984) attempted to 
draw these together and identified one general conclusion that did 
emerge from the various studies: that the choice of role orientation by 
councillors is not particularly associated with age, sex or social class, but 
rather with such factors as seniority and length of service on the council, 
the character of the councillor’s ward and party political allegiance.  
 
As already cautioned, like other classifications, it is not wholly watertight 
and individual councillors will not always fall into place within it. Gyford 
(1984) further added that the distinction is, at least theoretically, one that 
exists at a 
given point in time, and is one that an individual councillor can transcend 
during the course of a political career. The increasing complexity of policy 
making may, however, make that process more difficult. Cartwright 
(1974) found that the effect of the introduction of corporate planning in 
one London Borough had been to strengthen the split between those 
councillors who were interested in policy and others who were interested 
in casework,whilst other academic research, as we saw in the literature 
review, has attempted to provide typifications for the governance of local 
government. 
 
 
Gains et al (2005) suggest that the potential exists for local authorities to 
be independently strong and weak on the two dimensions of leadership 
and scrutiny. This in turn leads to the identification of four broad paths for 
implementation: 
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Low scrutiny/ low leadership: collectivist patterns of leadership and 
decision-making, fusion model in which neither leadership nor scrutiny is 
given a clear role. 
 
Low leadership/ high scrutiny: maintains collectivist patterns of leadership 
but introduces patterns of control and review, collective accountability 
model.  
 
Low scrutiny/ high leadership: have either transferred existing patterns of 
new leadership without introducing strong patterns of review, or have 
moved from collectivist patterns of leadership to a focussed executive 
without adopting the other parts of the reforms, executive autonomy 
model.  
 
The separation of powers model is the fourth model, which has both well-
defined leadership structures and strong forms of scrutiny and review. 
 
This research examined whether the councils conform to any of these 
leadership models. Other research has examined the politicisation of 
local government. The case studies conducted by Copus explored the 
patterns of political behaviour existing within the five councils which 
represent all three main political parties, and where the council has 
adopted the leader and cabinet executive arrangements. Copus 
concluded that the patterns of political behaviour display the resilience of 
the party group when faced with changing political structures, as well as 
the intensity of the relationships councillors have with the group. It is that 
relationship which places the group at the centre of political decision – 
making and policy development within local government. The common 
theme that runs throughout each of the case studies is that the politics of 
the councils are conducted within the political party group before it 
reaches the public domain. 
 
This politicisation of local government confirmed by Copus contrasts 
remarkably with the situation thirty years previously when Gyford (1984) 
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noted that party groups found it difficult to operate as co-ordinating 
devices and as policy initiators. To some extent he thought the then 
current development of policy committees reflected an attempt to fill this 
vacuum where groups have failed to do this. A key question he posed for 
the future of local government party politics is whether an effective policy 
-making role for the groups and the parties they represent, can be 
developed. The work of Copus suggests that the party group within local 
government has embraced this role, and this research examines to what 
extent this is reflective of the party groups within the Central Oxfordshire 
Sub – region. 
 
 
Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences 
 
The use of a case study requires explanation and justification. 
Comparative studies often do not include enough cases to allow the 
research question to be generically formulated. Sampling is introduced 
when a researcher selects a number of cases for study, rather than 
including the whole universe of possible cases in a study. Quantitative 
research often deals very explicitly with sampling, but in qualitative 
research this is less common. Earlier three research questions 
concerning spatial planning and councillors were identified. To investigate 
and pursue these questions a situation or case needed to be identified, 
where councillors are confronted with these issues, which can be 
observed and which is progressing towards resolution of these issues, 
and where analysis of this process can be carried out. Attention was 
drawn to the tension between networked forms of governance and the 
continuing importance of hierarchical relations in the governance of 
planning, which is one of the central themes of the  research and which is 
explored. 
 
Case studies are an extremely popular form of research design and are 
widely used throughout the social sciences. They enable the researcher 
to focus on a group, policy area or institution, and study it in depth over 
an extended period of time. While both quantitative and qualitative data 
   
 111 
can be generated by case study design, the approach has more of a 
qualitative character as it can generate a wealth of data relating to one 
specific case. The data cannot be used to generalise about the 
population as a whole as the case study is not a representative sample. 
However the attractiveness of case studies is that data on a wide range 
of variables can be collected on a single group, institution or policy area. 
A relatively complete account of the phenomenon can be achieved. This 
enables the researcher to argue convincingly about the relationships 
between the variables and present causal explanations for events and 
processes. These explanations and generalisations are limited to the 
particular case study. It may be possible to replicate the research at a 
later date but it may be impossible to know whether changes in an 
institution, for example, are due to changes in personnel or external 
developments such as new government policies. 
 
The case study approach – the detailed examination of an aspect of a 
historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be 
generalizable to other events – has come in and out of favour over the 
past five decades as researchers have explored the possibilities of 
statistical methods and formal models (George & Bennett 2004). 
Methodologically, these three methods use very different kinds of 
reasoning regarding fundamental issues such as case selection, 
operationalization of variables, and the use of inductive and deductive 
logic. These differences give the three methods complementary 
comparative advantages. Researchers should use each method for the 
research tasks for which it is best suited and use alternative methods to 
compensate for the limitations of each method. 
 
George and Bennett (2004) pay special attention to the method of 
process- tracing which attempts to trace the links between possible 
causes and observed outcomes. In process-tracing the researcher 
examines histories, archival documents , interview transcripts, and other 
sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or 
implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the 
intervening variables in that case. Process- tracing might be used to test 
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or to explain outcomes. Later in this chapter the multi-method approach 
to the research is described when reviewing the purpose of the 
questionnaire used together with the other sources identified in process- 
tracing. 
 
A case study design can be based on single or multiple cases. Carefully 
selected multiple cases will provide a much more robust test of a theory 
and can specify the conditions under which hypotheses and theories may 
or may not hold (Burnham et al 2008). Copus (2004) undertook five case 
studies taken from councils across the country that explored the patterns 
of political behaviour existing within these councils and the way in which 
the organisation and activities of the political party grouping influenced 
councillor activity. The research was designed to ensure that all the three 
main parties were represented. The number of cases appropriate in a 
particular research project depends on the research questions, the data 
available to answer these questions, the methodology appropriate to that 
data, as well as the general objectives. Eckstein, H. (1992) suggests that 
the argument for case studies as a means for building theories seems 
strongest in regard to precisely those phenomena with which the subfield 
of comparative politics is most associated: macropolitical phenomena, 
that is, units of political study of considerable magnitude or complexity 
such as nation – states and subjects virtually coterminous with them  
(party systems or political cultures ). 
 
In this research project a qualitative methodological approach to 
understanding the research objectives was taken. Guidance has been 
provided by the definition of qualitative research proposed by Denzin and 
Lincoln (1994): 
“Qualitative research is an interdisciplinary, transdisciplinary and 
sometimes counterdisciplinary field…It is multiparadigmatic in focus. Its 
practitioners are sensitive to the value of the multimethod approach. They 
are committed to the naturalistic perspective and to the interpretive 
understanding of human experience. At the same time, the field is 
inherently political and shaped by multiple ethical and political positions.” 
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Resources, timing and familiarity with the area have led to the choice of 
the Central Oxfordshire Sub- region as a case study. The intention was to 
examine three councils, each of them led by one of the main three 
parties: Oxford City Council, South Oxfordshire District Council and the 
Vale of White Horse District Council, but in the event concentration was 
on the first two as in the Vale progress on the Core Strategy was 
effectively shelved during the period of the research. At this stage 
reference is made to Skocpol (1984) who justified such an approach in 
the following way: “In contrast to the probabilistic techniques of statistical 
analysis – techniques that are used when there are very large numbers of 
cases and continuously quantified variables to analyse – comparative 
historical analyses proceed through logical juxtapositions of aspects of 
small numbers of cases. They attempt to identify invariant causal 
configurations that necessarily (rather than probably) combine to account 
for outcomes of interest.”  This has been the approach to this research. 
 
An early advocate of the benefit of the case study method in social 
inquiry was Robert E Stake. His essay published in 1978 provides a vivid 
description of the distinctiveness of the case study. 
 
“It is distinctive in the first place by giving great prominence to what is and 
what is not “the case” – the boundaries are kept in focus. What is 
happening and deemed important within these boundaries ( the emic) is 
considered vital and usually determines what the study is about, as 
contrasted with other kinds of studies where hypotheses or issues 
previously targeted by the investigators (the etic) usually determines the 
content of the study. 
 
But in the social science literature, most case studies feature : 
descriptions that are complex, holistic, and involving a myriad of not 
highly isolated variables; data that are likely to be gathered at least partly 
by personalistic observation; and a writing style that is informal, perhaps 
narrative, possibly with verbatim quotation, illustration, and even allusion 
and metaphor.” 
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That is the approach and style attempted in the case study as set out in 
Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis and in doing so, the context in which to 
draw generalisations has been provided but the researcher is aware that 
human beings are complex and their behaviour highly- context dependent 
so that lasting generalisations become difficult. (House, E.R. 2002). 
 
Professor Bent Flyvbjerg (2006) has attempted to deal with five 
misunderstandings about case – study research that he has identified as 
part of an ambitious (House, E.R.2002) goal to reformulate the social 
sciences so that they are relevant, moral and concerned about power and 
conflict. He does this from an essentially hermeneutic perspective 
(House, E.R. 2002) and that the complex subject matter of human beings 
does not lend itself to the type of universal generalisations common in the 
natural sciences, and that instead the focus should be on narration and 
case study research because so much depends on context, and 
furthermore social science studies should include power and conflict 
concerns because these are at the centre of human affairs. 
The five misunderstandings he identified are : (a) theoretical knowledge 
is more valuable than practical knowledge; (b) one cannot generalise 
from a single case, therefore,the single – case study cannot contribute to 
scientific development; (c) the case study is most useful for generating 
hypotheses, whereas other methods are more suitable for hypotheses 
testing and theory building; (d) the case study contains a bias towards 
verification; and (e) it is often difficult to summarise specific case studies. 
 
His article explains and in his view corrects these misunderstandings and 
he concludes with the Kuhnian insight that a scientific discipline without a 
large number of thoroughly executed exemplar case studies is a 
discipline without systematic production of exemplars, and a discipline 
without exemplars is an ineffective one. Social science may be 
strengthened by the execution of a greater number of good case studies. 
 
He also suggests a typology of strategies for the selection of samples 
and cases which distinguishes between A. Random selection and B. 
Information – orientated selection. This latter selection is separated into 
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four categories including as a fourth Paradigmatic cases which are 
defined as those where a metaphor can be developed or to establish a 
school for the domain which the case concerns. The researcher suggests 
that this case study falls within this latter category for it examines the 
problems for governance and collaboration in an area – the Central 
Oxfordshire sub – region – where a discourse of further growth needs to 
be stabilised in the local government system and allied agencies 
responsible for infrastructure. In the literature review other areas where 
such a discourse has begun were examined and there is some 
commonality but the strength of the approach is that the discourse 
described in the Central Oxfordshire Sub-region can be read as a 
narrative in its entirety, and it is from this that hypotheses can be 
generated which can be examined elsewhere. 
 
Flyvbjerg reformulates the five misunderstandings to demonstrate the 
utility of case – studies, and they are a productive means of examining 
the case study and its importance and relevance to the research. 
 
(1) Predictive theories and universals cannot be found in the study of 
human affairs. Concrete, context – dependant knowledge is therefore 
more valuable than the vein search for predictive theories and 
universals. 
(2) One can generalise on the basis of a single case and the case study 
may be central to scientific development via generalisation as 
supplement or alternative to other methods. But formal generalisation 
is overvalued as a source of scientific development, whereas “the 
force of example”is underestimated. 
(3) The case study is useful for both generating and testing of hypotheses 
but is not limited to these research activities alone. 
(4) The case study contains no greater bias towards verification of the 
researcher`s preconceived notions than other methods of inquiry. On 
the contrary, experience indicates that the case study contains a 
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greater bias toward falsification of preconceived notions than 
verification. 
(5) It is correct that summarising case studies is often difficult, especially 
as concerns case process. It is less correct as regards case 
outcomes. The problems in summarising case studies, however, are 
due more often to the properties of the reality studied than to the case 
study as a research method. Often it is not desirable to summarise 
and generalise case studies. Good studies should be read as 
narratives in their entirety. 
 
The Multi-Method Approach to the Research and the Purpose of the 
Questionnaire 
 
As explained above the qualitative approach is part of a multi-method 
approach which includes a quantitative questionnaire element, semi- 
structured in – depth interviews, some local media analysis and the 
analysis of planning documents. The rationale for potentially including a 
quantitative element in the research was to see how similar or different 
the councillors approached were in terms of their quantifiable opinions on 
the subjects included in the questionnaire. Participant observation during 
the public meetings also provided data on the interactions of different 
councillors and their perception of the issues. The data from the 
questionnaire analysis have been used cautiously and the advantage of 
the multiple methods approach has been to add rigour to the overall 
methodology which has not been over reliant on the questionnaire data. 
 
Reflecting on these propositions, the description of the sub-region 
includes the context in which local politicians have tried to develop the 
local capacity to manage the development options instigated by national 
government. This narrative provides background to the data obtained 
from the questionnaire survey and interviews. The surveys took place at 
a critical time in the development of local capacity for the governance of 
the sub – region as Core Strategies were prepared, consulted on and 
adopted by the local planning authorities. The questionnaires enabled an 
analysis of the three research questions, and the interviews permitted a 
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deeper exploration of a number of the themes as well as contacting a 
number of local actors important to the narrative. The case study 
represents a context in which the attitudes and actions of local politicians 
can be examined and generalisations attempted. 
 
The questionnaires sent to local politicians by e mail presented a discreet 
and courteous means of contacting them and allowed them to complete 
in their own time. They also presented an opportunity– and a number did 
– to indicate that they were prepared to be interviewed. They were 
extremely useful and it is hard to think of an alternative method of both 
contacting them and persuading them to complete the questionnaire 
within the resources of the thesis. In passing the researcher would 
mention that since being elected again a year ago, he has completed (by 
e mail) at least three surveys exploring political attitudes and views from 
research students. 
 
As is referenced later in this chapter the finalisation of the questionnaire 
design and content was an iterative process. By forwarding the first draft 
to the three council leaders the author was able to engage with them – 
either by interview or by telephone – not only to revise the draft but also 
to discuss the governance issues that were the primary interest. The 
challenges facing this approach as referenced in the conclusions is that 
the survey will only appeal to a minority of councillors because many are 
not interested in spatial planning. However from his knowledge of both 
South Oxfordshire District Council and Oxford City Council, the 
researcher believes that replies from nearly all of those councillors 
interested in the subject were received. 
 
The questionnaires were sent to each of the councillors during the 
summer of 2011 in the Oxford City, South Oxfordshire and Vale of White 
Horse District councils. The questionnaire (Appendix 2) was initially 
discussed with the original tutor Christine Lambert and then circulated to 
each of the party leaders of the three councils, each of whom commented 
on the draft and made suggestions for improvement. These comments 
are recorded in the interviews included at Appendix 1. The questionnaire 
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then went through several further iterations (Appendix 2) before being 
finally forwarded to each of the councillors by email. Interviews were also 
conducted with those councillors who expressed an interest following the 
initial questionnaire contact. During the summer and autumn of 2011 the 
researcher attended the public sessions of the examination in public to 
hear at first hand the debates between parish councils, members of the 
public, landowners and developers about the Core Strategy. In the main, 
few district councillors attended these debates; apparently leaving it to 
the officers and instructed legal counsel to explain the stance of the 
council.  
 
Interviews were conducted with a range of stakeholders identified from 
the published responses to the draft Core Strategies and those 
councillors who when responding to the questionnaire indicated that they 
would be willing to be interviewed. Initial contact was made by a variety of 
means, written letter, e mail and telephone and the interviews were 
conducted at a location chosen by the interviewee. The interview involved 
a semi- structured conversation about growth and capacity issues in the 
Sub-region and the individual`s perceptions and concerns about these 
issues.  
The interview themes included: 
 Background information and personal and political concerns. 
 Experiences and views on statutory, voluntary and private sector 
organisations. 
 Views on how they felt about effecting change in their ward and district 
council area. 
 The key sources of information at neighbourhood, ward, district, sub-
region and national levels. 
 Their views about how the capacity issues at the Sub-regional level 
were being addressed. 
 Their views on the planning and consultation process.  
 
In addition to the questionnaires and interviews other sources were 
included. All English councils are currently engaged in producing Core 
Strategies for their areas, which are subject to public consultation and 
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scrutiny.  The strategies proceed through a series of iterations that are 
subject to public consultation and comment by stakeholders. These are 
analysed by officers and the revised strategy is again subject to review by 
scrutiny committee, cabinet and full council. The Core Strategy as finally 
approved by Council is submitted to the Secretary of State and then 
subject to examination by an independent inspector who holds a public 
inquiry and makes recommendations for the final adoption of the Core 
Strategy. All of this material and debates are now available on the 
respective web sites of the individual councils. 
 
The approach in Oxford City Council and South Oxfordshire District 
Council towards the growth agenda was identified by examining cabinet 
reports and planning documents. Then preliminary interviews were 
conducted with the respective leaders to explain the research project and 
enlist their help. This included showing them the draft questionnaire and 
inviting their comments. There proved helpful in revising the 
questionnaire. This took place in spring 2011 and the researcher 
attended and observed cabinet meetings that are open to the public. 
Councillors were interviewed individually during summer 2011 about their 
attitudes and values on the semi – structured basis described above, and 
the selection of both Oxfordshire and of councillors to interview is best 
described as purposive rather than random. By reference to the case 
study of the Central Oxfordshire Sub - region the approach to policy 
making and decision- making at Cabinet for both councils was examined.  
The debate has essentially been conducted through the cabinet meetings 
of the two councils since 2004 and these were examined together with 
specific interviews. There is a broad range of opportunities by which 
councillors participate. These include council, cabinet meetings, and 
scrutiny committee, working groups, informal contacts between officers 
and councillors, attendance at parish and town council meetings and in 
city council areas, attendance at local area meetings. 
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Problems and Limitations 
 
Inevitably in a subject of a political nature there are ethical issues 
involved. Full consideration was given to the six key principles of ethical 
research that the ESRC expects to be addressed, and in devising the 
interviews to be conducted, the confidentiality and anonymity of 
respondents was respected.  The six key principles of ethical research 
that the ESRC expects to be addressed are: 
 
1. Research should be designed, reviewed and undertaken to ensure 
integrity, quality and transparency. 
2. Research staff and participants must normally be informed fully about 
the purpose, methods and intended possible uses of the research, 
what their participation in the research entails and what risks, if any, 
are involved. 
3. The confidentiality of information supplied by research participants and 
the anonymity of respondents must be respected. 
4. Research participants must take part voluntarily, free from any 
coercion. 
5. Harm to research participants and researchers must be avoided in all 
instances. 
6. The independence of research must be clear, and any conflicts of 
interest or partiality must be explicit. 
 
Some of those contacted did not wish to be interviewed and there was no 
attempt to coerce if the initial response was negative but those who did 
consent to interview did so enthusiastically. Given the amount of data 
publicly available, and that the interviews were intended to research 
some aspects in more depth in order to supplement the questionnaire 
responses, the broad canvas of the research was not adversely affected 
by non – respondents. Since the passing of the 2004 Planning Act there 
has been a dramatic improvement in the quality of planning data 
available from local government web sites, which has lessened the 
practical problems of data gathering which would have been evident in a 
research project of this nature even five years ago. 
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The Value of the Central Oxfordshire Sub-region as a Case Study 
 
The case study affords the opportunity to explore the three dimensions 
identified in Chapter 1 that influence the role of local councillors in local 
government through the prism of spatial planning. The first of these was 
the British polity expressed as the relationship between central 
government at Westminster and local government in the Town Hall. For 
more than four decades national policy towards the Sub- region was 
expressed as one of restraint. The special character of Oxford was to be 
preserved by its Green Belt and limited development in the wider county 
area beyond. Growth was to be directed to areas such as Milton Keynes 
and Reading. A fundamental change of national policy took place in the 
1990’s when with a sideways glance at Cambridge, central government 
realised that the Oxford area had the propensity to nature the new high – 
tech firms that were needed to stimulate the British economy in an era of 
globalisation. Local political acceptance of this change was initially 
grudging and these tensions have continued to the present time. 
 
The second dimension is the role of the political party in local government 
and its dominance in policy making. The Sub-region is characterised by 
the Labour party being the dominant political force in Oxford city, and the 
Conservative party in the surrounding rural districts, with the Lib Dems at 
times taking control during the electoral cycle. This has meant that 
councils have been subject to long periods of one party rule and the 
implications and difficulties this has created for effective scrutiny of policy. 
 
 
The third dimension is the evolving spatial planning system and the new 
emphasis on localism and collaborative planning. Because of the strong 
control exercised by central government, as  demonstrated by the 
adoption of the South East Plan by the former Labour government and 
which at the time of the research had not yet been repealed by its 
successor Coalition government, localism in policy making has been little 
demonstrated, much to the frustration of some local councillors. Similarly 
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collaboration has proved elusive as the failure of Oxford City Council and 
South Oxfordshire Council to agree a way forward that would deliver the 
proposed urban expansion of Oxford demonstrated. However the 
planned growth of Didcot in the southern part of the Sub-region has seen 
the Conservative- and Lib Dem- led riparian councils working together on 
an agreed strategy and policies. 
 
The Central Oxfordshire Sub-region does provide a revealing 
contemporary case study of the conflicting claims of economic growth 
and environmental protection taking place in many parts of Britain, and 
the role of the local councillor in these debates. 
 
Reflections on the Research Questions 
 
The advent of council executives and overview and scrutiny committees 
has introduced a new element to the internal and external cohesion of 
party groups. The executive acts as focus for party loyalty for the ruling 
group and, whilst willing to question the executive and to challenge its 
decisions, ruling groups do this at a group meeting not in overview and 
scrutiny. This new forum does open up a potential for party groups to 
engage in more cross-party deliberation than the old committee system 
but some opposition groups see it as an arena to criticise and challenge 
the ruling group from a purely party political perspective. The role of 
overview and scrutiny in the formation of spatial planning policy in the 
Central Oxfordshire Sub – region has been examined. Copus concludes 
that political decision – making at the local level is party – based political 
decision -making and party politics cannot be divorced from the activities 
of the council as a representative institution. It is the domination of local 
politics and council chamber politics by national parties that prevents any 
distinct carving out of a specifically local dimension to governance in 
Britain.  
 
The subject is of interest because of the changing styles of governance 
within local government and the role that councillors will have in these 
new forms. There has been research commissioned by the Department of 
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Communities and Local Government (2007) on the role of councillors in 
planning decision taking, but the research concentrated on what 
improvements could be made to the predictability and quality of local 
planning decisions, and did not consider to any great extent the political 
influence on councillors. Earlier research (1997) carried out on behalf of 
the Royal Town Planning Institute on “The Role Of Elected Members In 
Plan Making And Development Control “concentrated on good practice 
and the relationship between councillors and officers and was presented 
to the Committee on Standards In Public Life led by Lord Nolan who 
reported in July 1997, and who offered positive support to the role of 
councillors in planning decision making. 
 
Research by Short (1996) in a case study of Central Berkshire introduced 
a preliminary typology of responses by councils and councillors to the 
management of urban growth, Healey (2003) examining the Cambridge 
shire area and Walker (2008) studying the Bristol sub – region, and 
others have offered their reflections. There is no dispute that the 
councillor is an institutional actor in the management of urban growth and 
the conflicts between participants that arise in these territories. However 
some regard the extent to which councillors play a role in the mediation 
provided by the planning system in these conflicts as negligible or of no 
significance. Others, without challenging this conclusion, suggest that this 
is worrying and there are implications for democratic legitimacy and the 
good governance of communities. 
 
The Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 requires that local 
planning authorities prepare a Core Strategy (CS) for their area. The CS 
must have regard to the Regional Spatial Strategy prepared for that area, 
and the CS should comprise a spatial vision and strategic objectives for 
the area; a spatial strategy; core policies; and a monitoring and 
implementation framework with clear objectives for achieving delivery 
(para. 2.9). These requirements pose enormous challenges for both 
councillors and officers within local government. The research by means 
of a case study has sought to examine the manner in which the CS is 
prepared and advanced, the extent to which councillors are involved in 
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the process, the relationships with officers and the local community, and 
the political tensions that are generated by the mediation required to 
adopt a CS, prior to its examination by an independent Inspector.  
 
 A clearer understanding of the role of ideological and other ideas and 
values that influence spatial planning will help all those involved better to 
understand the evolution of policy and practice and the changing direction 
that it is now taking place This examination provides an opportunity to 
consider the role of representative democracy in spatial planning, which 
has evolved through a state – centred model focussed on welfare delivery 
and support for a mixed economy to what some academics see as a new 
mode of governance, which recognises the multiplicity of ways which link 
citizens, business and state, and that representative democracy is 
recognised as absolutely necessary but not sufficient in itself to respond 
to the complexity of the issues facing contemporary political communities 
( Healey 2011 ). 
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Chapter 4 The emergence of a growth agenda in The Central 
Oxfordshire Sub – region and the problems for governance and 
collaboration. 
 
In Chapter 1 dealing with the Research Design, the background and aims 
of the research were described. Chapter 2 reviewed debates about 
governance, particularly with regard to local government ,and the move to 
new collaborative practices in spatial planning was discussed in 
comparison with traditional government structures. Chapter 3 dealing with 
methodology provided the justification for a case study.  In this chapter 
the case of the Central Oxfordshire Sub – region is examined as a basis 
for exploring questions of governance and collaboration in a growth area. 
The chapter traces how the spatial planning objects and objectives of 
government for the Sub-region have significantly changed, and the 
difficulties that these changes have met as government attempted to 
create a political network which would permit the discourse of further 
growth to be stabilised in the local government system and allied 
agencies responsible for infrastructure. Allied to this is what institutional 
framework exists, within which local politicians can exercise leadership 
where there are conflicts about planning strategy, to promote 
collaboration and consensus.  
 
The problems of decision-making in the sphere of spatial planning for any 
particular generation of politicians were eloquently summarised by the 
experienced administrator Sir Geoffrey Vickers in 1965 : 
 
“The extent to which competing claims for land use frustrate each other 
and limit our initiative in our ever more crowded island today reflects a 
century of past decisions; and our initiative or inertia today will help to 
determine the degree and kind of choice which will be open to the next 
generation. We are the architects of our children's opportunities, if not of 
our own.“ 
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Introduction 
 
Healey (2006) argues that spatial planning practices can facilitate 
collective action with progressive purpose, contrasting with more 
established public jurisdictional authorities where planning is understood 
as neutral mediation of the public interest. In a study of the Cambridge 
Sub- region that had become a major growth area in London’s outer 
metropolitan area, she illustrates a situation with a substantial local 
capacity to manage development processes in a situation where there 
are always conflicting values and claims about development options and 
trajectories. This local capacity has been brought into existence, even 
though there is no formal organisation to represent it, and even though it 
extends across several administrative jurisdictions. 
 
Oxford, which is almost equi-distant from London and Cambridge, 
experienced these growth pressures much later. The Cambridge Science 
Park was founded by Trinity College in 1970, whereas the Oxford 
Science Park was not founded until 1990, and did not become a 
significant employer until 2000. Even in the mid 1990s, the common 
perception of Oxford was of a university city surrounded by a Green Belt 
with growth pressures being directed eastwards to Aylesbury and Milton 
Keynes, southwards to Reading and westwards to Swindon. However 
during this period, successive county structure plans had confirmed 
Didcot, straddling the London to Bristol railway, and equi-distant between 
Oxford and Reading, as a growth point (Plan 1). Decisions about the 
direction of growth that the town should take, which were the 
responsibility of Oxfordshire County Council, the structure planning 
authority, had caused major controversy both in the town and among the 
villages that bordered the town, and this culminated in a House of 
Commons debate initiated by Robert Jackson, the then Conservative MP 
for the Wantage parliamentary constituency in which Didcot was located. 
The debate proved remarkably prescient, both about the forces that 
would confront Oxfordshire and the contrasting approaches to the 
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governance of growth that would be adopted by the two main national 
political parties. 
 
The debate on planning in Oxfordshire took place on the evening of 11th 
March 2001  and was initiated by Robert Jackson. He began the debate 
by outlining the scale of growth that had been experienced in the county: 
“Oxfordshire has been the construction site for some 23,000 new houses, 
and over the period immediately ahead, until 2006, it will be required to 
accommodate a further 14,000, with another 11,700 to come by 2011. 
The two decades between 1990 and 2010, in other words, have seen the 
equivalent of the construction in Oxfordshire of a new city the size of 
Corby, with some 50,000 new inhabitants.” 
 
The MP pointed to one piece of evidence that he suggested showed that 
Oxfordshire was being overdeveloped. Between 1991 and 1999, the 
county’s population increased by 45,000. Some 41% of that increase can 
be attributed to natural change, or the normal demographic development 
of the local population. However, a striking 59% of that additional 
population represented net civilian migration. The MP criticised what he 
called the half-century-long tradition of centralised planning, which went 
back to the Town and Country Planning Act 1947, and pointed to an 
alternative approach that was being developed by the Conservative Party 
in opposition. This would give discretion to local authorities on how much 
housing should be built; they would be required to secure sufficient new 
accommodation for forecasted local population growth, but incremental 
building to support economic development will be a matter for local 
people to decide. The district councils will be in the lead, while the county 
councils will have a strategic co-ordinating role. At the same time, the 
views of town and parish councils will be given greater weight, and local 
residents will be given a right of counter-appeal when a proposed 
development breaches due process or a duly adopted comprehensive 
local plan. 
 
The then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Environment, 
Transport and the Regions (Ms Beverley Hughes) responded and, having 
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reviewed the difficulties that had been experienced in Oxfordshire in 
agreeing both the scale and the direction of growth, concluded that it was 
vital that a system was retained that required each local authority to 
accept in a corporate and shared manner some of the responsibility for 
the needs and future requirements of the region as a whole.  “That is the 
type of system that we have tried to institute and on which we are making 
progress.“In this debate the opposing views of the two principal political 
parties towards the governance of growth were starkly set out, and the 
debate provides a useful context for the planning issues that would 
dominate in Oxfordshire over the next decade. During the debate on the 
Planning & Compulsory Purchase Bill in the House of Lords, Lord 
Bradshaw, (2004)  also an Oxfordshire County Councillor, referred to the 
loss of local accountability involved in the south east region, citing the 
example of decisions in Oxfordshire being “sucked away and placed in 
Guildford”. [Hansard, HL, 6 January 2004, col. 119]. 
 
The Central Oxfordshire Sub - region was a relatively new spatial concept 
adopted for the purposes of spatial planning at the sub – regional level 
and incorporated in the South East Plan (SEP) adopted in 2009. At its 
core is the city of Oxford and its suburbs, bisecting it from north to south 
are the rivers Cherwell and Thames, and the A34 trunk road from the 
Midlands to the south coast ports. Threading through the north eastern 
quadrant is the M40 London to Birmingham motorway. A location plan 
showing this area is attached at Plan 1. The area extends to market 
towns in the north at Bicester, to the west at Witney, to the south at 
Abingdon and east at Wallingford. The railway town of Didcot is on the 
southern edge whilst Newbury which is outside the Sub – region lies to 
the south.  
 
A central theme of the South East Plan is a need to capitalise on the 
unique economic potential of Oxford as a world class university city at the 
centre of this Sub-region, and to improve housing availability and 
affordability. To achieve these aims a review of the Oxford Green Belt 
would be required. The Central Oxfordshire Sub-region had a relatively 
short life in that by announcing a commitment to abolish Regional Spatial 
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Strategies on 27th May 2010, the Communities Secretary of State Eric 
Pickles effectively abolished the concept. However the loss of the title 
does not change the circumstances on the ground, and the area still 
demonstrates a strong momentum for economic growth. This study 
focuses on part of the Sub – region, that of Oxford city and its hinterland 
to the south, extending as far as Didcot, and includes Oxford City and 
South Oxfordshire District Council. The area is shown on Plan 2. 
 
Healey, P. (2007) describes the power of spatial strategy to shape 
attention and maintain a degree of local control over the scale and form 
of urban development in the face of external pressures. In her case study 
of the Cambridge Sub-region, the first guiding strategy drawn up in mid 
century sought to “cap “ the growth of the city and disperse growth 
pressures elsewhere in the region is described . Similarly in the Central 
Oxfordshire Sub – region, this “cap” had been sought in mid century, but 
unlike the Cambridge Sub- Region survived for more than fifty years from 
1947 to 1999. This policy of containment of the city had the support of 
government and the majority of local authorities in the Sub – region. In 
this chapter the background to this consensus is described as well as the 
changes which have occurred in the last decade that have questioned the 
policy of containment on the basis of economic performance and 
comparisons with more successful European economic sub – regions. 
 
The geography of the Sub – region 
 
The area between Oxford and Newbury is representative of the finest 
scarp and vale country in southern England, with regular and abrupt 
scarps and well – developed vales. Southwards from the Oxford Clay 
Vale are the Upper Jurassic scarps, the Vales of White Horse and the 
Lower Thame, the Berkshire Downs and the Chilterns. The area is also 
representative of the agricultural landscapes of southern England. Oxford 
is the single large urban area and its location on the A34 trunk road has 
been in contemporary times the greatest single factor in urban 
development. With a population of more than 150,000 including its 
suburban areas, its growth from about 50,000 in 1901 reflects the 
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dependence of urban development on road transport. To the east of the 
ancient university city and physically separated from it by the Cherwell 
/Thames has arisen an industrial complex based on motor – vehicle 
assembly and a host of related and subsidiary enterprises. 
 
Concerns about the industrialisation of Oxford are almost as old as the 
modern city itself. Brunel, it is alleged, was dissuaded from siting his 
railway works at Oxford, which instead were located at Swindon, by the 
opposition of the Oxford colleges. On the 8th August 1928 a cartoon was 
published in the popular magazine Punch, which showed Mr Punch 
sitting on a bench on a hillside, a newspaper in his hands, whilst below 
him, the towers and spires of a historic city were being engulfed by the 
smoking chimneys of innumerable factories. Standing besides him, his 
walking stick pointing to the panorama below, is a severe, broad 
shouldered man, an American tourist. He asks, “Pardon me, sir, but can 
you put me wise to the name of this thriving burg?” Mr Punch replies “I 
regret to say, sir, this is Oxford“ (Appendix 9). The publication of the 
cartoon had been prompted by the news that a trust had been formed to 
protect the beauties of Oxford and its environs, and had appealed for a 
sum of £250,000 to purchase the land required for this purpose. The 
formation of the trust reflected the anguish at the time, that nothing other 
than land ownership could control the urban expansion then occurring. 
Between 1921 and 1941 the population of Oxford almost doubled, nearly 
entirely predicated on the growth of the car industry. The development of 
the car industry was almost an accident beginning with William Morris 
working out of a former barracks building off the High Street, and then at 
Cowley, introducing the mass production techniques brought from the 
American automotive capital of Detroit. 
 
Beyond and south of Oxford the pace of development was much less, 
and even in 1968 it could be remarked, “This is the first area of real 
countryside to be encountered west of London, where the rural character 
does not as yet have to be consciously fostered by careful preservation in 
Green Belts and the like”. Around Oxford, however there were concerns 
that its character had to be preserved by the application of Green Belt 
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policy. This will be reviewed shortly but at this point it is helpful to review 
how planning in the sub – region has evolved and the justification for this 
broader approach to resolving the problem of urban growth. 
 
Sub – regional planning 
 
In 1964 a new ministry was created by the then  Prime Minister Harold 
Wilson: the Department of Economic Affairs with George Brown MP at its 
helm, charged with preparing the National Plan and providing regional co 
– ordination. Early in 1965 a series of economic planning councils were 
set up, based on the old standard regions that had been used for 
statistical purposes. Members were appointed representing different 
groups in each region and there were the counterpart, the economic 
planning boards comprising civil servants seconded from London. The 
South East Economic Planning Council published its report in August 
1967: “A Strategy for the South East”. The strategy was based on four 
pairs of sectors for future growth, all radiating outwards from London 
along major lines of communication. Oxford was not included in a growth 
sector but a series of policies was outlined.Oxford’s position as a 
university and cultural town should be enhanced, if possible, but the 
dependence on a single industry - the motorcar industry - caused 
concern. Further industrial development in the city should be prevented 
and a Green Belt approved around Oxford. Employment needs could be 
catered for by directing light industry – unconnected with the motor 
industry - to Bicester and Didcot and possibly, in the future, to Banbury to 
the north.  
 
From the 1970`s development in Oxfordshire was guided by this 
approach, and Witney and Wantage (but not Banbury) were added to the 
“country towns“ of Bicester and Didcot as the preferred locations for new 
development. Overall the level of development was to be restrained and 
the Oxford Green Belt was a key element of this strategy which was 
adopted in successive structure plans for the county through to the late 
1990`s. In March 1993 shortly after the opening of the M40 motorway to 
Birmingham, the Department of the Environment in its consultative 
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regional planning guidance for the South East affirmed that the M40 
passed through an area of environmental restraint and should be 
regarded as a corridor of movement rather than development. In 
December 1998 the new regional agency SERPLAN published its 
sustainable development strategy for the South East that was to provide 
advice on updating the strategy for the region, but Oxford featured neither 
in the Areas of Expansion Pressure nor the priority areas for economic 
development. The Oxfordshire Structure Plan 2011 adopted in August 
1998 reiterated the “country towns“ strategy of diverting growth from 
Oxford City, and that the Oxford Green Belt had been successful in 
preventing major development that would have been detrimental to the 
character and landscape setting of Oxford. 
 
It was not until 1999, when the late Professor Stephen Crow chaired the 
Public Examination Panel into the Regional Planning Guidance for the 
South East, and whose report was published in September 1999, that the 
strategy for Oxford that had been extant for some fifty years was 
questioned. The panel recommended that the Thames Valley districts of 
Oxfordshire, including the City of Oxford, be included within the Western 
Wedge sub region, lying in the angle between the M3 and M40 “to some 
extent to complete a tidy picture, although there was in fact scarce 
reference to them at the examination “  and to be named the “ Middle 
Thames Area“. The panel noted that during the 1990`s the area’s 
economic profile had altered significantly with a large increase in 
business services employment and hi – tech, knowledge based 
industries. In the context of the UK, the performance of the “Western 
Wedge “ was impressive, but appeared less so in comparison with other 
EU regions, and that if the UK were to improve on its relative under – 
performance, measures would be needed to ensure the continued growth 
of its most economically buoyant region. Central to this is the economic 
performance of the “Western Wedge.”  
 
This theme was emphasised by the South East Development Agency, 
one of the agencies set up by the Labour government elected in 1997, 
which reported in December 2002 and identified the “Western Wedge“ as 
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one of the most important drivers of growth in both London and the South 
East.They recommended that the future of the area should be actively 
pursued through planning policies to secure economic growth and 
regeneration.  The Deposit Draft of the Oxfordshire Structure Plan 2016 
published in September 2003, and the last structure plan to be published 
for the county, emphasised that the economic development strategy for 
Oxfordshire recognised the area’s economic growth. 
 
Nationally changes were taking place in the governance of planning, and 
in December 2001 the Department of Transport, Local Government and 
the Regions published the planning green paper  “Planning: Delivering a 
Fundamental Change“. County structure plans were to be abolished and 
strategic policy would be set at the regional level through regional 
strategies. The Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act  passed by 
Parliament in May 2004 provided the legislative basis for these changes. 
Two years later in March 2006 the South East England Regional 
Assembly submitted a draft plan to the government. Central Oxfordshire 
was identified as one of the sub regional strategy areas and the aim was 
to capitalise on Oxford’s unique potential as a world class university city. 
 
 
Earlier in 2003 in a presentation to stakeholders SEEDA representatives 
posed the question “How best to exploit the dynamic and innovative 
economy of the area? “Three suggestions were put forward. The first was 
to continue building steadily on the Sub – region's strengths; the second 
was to adopt a more expansionist approach and the third was to focus 
more on the environment and export growth out of the Sub – region. Over 
the next two years the second, expansionist option gathered more 
momentum. 
 
Support for this questioning of the policy of containment came in the 
Interim Report of the Barker Review of Land Use Planning published by 
the Treasury in July 2006 . Oxford was chosen as one of the case studies 
for the analysis of the impact of planning control on the country’s 
economic performance. The authors noted how many of the same issues 
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that affect cluster development around Cambridge were to be found in 
the developments around Oxford. It was estimated that more than 100 
technology – based companies had originated in Oxford’s two universities 
and seven research laboratories employing 9000 people and with a 
business turnover of more than one billion pounds. Like Cambridge, 
Oxford had also been subject to a strategy of containment in recent 
decades, centred around a city with tightly defined borders circled by a 
large stretch of Green Belt. The population had risen from 108,000 in 
1981 to around 140,000 in 2001.Unlike in Cambridge, the extensive 
Green Belt had precluded any significant relaxation in containment in the 
county, despite the worsening of congestion in the city centre and the 
difficulty in securing land for housing in an area with some of the highest 
house prices in the South East. This had resulted in a tightening of local 
labour markets to the detriment of the local economy. 
 
Although 40% of high – technology firms in Oxfordshire were established 
before 1993, it was only comparatively recently that local authorities had 
taken this apparent clustering into account. In 1987 the Structure Plan 
was amended to permit exceptions for science based industries which 
could show a special need to be located close to Oxford University or to 
other research facilities in Central Oxfordshire, but Baker concluded that 
these policies had not solved many of the remaining issues, with land 
restrictions likely to impede further development. However Oxford had 
benefited from some planning flexibility (compared with Cambridge), 
when in 1988 the General Development order was modified to allow 
change of class from B2 (general industry) to B1 (business offices) 
without further planning permission being necessary. This facilitated the 
rapid growth of the Milton Park Business Park near Didcot on the A34 in 
the 1990s. By 1999 employment had increased to over 5000 on an 
extensively landscaped park covering more than 100 hectares.  
 
The Barker Review noted the criticism from some commentators that the 
growth of Didcot from 16,000 to 23,500 in 2001 had resulted in many 
people commuting into Oxford City from the town (although there is a 
good train service between the two centres) on a daily basis and that 
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Oxford by 2001 had 27,000 more jobs than residents. As noted later in 
this chapter, Didcot has been included in the Government’s New Growth 
Points programme and current planning proposals for the Didcot area 
would double the number of jobs at Milton Park. The ability of the Didcot 
area to be a counter – magnet to Oxford as part of a continuing policy of 
containment was a major issue of debate at the South East Plan EiP. 
 
Green Belt Policy 
The first Green Belt scheme was launched in England by the London 
County Council in 1935, adopted by Abercrombie in his Greater London 
Plan (1944), and subsequently given statutory protection by the 1947 Act.  
In August 1955 the Local Government Minister Duncan Sandys issued 
his circular (Circular 42 / 55) giving firm government backing to Green 
Belts. It was regarded as a milestone in English planning history and at 
the time was seen as a great victory for the Council for the Protection of 
Rural England (CPRE). He listed three reasons for the establishment of a 
Green Belt when he published the circular. These were: firstly, to check 
the growth of a large built up area; secondly, to prevent neighbouring 
towns from merging into one another; and thirdly, to preserve the special 
character of a town. A Green Belt was to be an area of land, near to and 
sometimes surrounding a town, which was to be kept open by permanent 
and severe restriction on building. The last principal government advice 
was in January 1995 during the premiership of John Major, when a 
revised version of “PPG2 Green Belts” was published, and has proved to 
be one of the longest serving planning policy documents. (These 
principles have been reiterated in the National Planning Policy framework  
[NPPF] published in 2012). 
 
Even during the deregulatory policy environment of the Thatcher era, 
Green Belt policy was not seriously challenged, although some Labour 
ministers gave the impression that building homes in the Green Belt was 
a test of their political muscularity. Richard Crossman, when appointed 
Minister of Housing in Harold Wilson`s first cabinet in 1964, permitted 
Birmingham City Council to build a large housing state at Chelmsey 
Wood in the Warwickshire Green Belt, and boasted in his diaries of the 
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tough decision he was prepared to take, whilst Deputy Prime Minister 
John Prescott at the beginning of his time in office in 1997 allowed a 
major housing scheme in the Newcastle Green Belt. The journalist 
Lynsey Hanley in her wryly sardonic book “Estates” writes about 
Chelmsey Wood where she grew up with her parents, and the decision 
by Richard Crossman.  “He never quite went as far as to say that the 
green belt was a bourgeois luxury, but the eagerness with which he 
signed off great tracts of virgin land to local authorities which only a few 
years earlier had had their planning applications refused by the 
Conservative government ,suggested that he felt as much” .  
 
Green belt policy seems to have two faces. Local politicians and local 
residents see the restrictions on development in green belts as 
permanent. Councillor Jerry Patterson, a former Leader and Planning 
Committee Chairman of the Vale of White Horse District Council, 
Oxfordshire writing to the Oxford Times in July 2006 about the prospect 
of a review of the green belt boundaries around Oxford opined: “That is a 
dangerous suggestion as the whole point of a Green Belt is that it should 
be as good as permanent to ensure that it safeguards the individuality of 
communities and avoids urban sprawl.” He concludes, “Once you start to 
review it, where do you end?” But professional planners see it differently. 
Paul Hudson, who at the time was chief planner at the Department for 
Communities and Local Government, in an interview in 2006 observed, 
“The functions of Green Belts is principally to prevent sprawl and 
coalescence of urban settlements. It’s not for countryside protection 
though these two coincide. Greenbelt policy provides for exceptions in 
tightly defined circumstances. Once housing takes place, it risks 
undermining the original policy. But reviewing green– belt boundaries, 
particularly inner boundaries must be a function of the forward planning 
process”. 
 
The Oxford Green Belt 
The review of the Oxford Green Belt is a contemporary struggle which 
says much about the attitudes to the Green Belt of all three major parties 
and is being fought out to the south of Oxford. The planning history of the 
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evolution of the Oxford Green Belt merits a brief examination because it 
demonstrates the conflicts and political differences that New Labour’s 
planning governance, based on the regional spatial strategies, has 
brought to a Conservative - run shire county that at its centre has Oxford 
and its dreaming spires where the city council has traditionally been run 
by the Labour party. 
 
The genesis for Oxford’s Green Belt lay in Thomas Sharp’s 1948 report 
to the Oxford City Council, “Oxford Replanned” which recommended the 
relocation of the motor industry out of the city, that its population be kept 
below 100,000, and no further development other than for rural purposes 
be allowed in a belt of countryside around the city some 16 kilometres 
wide. Thomas Sharp was a well- known planning consultant at that time 
and had prepared plans for Exeter, Durham and Chichester amongst 
others. He was appointed by the City Council in 1945 and was well aware 
of the difficulties that his recommendations posed to the City Council and 
others. In the prefatory note to his report he recorded, “With a full sense 
of the responsibility that has been placed on me, I have suggested 
whatever measures seem to me to be necessary, without regard to the 
power of those who may be affected by them. I hope that the City Council 
may take a similar course”.  
 
It was not until 1958 that formal proposals for an Oxford Green Belt were 
submitted to the Minister following the publication of Circular 42/55. The 
process was torturous; in 1961 an inquiry was held, and in 1975 the 
concept of a Green Belt for Oxford was approved as an amendment to 
the approved County Development Plan. The belt was narrower than 
Sharp had recommended, and was only 10 kilometres at its widest. The 
inner boundaries had still to be finalised, and this would take  many 
years. In 1988 the Department of the Environment published a document, 
“The Green Belts “and described Oxford as a city with a dual personality: 
famous as a university town and as a prosperous centre. The Green Belt 
was described as seeking to protect it from growing any bigger and to 
protect its character and setting. There was therefore for nearly thirty 
years widespread support for the Oxford Green Belt. 
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During that time there was major employment growth in the south of the 
county, in an area bisected by the A34 trunk road from the West Midlands 
to Portsmouth and Southampton, which now boasts the strap line 
‘Science Vale UK’, and includes the Culham Science Centre, Milton Park, 
and the Harwell Science and Innovation Centre. The vale is the home to 
thousands of jobs, many in high – tech and research. In March 2006 the 
local authorities that made up the South East Assembly submitted the 
South East Plan to the Secretary of State. A central feature of the plan 
was a Central Oxfordshire Sub – region centred on the city but including 
a large area to the north and south, which was to accommodate the 
employment and housing growth. In drawing up the plan two alternatives 
were considered for growth in Central Oxfordshire: (a) growth at Didcot, 
Wantage/ Grove, Bicester and within the built-up area of Oxford; and (b) 
an urban extension to Oxford with a review of the Green Belt. The draft 
plan proposed keeping the Oxford Green Belt unchanged, and rejected 
the urban expansion option.  
 
An independent panel of experts examined the plan and were impressed 
by the case put forward by the Oxford City Council, the Oxford colleges 
who owned land to the south of the city, and business interests, that land 
had to be released from the Oxford Green Belt to accommodate the 
housing needs of what had become one of the strongest growth areas in 
the country. The Oxfordshire Branch of the CPRE put forward a strong 
contrary view. The Panel reported in August 2007 and recommended an 
urban extension of Oxford, which would require a selective review of the 
Green Belt, and joint working between the Oxford City Council and South 
Oxfordshire District Council within which the proposed development area 
was situated. A number of exceptional circumstances were identified by 
the Panel to justify what they emphasised was a selective and not a 
strategic review. These included a significant potential within nationally 
important science, technology and education sectors; a significant excess 
of jobs already over working population; staff recruitment and retention 
problems reported by key business and public services; housing 
affordability ratios in excess of the regional average and some of the 
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highest house prices in the region. 
 
The Panel also recommended that the implications of the urban 
extension should be tested through a Sustainability Appraisal and an 
Appropriate Assessment, but this work was not done. Significantly the 
Panel did not accept that even larger growth in the Didcot area could 
meet the housing needs of Oxford. Some firms such as RM plc (computer 
manufacturers and IT) and the publisher Francis Taylor had relocated to 
the Milton Park near Didcot from Oxford, but employment dispersal from 
Oxford featured little in the EiP Panel’s consideration and Oxford’s 
significance as an employment growth centre was firmly emphasised. 
 
At the end of July 2008 the then Communities Secretary Hazel Blears 
supported the plans outlined in the EiP Panel's report for 4000 dwellings 
south of Grenoble Road, on Green Belt land near the Kassam stadium, 
the home of Oxford United Football Club and once owned by the 
newspaper magnate the late Captain Robert Maxwell MC. The Secretary 
of State charged Oxford City Council and SODC to identify land to be 
removed from the green belt to facilitate an urban expansion of Oxford. 
The announcement was couched in contemporary terms that extolled the 
regenerative benefits for Oxford, but to many such as the CPRE it looked 
like an old fashioned land grab by a Labour council into the shire county, 
reminiscent of those by Birmingham and Manchester in the nineteen 
fifties and sixties. (28) The South East Plan housing figures 2006- 2026 
for South Oxfordshire included 4,000 south of Oxford, 6,000 at Didcot, 
2,240 in the rest of the Central Oxfordshire Sub- Region and 2,700 for the 
rest of the district, making a total of 14,940 dwellings. 
 
In September 2008 Oxford City Council asked the Boundary Committee 
for England to move its boundaries so that it would include the proposed 
development south of Grenoble Road, near the Kassam Stadium. The 
last change had been in 1986, when Rose Hill and Littlemore moved from 
South Oxfordshire to City Council control. In a letter to the Boundary 
Committee the City Council chief executive Peter Slomain said that he 
was concerned that South Oxfordshire was not approaching the plan in a 
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“collaborative way” . 
 
Plan making and problems of governance 
 
In its representations to Hazel Blears in October 2008 (30) on the 
proposed alterations, Oxford City Council expressed its concern that the 
urban extension was not being delivered through a joint Development 
Plan Document, which would have been possible under the new planning 
regime introduced by the Planning & Compulsory Purchase Act. 2004 
The city council felt that the approach proposed by the Secretary of State 
weakened its position and would allow South Oxfordshire District Council, 
the shire district to the south of the city, within which all of the proposed 
Urban Expansion would be accommodated, to continue without the full 
involvement of the city council, even though there would be a need to 
integrate the Urban Extension into Oxford city. The city council had 
discussed with the other land- owners, Thames Water and Magdalen 
College, the need to work together.  
 
On 21st November 2008 Oxford City Council submitted its Core Strategy 
to the Secretary of State. The other Oxfordshire Councils were later than 
this. South Oxfordshire District Council considered its draft Core Strategy 
in March 2009, whilst the Vale of White Horse District Council, although 
having published its Preferred Options document in January 2009, was 
not at that time due to publish its Core Strategy until the summer of 2011. 
 
In May 2009 the final draft of the South East Plan was published by the 
Government Office for the South East (GOSE). A selective review of 
Green Belt boundaries was to take place on the southern edge of Oxford 
through one or more coordinated development plan documents. SODC 
and Oxford City Council would carry out collaboratively a review and the 
subsequent plan – making to a timetable and in a form to be agreed by 
GOSE. The lead Councils would involve other relevant parties in the 
process as appropriate. Earlier that year in March 2009 SODC had 
published its first draft of the Core Strategy that examined options to 
accommodate the SE Plan housing figures, and had shown an area of 
   
 141 
search for the Urban Expansion (shown at Plan 3). The SODC’s cabinet 
member for planning, pledged that her council would continue to fight the 
scheme, but that if the final version of the South East Plan retained the 
Government requirement, her Council had no choice but to make 
provision for it. However the version of the South East Plan published in 
May 2009 included a caution that if overwhelming evidence demonstrated 
the unsuitability of the initial area of search, the Central Oxfordshire 
authorities would ensure that a wider review (the form and extent of 
which would be agreed with GOSE) took place in order to identify and 
deliver one or more alternative suitable locations by 2026. 
 
In July 2009 South Oxfordshire District Council together with the CPRE, 
the University of Oxford and J A Pye (the latter two claimants were 
promoting alternative development sites) made a legal challenge to the 
inclusion of the Oxford urban extension in the SEP. The council’s 
complaint was that in seeking to allocate the urban extension there was a 
failure by the Secretary of State to assess properly the impacts of the 
urban extension to the south of Oxford and reasonable alternatives to it 
as required by law (the Environmental Assessment of Plans and 
Programmes Regulations 2004) and as anticipated by the Panel. 
 
The error was accepted by the Secretary of State, in particular, that there 
was a failure to comply with the procedural requirement of assessing 
reasonable alternatives to the SDA to the south of Oxford and the 
consequent selective Green Belt review. The Treasury Solicitor agreed 
that all references to the south of Oxford SDA should be removed from 
the SEP. However the proposed wording in the Consent Order retained 
reference to the 4,000 homes in Central Oxfordshire. The council 
challenged the Treasury Solicitor about the retention of the additional 
4,000 homes in the Central Oxfordshire sub-total. Exchanges between 
the two continued through the summer of 2010, but in July 2010 the 
Treasury Solicitor indicated that as Regional Strategies had been 
revoked, there was nothing for the challenges to quash or remit, and the 
council and other parties were invited to withdraw the challenges. This 
did not occur and the Consent Order has not been published.  
   
 142 
 
Oxford City Council had submitted its Core Strategy, predicated on the 
Urban Expansion taking place to the south of but outside the City 
boundary, as already indicated, to the Secretary of State on 21st 
November 2008, but consideration of this by an Inspector was later 
suspended until the outcome of the legal challenges that had been made 
to the Central Oxfordshire Sub – regional policy of the South East Plan by 
a number of parties including SODC and CPRE (Oxfordshire). The panel 
report had suggested that the urban extension to the south of Oxford 
should be delivered through a Development Plan Document (DPD) 
produced jointly by Oxford City Council and SODC, but the proposed 
changes put forward by Communities Secretary Hazel Blears did not 
specifically endorse the use of a joint DPD but referred to the local 
authorities “ working collaboratively “.  
 
SODC no doubt when the draft core strategy was published early in 2009 
took the pragmatic view that it would not get its core strategy endorsed by 
an independent Inspector following an EiP without the inclusion of the 
Urban Extension of Oxford. In September 2009 CPRE (Oxfordshire) 
announced that it had been advised that the Secretary of State, in 
response to the legal challenge to the South East Plan, submitted by 
them, had conceded that insufficient consideration had been given to 
alternative sites, and that the strategy for 4,000 new houses south of 
Grenoble Road would have to be reconsidered. The success of this 
challenge and subsequent changes introduced by the new Coalition 
Government in its Localism Bill persuaded SODC to drop the Grenoble 
Road proposals from the final consultative draft of its core strategy 
published in December 2010. The South East Plan housing figures for 
the rest of the district had been accepted, but the 4,000 dwellings south 
of Oxford had been dropped. 
 
In the same month the Inspector’s Report dealing with the Oxford City 
Council Core Strategy was published. The examination of the Oxford 
Core Strategy had been one of the longest running examinations in the 
country, because of a number of legal challenges and the changes of 
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policy resulting from the election in May 2010 of the Coalition 
Government. The Core Strategy had been submitted to the Secretary of 
State on 21st November 2008, and was subject to examination by two 
independent Inspectors appointed by him. Examination hearing sessions 
were held in July and September 2009 and September 2010. The final 
Inspector’s Report was received on 21st December 2010. The Core 
Strategy was found to be sound, subject to a limited number of changes. 
The conclusions of the report in relation to housing and employment are 
highly relevant and can be summarised as follows: 
 
a) South Oxfordshire Council has commenced work on the South of 
Oxford SDA, and the Inspector said that he had no evidence before him 
to suggest that provision for the 4,000 extra dwellings from this urban 
extension cannot be made before the end of the plan period. It is unclear 
as to how much employment provision should be made within the 
SOSDA. It is too early for any firm decisions on that matter. That will be 
for the future master - planning of the area. 
 
b) The Inspector concluded on housing land supply that the Core 
Strategy was soundly based, fully justified and would be effective in 
delivering the required levels of housing. Oxford City Council had 
indicated that the number of homes likely to be built in the city over the 
plan period was more than 1,000 homes higher than the original 8,000 
proposed. 
 
c) How much employment land? Similar specific requirements to the 
housing numbers are not provided in any direct form for employment 
growth in the city itself. Rather, the emphasis in guidance reflects 
Oxford’s evident strengths. The RSS is supportive of Central Oxfordshire 
striving to be a world leader in education, science and technology by 
building upon the Sub-region’s economic strengths (Policy CO1). Policies 
CO1 and CO2 and the supporting paragraphs, 22.1 to 22.11, highlight the 
sub-region’s world class economy and establish the role of the city and its 
importance to the sub-region and to the wider south east. Paragraph 22.5 
of the RSS indicates that “Oxford itself will be allowed to grow physically 
   
 144 
and economically (the Inspector’s emphasis) in order to accommodate its 
own needs, contribute to those in the wider region and help maintain its 
world class status”. 
 
d) This reflects SEEDA’s Regional Economic Strategy and the city’s 
position in the Oxford to Cambridge arc, the sub-region’s designation as 
a Regional Economic Strategy Diamond for Investment and Growth and 
the identification of the city as a Regional Hub. Whilst recognising the 
need to protect and enhance Oxford’s historic character and 
environment, guidance clearly envisages continued employment 
development to enhance the city’s economic role. Understandably, RSS 
Policy CO2 expects new employment in Oxford to take place primarily on 
previously developed land and former safeguarded land and/ or in 
conjunction with mixed-use schemes. 
 
e) The RSS identifies a guidance figure of a minimum of 18,000 
additional new jobs being created within the sub-region to 2016. No figure 
is given for the city itself, though the County Council suggests that this 
would equate to about 7,000 –7,500. Undoubtedly, for national and 
strategic reasons, Oxford has an important role to play in the future 
prosperity of the area and further economic growth is envisaged to reflect 
its position. There is no convincing evidence that a policy of restraint 
within the city would be appropriate. There can be no doubt that the Core 
Strategy is right to provide for a degree of continued growth. 
 
Two observations can be made on these conclusions: 
a) The Inspector’s assumption that South Oxfordshire Council was 
making progress on the South of Oxford SDA was incorrect. The South of 
Oxford SDA was dropped from the South Oxfordshire Core Strategy 
published in the same month that the Inspector reported. 
b) The housing implications of Oxford’s continued economic growth, 
which had already created the need for 4,000 extra dwellings to be 
provided outside the city and which are not being met, are not 
convincingly explored in the Inspector’s report. 
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The South Oxfordshire District Council Proposed Submission Core 
Strategy published in December 2010 makes it clear that following the 
revocation of Regional Core Strategies in July 2010, different approaches 
to the level of new housing in the district were assessed, but the Council 
had decided to continue with the housing delivery targets that were set 
out in the South East Plan, other than the proposed South of Oxford 
SDA. 
 
This complex situation had been made even more difficult by the series of 
legal challenges that had been made by Cala Homes to the letter of the 
27th May 2010 from the Communities Secretary Mr Eric Pickles informing 
local planning authorities of the Government's intention to abolish the 
regional spatial strategies and expecting them to have regard to this as a 
material consideration. The Court of Appeal handed down its judgement 
on the 27th May 2011. The Court declared that the proposed abolition of 
the strategies was not a material consideration in plan – making. It said 
the intention must be viewed in the context of both the Localism Bill's 
early stage in the legislative process and the need to undertake strategic 
environmental assessment of the effects of revoking the strategies. It 
held that significant weight could only be attached to the intention in 
exceptional cases and even then, very clear and cogent reasons for 
doing so should be given . 
 
South Oxfordshire District Council 
Before describing the preparation of the South Oxfordshire Core Strategy  
(SOCS), it is helpful to summarise briefly the area and its characteristics. 
It is a mainly rural area covering an area of 655 sq km (253 square miles) 
lying between Oxford and Reading, bisected by the River Thames and 
with the M40 running along its north eastern border, and the M4 along the 
southern border. The Oxford railway line runs through the district. More 
than half of the area is included within the Oxford Green Belt and AONBs 
(Plan 4). The district had an estimated population of 128,000 in 2006. 
The population has increased at a greater rate than England as a whole, 
with a 7.28% increase between 1991 and 2001 compared with England’s 
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2.57%. Forecasts for 2026 range from 141,420 to 142,500. 
 
Employment is concentrated around the four towns, particularly 
Wallingford and Didcot. In the rural areas there are some significant 
campus style developments including Culham Science Centre and 
Oxford Brookes University’s Wheatley Campus. There are also many 
small enterprises in converted agricultural buildings. There are several 
major employment areas close to the district (e.g. Harwell Science & 
Innovation Campus) and almost half of the working population works 
outside the district, while people commuting in take up 40% of the jobs in 
the district. Science Vale UK is an area of economic growth that is 
defined by four points: Didcot (in South Oxfordshire), Harwell Campus, 
Milton Park and Grove (all in the Vale of White Horse District). It is 
estimated that together with Culham Science Centre in the district, these 
first three areas have a combined employment potential of 12,500 
existing jobs with a future potential of a further 13,000 jobs. 
 
South Oxfordshire District Council is already heavily involved with a large 
area of growth at Didcot, in the south of the county where the A34 trunk 
road meets the Paddington: Bristol rail line, together with a major town 
centre redevelopment scheme. Originally earmarked in 1944 for growth 
In Abercrombie’s plan for Greater London and its region, Didcot’s time 
has come. The population was now about 23,000 and had grown rapidly 
in the past 30 years, increasing by 8,000 since 1981, and was predicted 
to grow by a further 12,000 to reach 35,000 by 2026. However in the 
case of Didcot there has been a shared vision for growth between the 
Conservative - controlled SODC and the Vale of White Horse District 
Council (VWHDC) which was led by the Lib Dems with the Conservatives 
as the minority party. Interestingly, following the initial planning 
negotiations in the late 1990s between the two councils which led to the 
shared vision, the councils have latterly (2008) appointed a joint chief 
executive, senior management team and common service teams (eg: 
planning policy, environmental management) across both councils. 
Senior management continues to advise politically controlled cabinets in 
each council.  
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The example of Didcot does demonstrate that where there is a shared 
vision and core strategy, politically different councils can collaborate.  In 
the case of Didcot however the growth strategy as we have seen 
developed as part of the “country towns“ strategy evolved by Oxfordshire 
County Council rather than devolved downwards from the regional 
assembly. However Didcot is not without its problems in terms of 
governance. South Oxfordshire District Council, which has invested some 
£54m in the town, is the lead authority, working with the Oxfordshire 
County Council, the riparian council the Vale of White Horse District 
Council, the Didcot Town Council and other agencies, and there is a 
Didcot Community Forum, which meets at six monthly intervals. But, 
unlike a New Town Development Corporation, there is no executive body, 
other than the SODC Cabinet, to co-ordinate growth. The Didcot portfolio 
is the responsibility of the SODC Leader, alongside a number of other 
significant responsibilities. 
 
The episode raises the question of how the Government, SEEDA and the 
EiP Panel thought that the South of Oxford urban extension could be 
delivered. The politics of this seem to have been overlooked. The Panel 
concluded that by the time that the RSS was adopted, there should be 
sufficient confidence for Oxford City Council and SODC to move straight 
to a joint Area Action Plan (AA) if they had completed their LDF core 
strategy by then . This has proved to be hopelessly over-confident and 
ignored the political differences between the two councils. The concept of 
RSSs introduced by the 2004 Act was based on a governmentality 
approach that envisaged the various tiers of the planning hierarchy 
sharing the discourse stabilised through the EiP process. This has not 
happened but, as is explained later in the chapter, established public 
jurisdictional authorities have meant that the discourse initiated by the 
EiP Panel remains a live issue.  
 
The Oxford experience bears out that around Bristol observed by A. 
Walker. He concluded that the operation of the new planning system 
lessened the control of local politicians over strategic planning, and that 
   
 148 
this goes conceptually against what the government’s broader local 
government reforms are trying to achieve, and adversely affects the 
ability of communities and councillors to make the most of their place 
shaping role, or to debate the scale of housing growth. 
 
In 2006 the DCLG commissioned Oxford Brookes University to identify 
lessons from the New Towns programme that might be transferable to 
the Growth Areas initiative set up by the Government to deliver up to 
100,000 extra new homes and many more jobs over the period 2006 – 
2016. (SODC was successful in its bid that Didcot be one of the growth 
points).  This was particularly important, as the Growth Areas would be 
the largest programme of state government- sponsored development 
since the New Towns. Part of the research examined the key lessons on 
governance. In respect of power and responsibility the consultants 
advised that clarity of responsibilities for delivery and related governance 
in the Growth Areas would be essential, especially so since delivery 
partnerships would be far looser entities with more diffused power 
structures than those which characterised the New Towns programme. 
Their further comments were particularly perceptive. They advised there 
might need to be a conscious trade-off between strong leadership of the 
delivery bodies and local democratic accountability, and that diffused 
partnership structures would not automatically be more democratically 
accountable than were the New Town Development Corporations if the 
real location of power and responsibility is mystified by the partnership 
itself. The growth of Didcot is an example of this, and is an issue 
discussed with local district councillors in the next chapter. 
 
Greenwood and Newman (2010) in their studies of traditional and new 
planning in the Thames Gateway come to similar conclusions, in that 
traditional planning may be slowly being replaced by new practices, but 
the continuation of a separate decision making process for large scale 
projects suggest that definitions of sustainable development, participation 
and good planning are unlikely to become stabilised. Gallent, N.(2008) 
similarly concludes that a divergence in local government and planning 
reform may accentuate conflicts by creating two distinct, and sometimes 
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contradictory, planning systems .  
 
Reflections 
 
As is evident from the history of the evolution of the South East RSS and 
its implications for the Central Oxfordshire Sub-region, the RSS, although 
successful in identifying and promoting the economic importance of the 
Sub-region, failed to ensure that the housing implications of this growth 
were satisfactorily dealt with in the Core Strategies being prepared by the 
constituent district councils. The RSS did not create a collaborative 
framework within which district councils were comfortable working 
together. Furthermore, although the RSS vision was shared by a number 
of organisations such as the Oxfordshire Economic Partnership, groups 
such as CPRE (Oxfordshire) were strongly opposed and were successful 
in mounting a legal challenge to the RSS. Unlike the Cambridge Sub- 
Region, a local capacity to manage the development process had not 
effectively developed.  
 
An embryonic organisation, The Oxfordshire Strategic Planning and 
Infrastructure Partnership (SPiP), a forum for liaison on spatial planning, 
economic development, housing, transport and infrastructure issues, has 
evolved. Initially this began from technical work initiated by the County 
Council as an input to the South East Plan, continuing through 
submissions to the Homes and Communities Agency concerning a single 
investment vehicle for the county. Now comprising the Leaders or 
Cabinet/ Executive members from each of the local authorities, SPiP 
would appear to comply with the new statutory duty to co-operate on 
planning matters required by the Localism Bill introduced by the Coalition 
Government. However, as we shall see subsequently, some councillors 
do not believe that SPiP can resolve the differences towards Oxford’s 
growth that exist amongst the local authorities without a statutory spatial 
planning framework that would require a consensual approach. 
 
The Planning Inspector appointed to consider the soundness of the South 
Oxfordshire Core Strategy, ahead of the examination in public heard in 
July 2011, wrote to the Council, setting out a number of issues relating to 
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the South Oxfordshire Strategic Development Area (SOSDA) on which he 
required comments. These were: firstly the SOSDA proposal in the SEP 
was the subject of successful legal challenge (albeit that the process was 
not completed with a formal Consent Order). It appears that agreement 
was never finally achieved about what the precise provisions of the 
Consent Order should be but, in any event, the adopted City of Oxford 
CS does not refer to SOSDA. Despite this, some believe that the City will 
eventually outgrow its capacity for growth within its boundaries and will 
therefore require some form and amount of related development to take 
place somewhere beyond them. Secondly, if a statutory duty to co-
operate were enacted, joint working between the City and its 
neighbouring authorities would be required to resolve this matter. 
However, it is not currently clear when this issue would need to be 
addressed, nor by what mechanism any such work would be set in 
motion. Finally, it is unclear what – if anything- a sound South 
Oxfordshire CS would currently need to say about this matter. 
 
The Inspector organised a pre - hearing meeting heard at the council's 
offices on the 17th May 2011, and invited those interested, including 
Oxford City Council and the CPRE, to write in advance with their 
comments on the issues he had raised. South Oxfordshire District 
Council also submitted a very substantial paper, “Response to Inspector's 
Initial Soundness Concerns May 2011”, dealing with these issues. At the 
meeting which was very well attended by representatives from town and 
parish councils, councillors, landowners and developers together with 
their legal advisors, the debate centred around whether the Core Strategy 
was sound, in that recent court rulings had established that the South 
East Plan was still relevant and that the South Oxfordshire Core Strategy 
should conform to the SEP. 
 
Leading counsel for a number of developers made it quite clear that in 
their view the strategy was not sound and should be withdrawn. The 
Inspector listened patiently to the points made, but made it clear that he 
would not be making any decisions that day and would consider all views 
before coming to a decision. Among many of the non - professional 
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representatives present in the room, there was a palatable sense of 
bewilderment and dismay as it appeared that the legal advisors for the 
developers very much had the upper hand, with the Council's advisors 
appearing confused and unsettled by the legal submissions being made. 
It was dawning on many present that despite the controversy and debate 
that had already surrounded the preparation of the Core Strategy (CS), 
more land needed to be identified for housing and other development. 
Subsequently on the 23rd May 2011, the Inspector published his 
conclusions after the exploratory meeting . 
 
On the question of the South Oxford Strategic Area (SOSDA) the 
Inspector summarised the successful legal challenge, and that following 
the election, the Coalition Government had advised that in the light of the 
passage of the Localism Bill, parties should await the outcome of the 
legislation, and not bear any unnecessary costs. The Inspector concluded 
that in the light of these events, SOSDA raised no fundamental 
soundness issue for the CS. The only outstanding issue could be a 
limited one: whether or not a sound CS needs to commit South 
Oxfordshire to working with its Sub – regional neighbours to find ways of 
catering with the situation that would occur if the City eventually outgrows 
its own boundaries. However the recently – adopted City of Oxford CS 
does not refer to SOSDA and it is currently unclear when the potential 
future needs of the Oxford Sub- region would need to be further 
addressed, or by what mechanism.  
 
Consequently the Inspector thought that this does not appear to be a 
current soundness concern but a potential one for the future which would 
need to be addressed by any then – current “duty to co-operate“ (NB. one 
of the provisions of the Localism Bill ). The Inspector further noted that 
there was no evidence or suggestion that South Oxfordshire's own “ local 
needs“ require 4000 houses to be located in the Green Belt on the edge 
of the City Council's area. The Inspector's response was perhaps a 
pragmatic one, given the difficult legal context that he found in relation to 
the SOSDA, but Oxford City Council, in their written representations to 
him in advance of the exploratory meeting, had made it clear that it was 
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seeking a reference to the SOSDA allocation, and either a policy 
allocation for it or a statement setting out how the Core Strategy would 
address the housing needs that were to be accommodated at SOSDA . 
Subsequently the Inspector accepted that view. 
 
 
On the question of whether the CS was sound in relation to the other 
growth proposals within the district, the Inspector accepted that the 
District Council had attempted overall to adhere to the SEP level of 
growth, but by relying on windfalls in the later stages of the plan, and not 
specifically identifying sites in the towns and larger villages, the CS did 
not comply with national planning policy. The implications were that the 
District Council would need to do further technical studies and consult 
with the public, which could delay the start of the EiP. 
 
Following discussions with the Council, the Inspector agreed to hold 
some of the examination hearings in July and the remainder, dealing with 
the housing issues, in November. Subsquently the Council approved 
changes to the Core Strategy on where the 814 additional dwellings 
should go, and to embark on further public consultation. The changes 
involved additional housing at Thame and Wallingford and in the larger 
villages. The Council meeting of the 30th June 2011 debated these issues 
but the meeting was poorly attended with only 31 of 48 councillors in 
attendance and the resolution to accept the changes was passed by only 
21 votes with 10 abstentions – only 43.75 percent of the total number of 
councillors in favour of the resolution. Cllr Angie Paterson Cabinet 
member for planning said after the meeting “Council's decision last night 
to approve the changes to housing numbers means we can now move 
the strategy forward again – although having to revise our numbers was a 
disappointment for us and for local communities, it is in all our interests to 
work to submit a strategy that the Inspector will find to be sound.“  It 
would seem however for a significant number of councillors, that they no 
longer felt that they had any control over the direction of the CS, and that 
the Council was being forced to adopt these changes. (Appendix 3). 
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The first part of the examination in public was held in July, and the 
Inspector considered the economy, town centres and shopping, the 
environment, Henley and rural communities. Around the table at the 
various sessions sat representatives of developers and land - owners, 
university colleges, parish councils, CPRE, the Oxford Greenbelt Network 
and the Oxford Preservation Trust. Other than a small number of 
councillors in the audience, there were no other councillors in the council 
chamber. The second part of the examination in public was scheduled for 
November 2011 when the housing numbers and the selection of strategic 
sites were examined by the Inspector. The Inspector reported at the end 
of the month. His recommendations were a mixed blessing for the 
council. He supported the scale and direction of growth at Didcot and the 
lack, at this stage, of an expansion area south of Oxford. However he 
thought that there might be might be possibilities for further growth at 
Henley, and at Wallingford he rejected the council's preferred site, 
substituting a rival site put forward by objectors. At Thame he similarly 
rejected the council's preferred site and noting that Thame Town Council 
had recently been awarded front - runner status in neighbourhood 
planning, he recommended that the final selection of development sites 
should be through the mechanism of a neighbourhood plan produced 
under the auspices of the new Localism Act subject to an overall amount 
of growth determined by him (Appendix 4). 
 
Of further relevance was the announcement on the 17th August 2011 that 
in response to a bid prepared by the Oxfordshire Local Enterprise 
Partnership, earlier that year, the Coalition Government had confirmed 
that the Harwell Research Park and the Milton Business Park, located to 
the west of Didcot, were among the ten new Enterprise Zones, which 
would benefit from business rate discounts over five years, corporation 
tax benefits, simplified planning procedures and access to superfast 
broadband. The manager of Milton Park estimated that  6,500 people 
currently work at the business park within 180 businesses, and the 
number could increase by 50 % with a further 8000 jobs, resulting in a 
£9m a year boost to the local economy by 2016. 
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Following receipt of the EiP Inspector’s final recommendations, South 
Oxfordshire District Council adopted the final draft of the Core Strategy at 
a council meeting on the 13th December 2012. The Cabinet discussed the 
draft on the 6th December 2012 but it had not been before the Scrutiny 
Committee. The Full Council meeting was fairly poorly attended and the 
debate barely lasted half an hour. The motion to adopt the Core Strategy 
was supported by 29 councillors with one (an independent councillor) 
voting against and six abstentions from opposition party councillors. 
Several members of the majority party expressed their frustration at the 
outcome, but given the length of time that preparation had taken, the 
resources devoted to it by the Council, and the need to have a strategy in 
place to avoid planning by appeal, these councillors felt unable to vote 
against the motion and reluctantly supported it. A copy of the minutes of 
the meeting is included at Appendix 11. After more than five years the 
overall impression was that the councillors had been worn down by the 
process and the imperative was now to get a strategy in place. 
 
The evolution of the Core Strategy for South Oxfordshire had been a 
disconcerting experience for many councillors, particularly the realisation 
that through the test of “soundness “ central government was able to 
impose a high degree of control over the content of the Core Strategy. In 
the next chapter I describe this evolution and discuss with councillors 
their experience and reactions to the process. 
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Chapter 5 The Evolution of the South Oxfordshire Core Strategy and 
the associated political and governance issues, with particular 
reference to the Central Oxfordshire Sub- region. 
 
Introduction 
The Core Strategy introduced by the Planning and Compulsory Purchase 
Act 2004 is the key document in the Local Development Scheme. PPS 12 
Local Spatial Planning (2008) published by the Department of 
Communities and Local Government advises that it should be comprised 
of a spatial vision and strategic objectives for the area; a spatial strategy; 
core policies and a monitoring and implementation framework with clear 
objectives for achieving delivery. The Localism Act (2011) maintains the 
requirement for local planning authorities to prepare a Core Strategy.  
 
At the time of my research (September 2012) the Vale of White Horse 
District Council had announced that following the announcement by 
Government to abolish the RSSs and top down housing targets, there 
was to be a review of the housing targets and sites in the emerging Core 
Strategy, and an interim housing policy would be adopted, but the work 
on the Core Strategy would be delayed. The Oxford Core Strategy was 
adopted on 14th March 2011, having been examined in hearings sessions 
in July and September 2009 and September 2010. The Inspector’s report 
was received on 21st December 2010, and the Council subsequently 
adopted the Core Strategy early in 2011.  
 
South Oxfordshire District Council had begun work on the Core Strategy 
in 2007, and forwarded the Submitted Version to the Secretary of State in 
March 2011. The examination in public took place in two stages in July 
and November 2011.  South Oxfordshire District Council had voted on 
the Submitted Version at two meetings on 18th November 2010 and 30th 
July 2011, the latter necessary because of revisions required to meet the 
EiP Inspector’s preliminary concerns. The latter part of the evolution of 
the South Oxfordshire Core Strategy has proceeded in tandem with the 
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research questionnaire programme and allowed a discussion with 
councillors of the associated political and governance issues.In this 
chapter I concentrate initially on the South Oxfordshire Core Strategy, 
whilst in the final section I extend the analysis to Oxford City Council and 
the Vale of White Horse District Council councillors. 
 
South Oxfordshire District Council 
In May 2007 following local government elections, the Conservatives 
increased their number of councillors on South Oxfordshire District 
Council, so that they held 37 of the 48 seats. The Liberal Democrats who 
had controlled the Council in the period 1995- 2003 were the second 
largest party with 7 seats, whilst the remaining four seats comprised 1 
Labour councillor, 1 Henley Residents Group (HRG) and 2 Independent 
members. At elections in May 2010 the Conservatives lost 4 seats, 
reducing their total to 33; the Lib Dems won 4 seats, as did Labour, with 
the balance of seats being 5 Independent and 2 HRG.  
 
In May 2007 there was a cabinet of five members including the Leader 
and the Planning Portfolio holder. Subsequently in 2008 the holder of the 
planning portfolio gave up this responsibility because of pressure of work, 
but retained responsibility for the expansion of Didcot, so that the Cabinet 
was expanded to six councillors. In June 2010 this councillor resigned 
from this portfolio over a disagreement as to where further development 
at Didcot should be located, and the Didcot portfolio was taken on by the 
Leader. 
 
The Council has been considering the emerging Core Strategy for 
several years. It has consulted on a range of development options and 
site allocations: 
(a) Issues and options in November 2007 
(b) Preferred options in March 2009 
(c) In respect of Wallingford only, in January/ February 2010 
(d) In respect of Proposed Changes to the Core Strategy in October 2010 
(e) In respect of Thame only, in October 2010, and 
(f) In respect of Thame, Wallingford and the larger villages in August 
2011.  
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Essentially the approach has been an iterative process with a series of 
external consultations following internal consideration of various options, 
which included a series of councillor workshops in 2008 covering the 
main topic areas for the Core Strategy “Preferred Options”. Subsequently 
in May 2010 the Proposed Submission Version of the Core Strategy, 
which was the successor document, following consultation on the 
“Preferred Options” document, was considered by Cabinet, and then by 
Scrutiny Committee in November, before going to Full Council that same 
month. The meeting of Scrutiny Committee was held in the evening at 
6pm on the 9th November and lasted until 11.20 pm. Most of the 
members of the public who spoke were either parish councillors or agents 
for development interests. A number of the recommendations were voted 
on. The agenda for the meeting was the proposed submission version of 
the LDF Core Strategy together with accompanying daughter documents. 
Compressing scrutiny into an evening – even if a long one – did not 
provide the time for effective questioning of the evidence. By way of 
example the scrutiny at Gloucestershire that I referred to in Chapter 1 
took a whole day involving a wide range of participants and agencies and 
that was dealing with a single topic. 
 
Given that Cabinet and Scrutiny comprise approximately twenty members 
in total, for the majority of councillors other than the councillor workshops, 
Full Council represents their major opportunity to comment and vote on 
the Core Strategy. However we saw in the last chapter that the July 2010 
meeting was poorly attended with only 31 out of 48 councillors present, 
and the changes passed by only 21 votes with 10 abstentions (Appendix 
3). Did this reflect a growing disillusionment by some councillors that the 
Core Strategy was being pushed forward for adoption by the Council by 
the leadership?  At the earlier meeting of Council in November 2010, 
which was again poorly attended with 35 councillors present, the Core 
Strategy was supported by a bare majority of just more than 50% 
(Appendix 5). A motion to refer the Core Strategy back to cabinet was 
lost by 11 votes to 24 against; those voting for it included independents, 
Lib Dems, two Wallingford ward councillors who were members of the 
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ruling Conservative group, and a Conservative councillor who had earlier 
resigned from the Didcot portfolio. 
 
 
Engagement by councillors with the Core Strategy  
 
One of the issues I have identified both in the literature search and the 
description of the evolution of the South Oxfordshire Core Strategy is to 
what extent councillors have engaged with the production of the Core 
Strategy and whether there is evidence of a more collaborative approach 
to place making. Question 5 of the questionnaire dealt with the Core 
Strategy and asked councillors whether they had found the preparation 
and adoption of the Core Strategy helpful, and whether they had had an 
opportunity to contribute to its evolution. I will review these responses 
shortly, but initially I comment on the opportunities available to councillors 
to participate in the evolution of the Core Strategy. The Councillor 
Workshops were held at an early stage when the preferred options were 
considered in Spring 2009, and the alternative strategies for the towns 
and rural areas were considered (Appendix 6). One Lib Dem councillor 
found these workshops helpful: 
 
“I don’t really know what has driven the Core Strategy at SODC. The 
previous portfolio holder encouraged member input and discussion. His 
successor did not continue this. Took no notice of stakeholder input, 
especially in relation between housing and employment. Seems to be a 
desire to hand over big chunks of land to developers to sort out 
everything to minimise SODC input”(Questionnaire 3). Once the 
workshops were over, the main input from councillors came via scrutiny 
committee. This met on 9th November 2010 (Appendix 7). The committee 
elects the chairman, but over a number of years, the role has been held 
by a councillor who is not a member of the ruling Conservative group; 
however of the thirteen member committee only four are not part of the 
ruling group. The scrutiny committee heard representations from parish 
councillors, local objectors, agents for landowners and developers, and 
also district council ward members. There was an informed debate about 
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the choices that the committee has to make, but the voting in the main 
went along party lines and the recommendations of the officers, which 
would have been cleared in informal meetings of the ruling group and 
senior management, were endorsed and would go forward to cabinet. 
 
 A Wallingford ward councillor who opposed the Core Strategy and 
addressed the committee, commented, “the Core Strategy was setting 
the town against itself”. An independent councillor, asked if the political 
groups would have a whip imposed or be allowed a free vote at Council. 
The Liberal Democrat group leader said his group would have no whip 
imposed. The independent councillor commented in her interview 
(Interview 4 & Questionnaire 2). “The Core Strategy should not be 
whipped, but loyalty was put above everything. If the Core Strategy was 
not overtly political, there was more chance of people buying into it, and 
consistency. The ruling group had not been consistent; they would not 
budge on Didcot, but had changed their mind on Thame, citing the 
evidence of a landscape appraisal that had been commissioned. 
Localism would encourage the preparation of neighbourhood plans, but if 
they were to be part of the development plan, they would have to go to 
cabinet to be endorsed, and a problem again of political whipping.” 
 
In Chapter 3 dealing with methodology I explained the circulation of 
questionnaires to each of the councillors during the summer of 2011 in 
the Oxford City, South Oxfordshire and Vale of White Horse District 
councils. There were 15 responses from South Oxfordshire District 
councillors, which was 42.8% of the total number of 35 Conservative 
councillors (there being two vacant seats). Of these responses, 6 (40%) 
were female and 9 (60%) male, which was broadly representative of the 
council as a whole that was 43.5% female and 56.5% male. Of the 15 
councillors, ten (66.7%) were backbenchers and five (33.3%) were senior 
members of the council, namely the Chairman, the Leader, Cabinet 
Portfolio holder for Planning, Chairman of the Planning Committee and a 
further member of Cabinet, which meant that senior members were rather 
more represented in the questionnaire answers than the council as a 
whole. I set out the results of my survey in Appendix 12 and here I 
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summarise the responses to the specific questions. 
 
Housing and Employment Targets 
 
Dealing with the first question, Do you think that the provision of housing 
and employment within the planning system in District Council areas 
should be guided by set targets, the answers support the principle of 
cooperation between districts at county level, rather than reliance on 
regional plans. The Leader of the Council (Questionnaire 5) summed up: 
“People do not understand boundaries. Infrastructure is so important 
when building homes, therefore we need to look strategically. If you do 
not have some sort of target you will never manage to get the required 
number. Those already in an area rarely want more.” This goal was 
summarised from a different perspective: ”There needs to be some 
strategic planning at a high level, otherwise housing growth may only 
occur where developers want to build, and that would be purely finance-
led” (Questionnaire 1). 
 
From others there was a plea for a unitary approach (Questionnaire 7) or 
that South Oxfordshire District Council and VWHDC should have 
prepared a joint Core Strategy, for South Oxfordshire was a single area 
for employment purposes and Didcot’s growth straddled district 
boundaries (Questionnaire 2).  
 
Councils determining their own requirements for housing and 
employment provision 
 
The second question sought reasons why until the introduction of the 
Localism Bill previous governments had been opposed to councils 
determining their own requirements for housing and employment 
provision. The answers showed a very high level of support for the view 
that members need to be informed by locally produced Housing Needs 
Assessments in order to determine requirements for housing and 
employment. Allied to this was the view that councillors are not trusted to 
make these decisions: “A combination of the above and possibly distrust 
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in Councillors, for all sorts of reasons political and of capability” 
(Questionnaire 11); “Lack of confidence by Central Government in the 
ability of Local Government. The ‘Man in Whitehall knows best syndrome” 
(Questionnaire 6).  
 
 
Other views expressed were: 
“Urgent need to address affordable housing problem in the District. 
Mobility means that people work throughout the south east, but value the 
traditional market towns in the District as a place to live, but their children 
cannot afford to live here” (Questionnaire 15). 
“I believe it was the need for central control in Westminster and a belief 
that if they left it to the local communities they would not want extra 
housing in the first place. This misguided view has led to massive moves 
to the south east of England to the detriment of the rest of the country. 
Instead of following policies to encourage employment in the rest of the 
country, a policy of concentrating jobs in the south east and then 
providing housing after the event has ruled” (Questionnaire 9). 
“Governments of all flavours have had different agendas when seeking 
housing targets – Rarely have these agendas ever been about the 
market. Cllrs. will always have a tendency to be parochial so Government 
needs to demonstrate what local authorities can achieve in order to get 
past that parochialism” (Questionnaire 4).  
“Although training is given to Cllrs, the issues are complex, and the 
officers tend to lead…” (Questionnaire 12). 
“I am sceptical about the Localism Bill, I don’t think Parish Councils will 
engage with localism as much as the Government hopes” (Questionnaire 
13). 
 
Changes in planning thought 
       
The third question asked the response of councillors to changes in 
planning thought which have seen the evolution of spatial planning from a 
mainly regulatory function controlling land use through the planning 
control system to a more holistic approach. The answers showed strong 
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support for councillors becoming involved in place making, in addition to 
the traditional role of serving on planning committee, and playing a more 
collaborative role, but at the same time still taking the major decisions 
within the planning system. Comments made by councillors included: 
“These decisions are generally made by council officers. Not enough use 
is made of the detailed local knowledge of councillors. The local plan is 
set by the Council and so exceptions to it may sometimes be necessary, 
but these should always be determined by councillors and not delegated 
to officers” (Questionnaire 1).  
 
The Value of Core Strategies 
 
The fifth question sought views on the value and importance of Core 
Strategies and whether councillors felt that they had had the opportunity 
to contribute to them. There was a small majority of councillors who 
thought that the preparation and adoption of the Core Strategy was either 
very helpful or fairly helpful. A recurring theme was that the strategy had 
been too officer-led: “Our core strategy was driven by the officers seeking 
the easiest way for them to deal with the issues and any fallout”; “Too 
much is delegated to officers who think they know it all” (Questionnaire 
1).  
This councillor who represents a Thame ward has been instrumental in 
arguing that the final choice of development sites should be delegated to 
the town council acting in concert with the local community.  
 
Another councillor (Questionnaire 9) expressed his concerns as follows: 
“The public elect their councillors to determine which planning 
applications should be allowed in their district and to set the policy for 
future development. Unfortunately when it comes down to it we have so 
little control I believe the public have been misled”; “I felt it was too 
officer-led and councillors were very low in the decision process. It 
started with a general invite to all developers to pick any land they 
wanted to develop, followed by officers picking their preferred sites, and 
then only finally councillors involved, with very little strategic direction 
involved.” “The planning system is geared to encourage development but 
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give the public the feeling that their view is listened to, but in reality 
central control is maintained by locking councillors down to a rigid set of 
processes and then overriding councils by the inspectorate system. 
Councillors are therefore only providing a quasi-judicial process which 
can be challenged in the inspectorate process.” 
 
 
The Council Leader (Interview 1) saw it differently: “Planning 
development control was not whipped politically and this should remain, 
but policies and the Core Strategy were political, although it was difficult 
to engage backbenchers in policy formulation.” The former Cabinet 
portfolio holder for planning commented (Questionnaire 4): “I resigned 
from the Cabinet, because I was concerned that adoption of the strategy 
was whipped.” 
 
A higher proportion of councillors felt that they had had an opportunity to 
contribute to the evolution of the Core Strategy, but again there were 
concerns that much was officer-led: “My impression was that sessions 
offered for members’ contributions were presented by the officers in ‘bite 
sizes’ rather than facilitating a strategic overview. I felt that ‘consultations’ 
tended to be a way of reinforcing decisions taken at the top, rather than 
encouraging a bottom-up process”. (Questionnaire 10). 
The Leader was characteristically robust: “There had been far more 
consultation than previous plans. Wide consultation, workshops, 
discussions at all stages; however, there will always be those who feel 
that they have not, due to the fact that they are the ones getting the 
growth” (Questionnaire 5). 
 
What emerges from this examination is that the evolution of the Core 
Strategy is a complex, time-consuming process that proceeds as a series 
of at least four iterations, the first proceeding through councillor 
workshops, scrutiny, cabinet and full council before consulting on the 
preferred options. This is Phase 1. Then on receipt of the public 
consultations, a pre-submission draft is taken through the same cycle of 
scrutiny, cabinet and full council before being published for public 
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consultation and then submitted to the Secretary of State. This is Phase 
2. The third phase involves the examination in public by an independent 
Inspector who in turn makes recommendations that are again subject to 
the cycle of scrutiny, cabinet and full council before public consultation, 
and then submission again to the Inspector. The fourth and final phase 
comprises the binding recommendations of the Inspector and the 
adoption of the modified Core Strategy by the Council. Holding this 
together is a steering group of the cabinet portfolio holder for planning 
and a senior group of officers including the strategic director for planning. 
 
Understandably this complex process can leave backbenchers feeling 
both perplexed and marginalized. Some of their criticisms have already 
been noted.  The portfolio holder for planning and the Leader saw it 
differently. The portfolio holder introducing the strategy at full council 
thought that there had been a wide- ranging discussion amongst ward 
councillors, “but in the end someone has to take responsibility for 
decisions and there is unlikely to be universal agreement.” The Leader 
commented, “We have to be guided by officers as they are the ones who 
have a greater understanding of policy etc; this does not mean just 
rubber stamping what they say, it means challenging them, hence 
councillors need to be better trained to also have a better understanding. 
I believe the new type of officers are far more flexible and pro-active. I 
have seen such a change since I was first involved.” This was an 
interesting reflection because a common complaint amongst 
backbenchers was that the council was too “officer-led”. 
 
I set out in Chapter 1 my premise that the Core Strategy as finally 
submitted to the Secretary of State was essentially a political strategy 
that balanced the requirements for growth whilst ensuring that political 
support in the wards on which the party particularly relied for its majority 
was not compromised, whilst accepting that in some wards experiencing 
the major growth, members of the group might oppose the strategy. This 
had been particularly the case in Wallingford where two Conservative 
councillors representing Wallingford North Ward had voted against 
development in their ward. In Thame the Conservatives controlled only 
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two of the four ward seats, and one of the councillors    was the Council 
Chairman and effectively out of local politics for that year. The other 
Conservative councillor, a member of cabinet, was absent from both 
council meetings that had discussed the Core Strategy. Essentially, 
therefore, the political leadership sees wards where growth proposals are 
controversial as ones where councillors in the ruling group are given 
licence either to object or effectively to abstain. It is evidently an 
expedient that only a group with a large majority can entertain.  
 
Relationship with officers 
 
The relationship between officers and councillors is a key element of 
governance in local government, particularly in spatial planning where 
councillors rely heavily on officers for professional advice and technical 
help. This aspect was covered in the questionnaire and the final question 
(Question 6) was open-ended and gave councillors the opportunity to 
comment on their role as councillors within the planning system. The 
most significant issue was the relationship with and role of officers.  All of 
those back benchers who responded were concerned that officers 
exercise too much control. Only the Leader and the Chairman of Planning 
Committee offered support for the officers’ role, the latter commenting: 
“SODC is democratic, well run, no corruption, officers work hard, and 
councillors on planning committee work within the agreed parameters” 
(Questionnaire 13). The Chairman of the Council, although agreeing that 
there was a problem, thought it double-edged: “Councillors, whether at 
planning committee or policy making, need to be more determined and 
not rely on officers overly. Officers are there to offer policy and technical 
support.” (Questionnaire15). A member of cabinet and a leading 
councillor from Didcot felt that as the town had been scheduled for major 
growth, local members should be more involved in decision taking, and 
there should be a forum for discussing Didcot’s growth (Questionnaire 
12). 
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Central Oxfordshire Sub- region: aspects of governance 
The questionnaire was e mailed to all the then sitting councillors for 
Oxford City Council and the Vale of White Horse District Council and 
dealt with the same issues of governance and collaboration that were 
discussed with councillors from South Oxfordshire District Council. 
Turning to the wider area, and those questionnaires that were returned by 
councillors from Oxford City Council and the Vale of White Horse District 
Council, there were only four replies from the latter council: the then 
Leader, the then Planning Portfolio holder and two back benchers. As we 
have seen, the preparation of the Core Strategy for the Vale had been 
delayed significantly, and this may have led either to a lack of interest or 
to inertia amongst councillors. Of the seven Oxford City councillor 
respondents, three were senior members and the remainder were back 
benchers.  The majority of those responding from the two Councils were 
male (82%). Both the Leaders of the two Councils agreed to be 
interviewed (Interviews 2 & 3). Dealing with these first as they do provide 
a useful background: 
 
The Oxford City Council Leader acknowledged that his Council and 
South Oxfordshire District Council had failed to agree on a plan for the 
Oxford Urban Expansion, and that the only way forward was through the 
Spatial Planning and Infrastructure Partnership (SPIP). Within Oxford 
ward committees were to be replaced with two area committees for 
planning and a call-in committee. Forums would be convened to reflect 
local opinion. Oxford had a strong tradition of area committees and local 
democracy, and that place- making had been an integral part of being a 
councillor in Oxford. The Vale Leader also acknowledged the importance 
of SPIP, of which he was a member. Policy formation often did not 
involve members of the planning committee. The Planning Portfolio 
holder of the Vale thought the consultation exercises for the Core 
Strategy were “over-long, cumbersome and extremely expensive – well 
over half a million pounds and quite a waste of money.” (Questionnaire 
25). 
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The role of SPIP was endorsed by the Oxford City councillor who was a 
member of the committee (Interview 6) and who drew a distinction 
between the sub-regional level, the city, where the Core Strategy was 
unashamedly a political document, and neighbourhood plan level where 
localism could work provided local members show robust leadership and 
not just ‘cherry pick’ as with planning applications.  
 
When the Oxford Core Strategy was adopted by Oxford City Council in 
March 2011, it concluded some five years of preparation. The Council 
was controlled by Labour with 26 of the 48 seats, with the Lib Dems 
having 16 seats, the Greens 5 seats and a single member representing 
the Independent Working Class Association. The voting at the Council 
meeting went along party lines with 24 Labour councillors voting to adopt 
the CS, 5 Green councillors voting not to adopt, and 12 Lib Dem 
councillors abstaining. There were apologies from seven absent 
councillors. Compared with the debates at South Oxfordshire, there was 
a higher turnout of councillors, and there were no dissenting councillors 
amongst the ruling group. Minutes of the council meeting are included at 
Appendix 8. The preparation of the CS had been a massive undertaking, 
with progress interrupted by changes of national government and new 
policy announcements, as described in the Officer’s report to the Council. 
Despite all the consultation and debate, the CS could command only the 
support of the ruling group, albeit that this was unanimous. Against this 
background, it is instructive to gain the opinions of councillors as to the 
value of the preparation and adoption of the CS. 
 
Housing and Employment Targets 
 
The answers to the first question as to whether the provision of housing 
and employment within the planning system in District Council areas 
should be guided by set targets demonstrate a much stronger support for 
regionally set housing and employment targets, and greater collaboration 
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between district councils than was evident in the replies from South 
Oxfordshire District councillors: 
“Co-operation important in principle, but party political differences can 
create deadlock, and impede agreement, if neighbouring councils have 
differing plans/ core strategies.” (Questionnaire 18) 
“…In practice, with differing objectives it will be very difficult to achieve 
greater collaboration”. (Questionnaire 19) 
“Difficulty in Oxfordshire – Labour-run Oxford City with tight boundary and 
wish to see growth in housing/ jobs, but surrounded by councils hostile to 
these policies. Targets are better made regionally; then, no opportunity 
for authorities to duck their responsibility to contribute to housing and 
employment needs in region.” (Questionnaire 16) 
“Reality of housing & employment patterns and needs does not conform 
to District Council boundaries eg.  Oxford: in/ out migration for work/ 
housing” (Questionnaire 20) 
“Districts should determine needs ref. housing and employment growth 
via LDFs, but then these need to be co-ordinated across the County ref. 
main infrastructure requirements; … also HCA & others that bring funding 
to the table should be there.” (Questionnaire 26) 
“Regional targets prevent nimbyism.” (Questionnaire 24) 
“Collaboration necessary when close to boundaries between District 
Councils.” (Questionnaire 23) 
 
Councils determining their own requirements for housing and 
employment provision 
There was strong agreement, as had been the case with South 
Oxfordshire District councillors ,that councillors will pursue local interests, 
and not give sufficient weight to wider requirements, but it was not agreed 
that councillors do not have sufficient knowledge to make these 
decisions. Again a majority thought that the pursuit of political aims would 
tend to predominate. There was less support for locally produced 
Housing Needs Assessments than had been the case with South 
Oxfordshire District councillors.  
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“I think there was a recognition that some plans need to be made at a 
higher level than that of the district. Travel- to- work areas, for instance, 
don’t respect district boundaries, and neither do housing markets. The 
case is even stronger when you look at areas like water, waste and 
minerals. Although regional targets (and before that, structure plans) 
could help overcome NIMBYism, and also gave local politicians someone 
else they could blame, I think the main drivers were probably those I 
mention above.” (Questionnaire 19) 
 
“Our Council has used Housing Needs assessments as the driver for 
determining numbers and partly to validate the regional statements. But 
there has been the tendency to blame it on centrally produced numbers, 
but with that gone we are having to fall back on needs assessment.” 
(Questionnaire 26). 
 
 
Changes in Planning Thought 
 
There was very strong support for councillors’ role in place- making, and 
a very similar level of support to that evidenced by South Oxfordshire 
District councillors for the importance of the councillor’s role in planning. 
The collaborative role for councillors in bringing various stakeholders 
together was also very strongly endorsed.   
“The probity issues that seek to ensure that members do not fetter their 
discretion when determining planning applications still holds, but there 
are opportunities to act as mediator and discuss common concerns and 
interests with developers, but to draw the line at discussing specific 
proposals if these are coming forward for determination. I have already 
started to do this in my patch in Oxford where health and universities 
dominate Headington so I have brought together a group of stakeholders 
who meet quarterly to discuss spatial and development issues and 
tensions.” (Questionnaire 18) 
 
“Clearly councillors should do more than just look at contentious 
development control decisions. They should also have input into 
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formulating planning policies, and I think there’s a strategic role that they 
need to play. There will be a long and difficult process of adjustment to 
the role of elected members once the Localism Bill passes.” 
(Questionnaire 19) 
 
“There is tension between place-shaping (top down) and localism (bottom 
up). I favour the ward councillor working alongside the community in 
making these decisions.” (Questionnaire 22). 
“The Executive/ Cabinet structure does to some extent prevent members 
in general taking that place-making role but it is certainly 
desirable”(Questionnaire 23) 
“This represents the single biggest challenge for councillors in articulating 
clearly what makes communities and places. The balance in investment 
benefit and new development is going to be a very difficult challenge – 
given the lack of available funds.” (Questionnaire 26) 
 
Questioned on whether in order to exercise community leadership within 
their ward, there would be occasions where councillors may have to go 
against the policies of the party of which they are a member there was a 
little less support for this view than had been the case with South 
Oxfordshire councillors but the over-whelming view was nonetheless that 
party political allegiances could not always be adhered to. When asked if 
there would be occasions where there may be the need for a more 
flexible approach to the application of adopted Local Plan policies 
flexibility was again endorsed by a strikingly similar percentage to that 
evidenced by South Oxfordshire District councillors: 
“Your duties as a councillor are to act in the best interests of the citizens 
of the ward and city you represent. Party policy is a secondary 
consideration.” (Questionnaire 16) 
“If the question is – will people sometimes go against local party priorities 
to reflect local concerns, and will they sometimes want to deviate from 
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local plan policies in certain development control decisions – the answer 
is obviously ‘yes’! The extent to which members will do this will vary 
(according to their principles, their majority, the strength of their local 
party, whether they hold a leadership position in the council, the strength 
of feeling in the community, amongst other factors)”. (Questionnaire 19) 
 
“I have not been aware of political pressures in planning for many years 
but I do  feel planning has become less flexible and more policy-based, 
with members now less prepared to go against the plan.” (Questionnaire 
23). 
 
“Strict adherence to the Local Plan is what planning policy and 
development officers rely on, but there is going to be much greater 
flexibility all round from them, but clear arguments from both members 
and communities that want new development. The LDF/ Local Plan will 
set broad outline, with neighbourhood plans allowing the community to 
feel that they are planning the community. But who does this – the local 
pressure group, parish council/ meeting, or a formally constituted 
community led planning group. Watch this space !.” (Questionnaire 26). 
 
The Value of Core Strategies 
  
There was more support for the Core Strategies: 69.2% indicated that 
they had found the preparation and adoption either very helpful or fairly 
helpful. The percentage of councillors who were positive about the 
opportunity to contribute was also higher at 65.4%, compared with 60% 
of South Oxfordshire District councillors. The comments that were made 
tended to be either critical or anxious: 
 
“It has taken a very long time to get ours together (the Inspector has only 
just ruled on it) and most of the policy contained within it was decided 
before I became a councillor. Parts of it are very  unpopular with the 
community.” (Questionnaire 22). 
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“My fear is that the new system is poorly understood by the public.” 
(Questionnaire 23). 
 
The final question (Question 6) was open-ended and gave councillors the 
opportunity to comment on their role as councillors within the planning 
system. Unlike South Oxfordshire councillors, those in the other districts 
did not see the relationship with and role of officers as a significant issue. 
Questions over consultation and local accountability were more to the 
fore. 
“There are great dangers in the Localism proposals that might be 
reflected in the forthcoming changes to the planning system. I think it is a 
nimby’s charter and will destroy the over-arching policy framework that 
has been at the centre of town and country planning since 1947. Of 
course I think that participation and consultation are essential, but these 
emerging ideas are badly thought through and will suffer the same fate as 
similar intentions in the 1980s which saw reaction from the development 
industry which led to a back down by the government and the return to a 
more centralised policy driven system.” (Questionnaire 18). 
 
“Our City Council is centralising planning back from area committees on a 
party political formula which will mean that decisions on applications in 
eg. predominantly Green areas will be made by Labour councillors. This 
should not be a problem if members vote apolitically, but this does not 
appear to happen … As a back bencher I shall have relatively little power 
over planning decisions other than to represent my residents at central 
town hall meetings. I would like more power to work with county and 
other district council planners on improving traffic congestion – road 
planning improvements are desperately overdue and need to be done on 
a wide area basis.” (Questionnaire 22). 
 
“There needs to be more consideration of the benefits and disadvantages 
on the ground of individual applications and less adherence to policy for 
the sake of following the plan.” (Questionnaire 23). 
and finally: 
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“It disappoints me that we spend so much money writing plans and 
policies. Somehow we have to do it faster and cheaper.” (Questionnaire 
26).  
 
This comment is worth emphasising in that in the case of both South 
Oxfordshire and Oxford City Council, the preparation and adoption of 
their Core Strategies has effectively been the lifetime of a five - year term 
of parliament, and in the case of the Vale of White Horse District Council, 
will be even longer. 
 
In exercising his role the councillor has a number of options available to 
him in terms of how he performs in relation not merely towards his 
constituents, or towards the workload of the local authority, but also 
towards his party (if any), the local pressure groups, the officers and the 
community outside his particular ward (Gyford 1984). A number of 
attempts have been made to investigate and to summarise the wide 
variety of role orientations that a councillor may assume. 
 
These were summarised in Chapter 2. We saw that one of the early 
attempts was by Gyford who drew these role orientations together and 
identified one general conclusion that did emerge from the various 
studies: that the choice of role orientation by councillors is not particularly 
associated with age, sex or social class, but rather with such factors as 
seniority and length of service on the council, the character of the 
councillor’s ward and party political allegiance. These orientations link 
with each other, forming “clusters” which provide differing emphases to 
the varying aspects of a councillor’s role. Gyford concluded that the 
available evidence supported the hypothesis that two internally consistent 
clusters of role orientations characterising junior and senior councillors 
could be identified, and he described these as the “tribune” and the 
“statesman”. Like other classifications, this is not wholly watertight, and 
individual councillors will not always fall into place within it, but my 
empirical research suggests that in terms of the preparation and adoption 
of the Core Strategy, this is a particularly helpful classification. 
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Gyford (1984) further added that the distinction is, at least theoretically, 
one that exists at a given point in time, and is one that an individual 
councillor can transcend during the course of a political career. The 
increasing complexity of policy making may, however, make that process 
more difficult. Cartwright (1974) found that the effect of the introduction of 
corporate planning in one London Borough had been to strengthen the 
split between those councillors who were interested in policy and others 
who were interested in casework. Copus (2004) described how the 
politics of the councils are conducted within the party political groups 
before it reaches the public domain. 
 
The role orientations of councillors 
 
Given my knowledge of the three district councils in the southern area of 
the Central Oxfordshire Sub- region, I was able to identify among the 
questionnaire respondents senior and junior councillors, based on current 
membership of cabinet or committee chairmanship. Senior members 
made up 42%, which means that they are somewhat over-represented, in 
that one would anticipate that at any one time about a third of the 
councillors in a district council could be regarded as seniors. 
 
 In terms of taking a wider perspective towards development targets, 
whether at regional or county level, there was a discernible distinction, 
with senior councillors wishing to take the wider perspective and junior 
councillors having a local focus, but not appreciably so. At both senior 
and junior level there was overwhelming support for greater collaboration 
between district councils.   
 
The “statesman” approach noted by Gyford (1984) was discernible in the 
attitude of senior councillors towards the reasons why previous 
governments had been opposed to councils determining their own 
development targets, their identifying localism and insufficient knowledge 
as factors more strongly than junior councillors. The latter had more 
confidence in their knowledge and political aims, whilst neither placed 
much store in the benefits of Housing Needs Assessments. Senior 
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councillors had more confidence in the opportunities to be involved in 
place- making, but overall nearly all councillors were positive about these 
opportunities. Junior councillors were slightly more emphatic that 
councillors should still be those who should make the major planning 
decisions, but were also more positive about playing a collaborative role 
in bringing stakeholders together. The most pronounced difference in 
attitudes between senior and junior councillors was evident in the 
answers to these questions. Junior councillors indicated both their 
willingness to go against their party’s policies and their wish for a more 
flexible approach to Local Plan policies, illustrating the “ward focus” of 
junior councillors identified by Gyford (1984). 
 
Responses to questions 4 and 5 in particular revealed a number of 
differences between the perceptions of senior and junior councillors. For 
example, 8 out of 11 senior councillors (72.7%) thought that there were 
occasions when councillors might have to go against their party’s 
policies. In the case of junior councillors the corresponding figure was 13 
out of 15 (86. 6%).  Similarly, 14 out of 15 junior councillors (93.3%) 
thought that there were occasions when there might be a need for a more 
flexible approach to the application of adopted Local Plan policies. This 
view was shared by only 7 of 11 senior councillors (63. 6%). 
 
There were also differences in perceptions of the value of the preparation 
and adoption of Core Strategies: 6 out of 11 senior councillors (54. 5%) 
regarded this as very helpful, whereas only 4 out of 15 junior councillors 
(26. 6%) did so. Similarly, a further third of junior councillors (33.3%) 
rated the process as unhelpful, a view shared by none of their senior 
counterparts. Furthermore, 10 out of 11 senior councillors (90. 9%) felt 
that they had had an opportunity to contribute to the evolution of the Core 
Strategy in their District, compared with only 7 out of 15 (46. 6%) of junior 
councillors. 
 
Finally, some illustrative quotations from a senior councillor:  
 “If the question is – will people sometimes go against local party policies 
to reflect local concerns, and will they sometimes want to deviate from 
   
 176 
local plan policies in certain development control decisions, the answer is 
obviously ‘yes’! The extent to which members will do this will vary 
(according to their principles, their majority, the strength of their local 
party, whether they hold a leadership position in the council, the strength 
of feeling in their community, amongst many other factors.”  
(Questionnaire 19). 
 
“From my experience, planning has had a reputation as being complex 
and technical, which puts some elected members off being involved, and 
also (like the general public), too little attention is paid to the process of 
policy/ plan formulation – things then “kick off” when unpopular 
development control decisions have to be taken.  The role of elected 
members is going to need a fundamental rethink after the Localism Bill; 
are people community advocates/ representatives or leaders? How will 
elected members work on strategic planning challenges? How will we 
handle the growing incentives to accept development?” 
(Questionnaire 19). 
 
With this analysis as a background and context I now turn to the 
questions that I identified in my literature review. 
 
a) De- politicisation in local government  
 
Although councillors welcomed greater collaboration with stakeholders, 
there was nonetheless, particularly amongst junior councillors, a desire to 
ensure that their political role was not minimalised. The need to prepare 
and adopt a Core Strategy for a district council area had, on the one 
hand, encouraged the collaborative approach advocated by Healey 
(2006) and others, but on the other had politicised policy and plan making 
to a significantly new degree. The Leader of South Oxfordshire District 
Council saw a clear distinction between development control decisions 
that were not whipped politically and the Core Strategy that was political, 
although it was difficult to engage backbenchers in policy formulation 
(Interview 1). 
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Not surprisingly, this view was not supported by Independent councillors 
(Interview 4) and had led to conflict within the ruling group (Interview 5), 
but it was a view strongly endorsed by senior Oxford City councillors 
(Interview 6). The preparation of Core Strategies was a significant 
change for district councils, pursuing a more over-arching approach than 
the land-use plans required under the 1990 Planning Act. There also 
needed to be more collaboration, particularly in economic development 
(Interview 15), with county and sub-regional agencies, but the 
implications of these changes appeared to be an ever-increasing growth 
in the influence exerted by senior officers, and an alienation of 
backbenchers, who felt less engaged in the process. Backbenchers in 
marginal wards could feel particularly under pressure (Interview 16).  
 
Whether the adoption of Core Strategies at Council meetings at Oxford 
City Council and South Oxfordshire were politically whipped is difficult to 
ascertain, because of its sensitivity. However what is clear is that parties 
voted along political affiliations at the respective Council meetings, and 
we have seen that within the ruling group at South Oxfordshire “opt outs” 
or “diplomatic absences from meetings” were agreed with the Leader. It is 
a reasonable assumption that voting was whipped because the ruling 
group either in Oxford or South Oxfordshire could not be certain of the 
voting arithmetic at Council meetings and would want in any event to 
demonstrate at least a majority of the Council in support of the adopted 
Core Strategy. My main finding is that the Core Strategy is a clear 
expression of the political aims of the Council and its ruling group and 
supports the conclusions of Copus (2004) that the politics of the council 
was conducted within the party group before it reaches the public domain 
and that dissenters were given some freedom by the leadership rather 
than risk a overly public split within the party. 
 
b) Core Strategies as expressions of political aspirations for the district 
 
The Leader of South Oxfordshire District Council, who was also a 
member of the Local Enterprise Partnership and the County Spatial 
Planning and Infrastructure Planning Liaison Group (SPIP), had a clear 
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idea of the Core Strategy as a document setting out the political vision for 
the future development of the district (Interview 1). This, together with 
collaboration with other councils and agencies, involved senior officers 
and members, and it was difficult to engage backbenchers in policy 
formulation. There was likely to be an increased emphasis on economic 
development, and within the council, senior management was trying to 
re-focus professional planners to become more aware of the overall 
activities of the council, and not just development control. 
 
One casualty of this approach was that the Urban Expansion of Oxford, 
proposed in the South East Plan (2009), had been dropped and, despite 
the representations of Oxford City Council, the EiP Inspector examining 
the South Oxfordshire Core Strategy had not been persuaded to 
resurrect the policy in the Strategy, preferring that these housing 
requirements be further examined at the County level. Although the 
Oxford Urban Expansion had featured in a list of priorities prepared by 
SPIP, this could not of itself safeguard the policy. The Chairman of the 
Local Enterprise Partnership (Interview 15) had made it clear that the 
LEP would not interfere in the statutory decision-making of elected 
members of local authorities. The increased politicisation of plan making 
as exemplified in the Core Strategies will, I suggest, make collaboration 
between district councils more difficult, particularly where it involves 
significant housing development, despite apparent enthusiasm for this 
collaboration expressed by councillors. A local developer (Interview 13) 
thought local authorities had failed to deal with these issues and that his 
company would have to lobby in order that the issues are confronted. 
 
The issue of increased politicisation in plan making raises some 
interesting questions about leadership and scrutiny. Gains et al (2005) 
demonstrated how the potential exists for local authorities to be 
independently strong and weak on the two dimensions of leadership and 
scrutiny. This led to the identification of four broad paths for 
implementation to move down. These included the low scrutiny/high 
leadership model where there has been a move from collectivist patterns 
of leadership to a focussed executive without adopting the other parts of 
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the reforms. Gains called this the “executive autonomy model “ and this 
appears to have become the overwhelming form of governance in South 
Oxfordshire District Council and to some extent also in Oxford City 
Council which has adopted the “Strong Leadership “ role for the executive 
offered by central government although a strong opposition of Lib Dems 
and Greens exercise a scrutiny role. 
 
c) Do councillors welcome the opportunities afforded by the Localism Act 
to determine their own requirements for housing and employment within 
the district? 
 
From the questionnaire results we have seen the support for this approach, and 
a number of interviews (Interviews 4, 5 and 9) revealed support and evidenced 
concern that Sub-regional targets had been too prominent in the production of 
the Core Strategy. CPRE (Interview 12) pointed out that the major influence on 
the policies being followed by the Oxford City Council was the Oxford 
Strategic Partnership on which both Oxford University and Oxford 
Brookes University were represented: “A major objective of the Council 
was to achieve unitary status and their growth agenda was part of this 
campaign” (Interview 12). Within Oxford City Council the six area 
planning committees that had met monthly across the city were being 
replaced by two larger planning committees. The justification for replacing 
them was that some of the committees had a poor record of decision-
making (Interview 6). However, because of Oxford’s political geography, 
the Lib Dems and Greens had been able to lead these smaller area 
committees, whereas the two larger area committees would be politically 
balanced to reflect the political make-up of the whole Council, thus giving 
Labour a majority on both. Evidently localism in Oxford had proved 
uncomfortable for the political leadership of the Council: “They are over-
influenced by local people” (Interview 6). The new approach was 
welcomed by a local developer (Interview 13), who thought the“ area 
committees were very parochial and inexperienced, and lost a lot of 
appeals”.  By contrast we have also seen how localism can be interpreted 
to include important local institutions such as the Universities with their 
own agendas. 
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d) In addition to membership of the planning committee, are there 
opportunities for councillors to become involved in place- making? 
 
As we have seen, senior councillors had more confidence in the opportunities to 
be involved in place- making, but overall nearly all councillors were positive 
about these opportunities. Junior councillors were slightly more emphatic that 
councillors should still be those who should make the major planning decisions, 
but were also more positive about playing a collaborative role in bringing 
stakeholders together. The three council leaders (Interviews 1, 2 & 3) were 
supportive of councillors becoming involved in place making, and it does 
represent an opportunity for junior councillors to define a new role for 
themselves, in addition to membership of the regulatory planning committee. For 
the Leaders it could hopefully empower councillors who otherwise might 
either not become engaged in policy formulation, or alternatively 
challenge it. 
 
e) Councillors as the people who should make the major decisions, and 
collaboration with stakeholders  
 
We have seen that councillors are supportive of a more collaborative role, 
but particularly the junior councillors are also concerned to ensure that 
their traditional role as decision makers in planning is not diminished. 
Senior members, through their involvement in external organisations and 
consortia, already play a collaborative role and it is in this way that these 
agencies exert their influence on the councils 
 
A recurring theme both from the questionnaire replies and the interviews 
was the need to distinguish between policy making on the one hand and 
the regulatory function of planning development control on the other. The 
Chairman of the South Oxfordshire Planning Committee (Interview 11) 
emphasised the importance to the public of the development control 
meetings, where interested parties could orally make submissions to the 
committee. She was happy with the delegation arrangements to officers, 
as the committee did receive all the big planning applications. However 
she had little time for those councillors who thought that they had been 
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marginalised in planning matters, and advised them that they should 
become more involved at a ward level. She emphasised that there was 
no political whip on planning decisions. The probity of maintaining a clear 
distinction between policy making and planning decisions on individual 
applications has been an important feature of the planning system in 
England since the 1947 Act. The increased politicisation of policy making 
renders that even more important. 
 
It is significant that in the new organisational structures being introduced 
to local government, such as at Stratford- on- Avon District Council in 
Warwickshire, with which I am familiar, planning development control and 
enforcement is grouped with other regulatory activities such as 
environmental health, land drainage and licensing, responsible to a Head 
of Environment and Planning, whilst planning policy is grouped with other 
policy areas such as housing within a Corporate Support department. 
 
 
f) Community Leadership  
 
The most pronounced difference in attitudes between senior and junior 
councillors was evident in their responses to this issue. Junior councillors 
indicated both their willingness to go against their party’s policies and 
their wish for a more flexible approach to Local Plan policies. This follows 
a familiar pattern noted by Gyford (1984) who cites Newton (1974) who 
found that the delegate role appealed particularly to the member for a 
marginal ward, whilst trustees were more likely to come from safe wards. 
Junior councillors, in their first term of office, were found to endorse a 
ward focus and adopt a watchdog role, with wider horizons developing 
later on (McKinsey & Co 1973). Their involvement in local ward issues 
may bring them into contact with pressure groups outside the council, 
whereas senior councillors pre-occupied with council work may have at 
best only honorific links with such groups, noted Gyford (1984). 
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g) The value of the preparation of Core Strategies within the planning 
system 
 
As we have seen, there were significant differences between junior and 
senior councillors in their perception of the helpfulness or otherwise of the 
Core Strategy system and the opportunity to contribute. For a number of 
ward councillors the process had been particularly difficult (Interviews 4, 
5, 7 & 9). Chairmanship of the Council meetings had also been difficult 
(Interview 8). For both Oxford City Council and the South Oxfordshire 
District Council, the preparation and adoption of their Core Strategy had 
pre-occupied them for more than five years. Such a protracted process 
invites all sorts of dangers, particularly that of being overtaken by events. 
The evidence does invite the question as to whether the process can be 
simplified and shortened. 
 
In South Oxfordshire, despite the extensive consultation, significant 
changes to the strategy came about only because of the intervention of 
the EiP Inspector. That stage could have been reached much earlier by 
means of a simplified consultation period. In relation to economic 
development, questions are posed as to the effectiveness of the planning 
process, and the conflicting aims of the various economic agencies 
(Interview 14). The failure to develop local capacity to manage the 
development process in Oxfordshire, which, it is claimed, has the largest 
concentration of research and development activity in Western Europe, 
was noted by the Chairman of Oxfordshire LEP (Interview 15). He wanted 
to ensure that the LEP was “business led” and addressed the issues that 
were threatening the local economy, such as the mis-match between skill 
needs and local educational provision. The Coalition Government had 
announced that the LEPs would have a crucial role in determining local 
priorities for infrastructure spending (Interview 15). This surely raises 
questions in terms of the future review of Core Strategies for the Sub- 
region, and the need for these documents to be prepared within a much 
shorter time frame. 
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h) Institutional mechanisms for local authority and public agency 
collaboration  
 
The Leader of the South Oxfordshire District Council referred to a number 
of cross-boundary issues affecting the District (Interview 1) and, given the 
geographical context of the District (Plan 4), this is hardly surprising. 
These issues include the expansion of Aylesbury to the north east and 
Swindon to the south west, the possible expansion of Oxford into the 
District, and the growth of Didcot, which was divided between the SODC 
and VWHDC areas. The demise of the South East Regional Agency 
meant that new voluntary agencies would have to be created, similar to 
ACTVAR (Association of Councils in the Thames Valley Region), which 
had been disbanded in favour of the regional agency. SPIP provided a 
forum for the Oxfordshire area, but in respect of its terms of reference 
(Interview 1) there was now a degree of overlap with the Oxfordshire LEP 
(Interview 15). The Chairman of the SPIP at the time of the interview 
(Interview 10) explained that SPIP was local authority- led looking to 
2026, but business could not look so far ahead. The Oxfordshire 
Economic Partnership had been a disappointment, but SPIP and the new 
LEP would need to be partners, but having a different focus: He was 
“suspicious of business leaders who spend a lot of time on such groups, 
probably saw it as networking” (Interview 15). 
 
For the South Oxfordshire Sub- region there are now institutional 
mechanisms in place. For their effectiveness these rely heavily on 
collaboration between the political leaders, and, other than Oxford City, 
these all now come from the same political party. Beyond the Sub- 
region, however, there are no collaborative arrangements and it will be 
devolved to EiP Inspectors to ascertain whether the new “Duty to co-
operate” within the 2011 Localism Act is being discharged. 
 
i) The role of senior officers and their relationship with councillors  
 
Both in the interviews and the questionnaire replies, concerns were 
expressed that in both the Oxford City and South Oxfordshire District 
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Councils, the progression of the Core Strategy had been too officer-led, 
and that councillors, particularly back benchers, had not been overly 
involved in the process, and felt marginalized. Legally, local government 
officers are the servants of the council that appoints them and of the 
council as a whole, not of professionalism, or of a Majority Party, and in 
their work the officers’ activities are circumscribed by the policies laid 
down by the council. The political affiliation of officers is a sensitive 
subject, but unlike Germany where senior local government officers are 
active members of a political party, and elected to their office, in England 
this is not the case. Of more interest is the “managerialist” culture of 
senior officers, which was discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. Gaydon (1984) 
suggests that local government is a stronghold of professionalism, and 
that to those schooled in a profession, especially one with a fairly high 
technical content, it is hard to admit that a proposal which is apparently 
right on technical grounds can be dismissed on “mere” political grounds. 
 
However, the genesis of the Core Strategies in Oxford City and South 
Oxfordshire District Councils has been more complex. With both Councils 
having a clear political majority, officers “know where they are” (Blowers 
1977) and can adapt accordingly. As a consequence the Core Strategies 
have evolved from a nexus of senior councillors and officers, and 
ultimately only effectively challenged at the EiP, where objectors have an 
opportunity to persuade the presiding independent Inspector of their 
views: “The balance between the real contribution of officers and 
members to policy-making will depend on the level of political direction 
coming from the members within a particular council” (Alexander 1982). 
In both Oxford City and South Oxfordshire, senior councillors had a clear 
idea of what they wanted to achieve. 
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Chapter 6 Reflections on the three research questions 
Introduction 
In this chapter I draw together the various findings from my interviews 
and surveys and explain what the case study of the Central Oxfordshire 
Sub – region tell us about the key research questions set out at the 
conclusion of the literature review. I describe a conceptual – analytical 
framework for understanding the role of the councillor in local 
government. I then move onto discuss the field - work findings in relation 
to this conceptual – analytical framework and how they relate to the 
existing literature on the role of the councillor in local government. My 
reading and reflection have helped me formulate three research 
questions: a) Has the lack of local government autonomy inhibited the 
adoption of innovative forms of collaborative planning b) Have councillors 
understood the central tenets of collaborative planning and acted upon 
them and c) Can local politicians who are not members of the council`s 
executive play a more effective community leadership role by becoming 
more involved in the scrutiny of policies for space and place making. 
 
There were also secondary or subsidiary questions that help to elaborate 
he major questions that could also be tested through the research. These 
were: 
 
1) Does the move from government to governance signify a de-
politicisation in local government, and a reduced role for councillors, 
particularly those neither in cabinet nor having committee leadership 
roles? To what extent do councillors conform to the typology of roles 
ascribed to them by academic research? 
 
2) Are Core Strategies that are intended to be over-arching in terms of 
the governance of the district, and not just land-use allocation 
documents, essentially expressions of political aspirations for the district? 
In these circumstances, should the strategies be politically “whipped”, 
and what scope is there for councillors to dissent whose wards may be 
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critically affected? Can the Core Strategies be used to share political 
space, influence and power with those outside the world of the party? 
 
3) Do councillors welcome the opportunity afforded by the Localism Act to 
determine their own requirements for housing and employment within the 
district and to what extent are they influenced by considerations of ward 
and re-election? 
 
4) In addition to membership of the planning committee, are there 
opportunities for councillors to become involved in place making and 
does party membership impede this?  
 
5) Does the traditional argument that views councillors as the people who 
should make the major decisions within the planning system still hold, or 
should the councillor play a more collaborative role in bringing 
stakeholders together and broaden the area for decision taking in place 
making? 
 
6) In order to exercise community leadership within their wards, will there 
be occasions when councillors may have to go against the policies of the 
party of which they are a member, and will there be occasions when 
there may be the need for a more flexible approach to the application of 
adopted Local Plan policies? To what extent does party leadership 
tolerate divergent views at the ward level? 
 
7) How do councillors rate the value of the preparation of Core Strategies 
within the planning system, and do they feel that they have had an 
opportunity to contribute to the evolution of the Core Strategy? To what 
extent are policies proposed by senior councillors and officers and what 
is the scope for back bench involvement? 
 
8) Given that a whole range of issues, eg: employment and the journey to 
work area, housing needs, waste, transport and infrastructure needs 
transcend district-wide boundaries, what institutional mechanisms are 
there for local authority and public agency collaboration, now that 
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regional spatial strategies have been revoked by the Coalition 
Government? To what extent is such collaboration hampered by party 
political differences? 
 
Turning now to the three research questions identified earlier in the thesis 
and also reflecting on the secondary questions identified above. 
 
a) Has the lack of local government autonomy inhibited the adoption of 
innovative forms of collaborative planning 
 
Walker pointed out (2008) that local government in England traditionally 
undertakes activities on behalf of central government and does not 
possess power over its own affairs. Jones and Stewart (2002) suggest 
that despite the relentless flow of consultation papers, the nature of the 
central – local relation has still not been tackled and the main 
recommendations of the Layfield report have been ignored by all 
governments. In Chapter 1 a two- fold typology of local autonomy (Gurr 
and King 1987) was described, one of which was autonomy from central 
government. Hall (1983) suggested a definition of autonomy – the ability 
of local government to maximise its policy   making powers and 
implementation capacities. The evolution of a spatial strategy for the 
Central Oxfordshire Sub – region has shown how these strategic/local 
tensions have been evident during that process.  
 
Central government through the medium of the Regional Spatial Strategy 
(RSS) that had extensive consultation and independent examination, and 
was approved by the Secretary of State set overall parameters for growth 
in the Sub-region. The evidence at the Examination in Public of the RSS 
was that it was in the national interest that the growth potential of the 
Sub- region be encouraged. This involved a higher trajectory of growth 
than previously and this caused tension between central and local 
government. More particularly the response of the political leadership of 
the local authorities was to reluctantly plan for this level of growth and this 
created tensions within the authorities as the governing political parties 
exerted their authority over councillors. In the final analysis local 
authorities have little discretion when central government designates part 
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of the country as a growth area and the task of local government is 
essentially one of managing that growth. 
 
The Urban Extension of Oxford into South Oxfordshire was an important 
requirement of the RSS but it set the two riparian district councils against 
each other. Although South Oxfordshire District Council, initially on 
pragmatic grounds, did include the concept in the first draft of the Core 
Strategy, so as to avoid a challenge to the competence of the plan, the 
successful legal challenge by the CPRE to the RSS provided South 
Oxfordshire District with an opportunity to change its policy ahead of 
district council elections and prepare a final draft of the Core Strategy 
(CS)  without the Urban Extension. Oxford City Council objected to this 
omission at the Examination in Public, arguing that the CS was not 
compliant with the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) because 
South Oxfordshire District Council had not considered what contribution it 
should make to the City’s housing needs. The Inspector who examined 
the CS recommended additional wording that encourages the district 
councils to co-operate in assessing and meeting the housing needs of 
Oxford. 
 
The Localism Act 2011 places a duty on public bodies to cooperate on 
planning issues that cross- administrative boundaries and this is 
reinforced in the NPPF. The case study of Central Oxfordshire suggests 
that because the progress of an agreed spatial strategy is so protracted 
and extends beyond the life of a particular parliament and there is the 
possibility therefore of political changes at national government level, 
recalcitrant district councils can procrastinate and delay, hoping that 
national legislative changes may absolve them of a particular irksome 
responsibility. Against that background a legal duty to cooperate is likely 
to be fraught with difficulty because it is open to legal challenge and 
differing interpretation. Those academics and practitioners arguing for a 
more collaborative approach to spatial planning might take heart from the 
Central Oxfordshire Sub region case which has demonstrated the 
impracticality of a legalistic approach to cooperation where there are 
strong political differences between riparian district councils and their 
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strategic objectives. However Vigor et al (2000) suggest the current 
structure of the planning system works against a shift towards consensus 
around difficult local and development issues because of the continuing 
power of vertical relations. A significant influence on these relations are 
the political parties in local government. 
 
Within councils, the attempts by the political leadership of the ruling party 
to comply with the strategic goals of central government creates its own 
tensions, particularly between the “tribune” and “statesman” councillors 
depicted by Gyford (1984).”Tribune” councillors want to represent their 
wards but if this means acting as an advocate for residents opposed to 
new development proposed by the majority party in the Core Strategy, 
sanction to do this by the leadership (the “statesman “ councillors) is a 
fine political calculation. The case study demonstrates how the various 
themes identified in the literature review have been evident in the 
emergence of a growth agenda for the Central Oxfordshire Sub-region. 
Those such as Stoker (2000),  Skelcher  (2004 ) and Finch ( 2007) who 
documented a move towards governance with local government working 
across boundaries, to achieve a more collective action, and  those such 
as  Rhodes (1997)  and Goodwin  (1998 ) who evidenced political action 
emerging from a host of governmental  and non – governmental bodies 
might see the emergence of this growth agenda as corroborating these 
tendencies. 
 
However in managing this growth and given central government’s 
determination, described by Coulson (2004) to keep local politicians 
within a tightly controlled financial framework, the role of the controlling 
political parties is to shape this growth agenda so as to reflect their 
political priorities and ensure political survival. This demonstrates the role 
of the political group and its concern   with capturing control of the council 
and to meet technocratic and managerial needs rather than reflect 
communities of place noted by Copus (2004). Despite all that has been 
written by Healey et al (2003, 2011) on collaborative planning, in this 
case study, the adoption of spatial strategies for the district council areas 
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is determined by the ruling parties wishing to maintain control of their 
councils. 
 
In Chapter 2 the concept of Governmentality was discussed. Foucault 
(1991) expressing the view that the state can only govern in and through 
networks and coalitions and receiving support for this view from Miller 
and Rose (1990), Dean (1999) and Rose ( 1999) with Murdoch and 
Abram ( 2002) observing that this raised the question of the amount of 
spatial sensitivity to be permitted in the system. The case study and the 
interviews suggest that there is only a limited amount of spatial sensitivity 
that can be permitted in the system and this is under the control of the 
ruling political party who will pursue this in its own interests. My 
conclusion is that the lack of local government autonomy has inhibited 
the adoption of innovative forms of collaborative planning. 
 
b) Have councillors understood the central tenets of collaborative 
planning and acted upon them. 
 
The spatial planning system has had a crucial role to play in mediating 
between different interests since the creation of the land use planning 
system in 1947. (Elson 1986). The concept of the development plan in 
the planning system is in part a vehicle for providing the rationale for 
specific decisions, and to do this effectively, a plan should state the 
principles which are to guide the local authority’s decision making 
(Healey et al 1988). Central government has however sought to constrain 
local discretion by limiting both the scope and content of the plans. In 
responding to these conflicting pressures Short (1996) opined that the 
planning system originally introduced to regulate and direct development 
had been transformed into a system of negotiation. 
 
Encouraged by the “ modernising “ agenda for spatial planning introduced 
by the New Labour government after 1997, Healey (2007) and others 
including Allmendinger (2007) argued that collaborative spatial planning 
can facilitate collective action with progressive purpose, contrasting with 
more established public jurisdictional authorities where planning is 
   
 191 
understood as mediation in the public interest. However Brownhill and 
Carpenter (2009) in a study of the evolving forms of governance in the 
Thames Gateway area ,identified the tension between networked forms 
of governance and the continuing importance of hierarchical relations. 
 
The Central Oxfordshire Sub – region also provided an opportunity to 
observe these tensions. Both Oxford City Council and South Oxfordshire 
District Council were placed in the role of coming forward with 
development plans that reflected the higher trajectory of growth approved 
by central government for the sub – region. Councillors in both districts 
were confronted with the conflicting goals that such a trajectory inevitably 
introduces. On the question of the place- making role of spatial planning, 
senior councillors had more confidence in the opportunities to be involved 
in place- making, but overall nearly all councillors were positive about 
these opportunities. Junior councillors were slightly more emphatic that 
councillors should still be those who should make the major planning 
decisions, but were also more positive about playing a collaborative role 
in bringing stakeholders together. The three council leaders were 
supportive of councillors becoming involved in place- making, and it does 
represent an opportunity for junior councillors to define a new role for 
themselves, in addition to membership of the regulatory planning 
committee. For the Leaders it could hopefully empower councillors who 
otherwise might either not become engaged in policy formulation, or 
alternatively challenge it. 
 
Councillors were supportive of a more collaborative role, but particularly 
the junior councillors were also concerned to ensure that their traditional 
role as decision makers in planning is not diminished. Senior members, 
through their involvement in external organisations and consortia, already 
play a collaborative role and it is in this way that these agencies exert 
their influence on the councils. A recurring theme was the need to 
distinguish between policy making on the one hand, and the regulatory 
function of planning development control on the other. The Chairman of 
the South Oxfordshire Planning Committee emphasised the importance 
to the public of the development control meetings, where interested 
   
 192 
parties could orally make submissions to the committee. She was happy 
with the delegation arrangements to officers, as the committee did 
receive all the big planning applications. However she had little time for 
those councillors who thought that they had been marginalised in 
planning matters, and advised them that they should become more 
involved at a ward level. She emphasised that there was no political whip 
on planning decisions. The probity of maintaining a clear distinction 
between policy making and planning decisions on individual applications 
has been an important feature of the planning system in England since 
the 1947 Act. The increased politicisation of policy making renders that 
even more important. 
 
 
The most pronounced difference in attitudes between senior and junior 
councillors was evident in their responses as whether to go against the 
party when formulating policy. Junior councillors indicated both their 
willingness to go against their party’s policies and their wish for a more 
flexible approach to development plan policies. This follows a familiar 
pattern noted by Gyford (1984) who cites Newton (1974) who found that 
the delegate role appealed particularly to the member for a marginal 
ward, whilst trustees were more likely to come from safe wards. Junior 
councillors, in their first term of office, were found to endorse a ward 
focus and adopt a watchdog role, with wider horizons developing later on 
(McKinsey & Co 1973). Their involvement in local ward issues may bring 
them into active contact with pressure groups outside the council, 
whereas senior councillors pre-occupied with council work, may have at 
best only honorific links with such groups, noted Gyford (1984). 
 
There were significant differences between junior and senior councillors 
in their perception of the helpfulness or otherwise of the Core Strategy 
system and the opportunity to contribute. For a number of ward 
councillors the process had been particularly difficult. Chairmanship of 
the Council meetings had also been difficult .For both Oxford City Council 
and the South Oxfordshire District Council, the preparation and adoption 
of their Core Strategy had pre-occupied them for more than five years. 
   
 193 
Such a protracted process invites all sorts of dangers, particularly that of 
being overtaken by events. The failure to develop local capacity to 
manage the development process in Oxfordshire, which, it is claimed, 
has the largest concentration of research and development activity in 
Western Europe, was noted by the Chairman of Oxfordshire LEP .He 
wanted to ensure that the LEP was “business led” and addressed the 
issues that were threatening the local economy, such as the mis-match 
between skill needs and local educational provision. The Coalition 
Government has announced that the LEPs would have a crucial role in 
determining local priorities for infrastructure spending. 
 
My conclusion is that councillors have understood the central tenets of 
collaborative planning but have not been able to act upon them as much 
as they would wish because of the lack of autonomy for local government 
and a centralised system of central and local government relationships 
which impedes local initiatives. 
 
c) Can local politicians who are not members of the council`s executive 
play a more effective community leadership role by becoming more 
involved in the scrutiny of policies for space and place- making. 
 
Although councillors welcomed greater collaboration with stakeholders, 
there was nonetheless, particularly amongst junior councillors, a desire to 
ensure that their political role was not minimalised. The need to prepare 
and adopt a Core Strategy for a district council area had, on the one 
hand, encouraged the collaborative approach advocated by Healey 
(2006) and others, but on the other had politicised policy and plan making 
to a significantly new degree. The Leader of South Oxfordshire District 
Council saw a clear distinction between development control decisions 
that were not whipped politically and the Core Strategy that was political, 
although it was difficult to engage backbenchers in policy formulation. Not 
surprisingly, this view was not supported by independent councillors and 
had led to conflict within the ruling group but it was a view strongly 
endorsed by senior Oxford City councillors.  
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The preparation of Core Strategies was a significant change for district 
councils, pursuing a more over-arching approach than the land-use plans 
required under the 1990 Planning Act. There also needed to be more 
collaboration, particularly in economic development , with county and 
sub-regional agencies, but the implications of these changes appeared to 
be an ever-increasing growth in the influence exerted by senior officers, 
and an alienation of backbenchers, who felt less engaged in the process. 
Backbenchers in marginal wards could feel particularly under pressure 
Whether the adoption of Core Strategies at Council meetings at Oxford 
City Council and South Oxfordshire were politically whipped is difficult to 
ascertain, because of its sensitivity. However what is clear is that parties 
voted along political affiliations at the respective Council meetings, and 
that within the ruling group at South Oxfordshire “opt outs” or “diplomatic 
absences from meetings” were agreed with the Leader. It is a reasonable 
assumption that voting was whipped because the ruling group either in 
Oxford or South Oxfordshire could not be certain of the voting arithmetic 
at Council meetings, and would wanted in any event to demonstrate at 
least a majority of the Council in support of the adopted Core Strategy. 
The main finding is that the Core Strategy is a clear expression of the 
political aims of the Council and its ruling group, and supports the 
conclusions of Copus (2004) that the politics of the council was 
conducted within the party group, before it reaches the public domain, 
and that dissenters were given some freedom by the leadership rather 
than risk a overly public split within the party. 
 
The Leader of South Oxfordshire District Council, who was also a 
member of the Local Enterprise Partnership and the County Spatial 
Planning and Infrastructure Planning Liaison Group (SPIP), had a clear 
idea of the Core Strategy as a document setting out the political vision for 
the future development of the district This, together with collaboration 
with other councils and agencies, involved senior officers and members, 
but it was difficult to engage backbenchers in policy formulation. There 
was likely to be an increased emphasis on economic development, and 
within the council senior management was trying to re-focus professional 
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planners to become more aware of the overall activities of the council, 
and not just development control. 
 
The Urban Expansion of Oxford, proposed in the South East Plan (2009), 
had been dropped and, despite the representations of Oxford City 
Council, the EiP Inspector examining the South Oxfordshire Core 
Strategy had not been persuaded to resurrect the policy in the Strategy, 
preferring that these housing requirements be further examined at the 
County level. Although the Oxford Urban Expansion had featured in a list 
of priorities prepared by SPIP, this could not of itself safeguard the policy. 
The Chairman of the Local Enterprise Partnership   made it clear that the 
LEP would not interfere in the statutory decision-making of elected 
members of local authorities. The increased politicisation of plan making 
as exemplified in the core strategies will make collaboration between 
district councils more difficult, particularly where it involves significant 
housing development, despite the apparent enthusiasm for this 
collaboration expressed by councillors. A local developer thought local 
authorities had failed to deal with these issues and that his company 
would have to lobby in order that the issues are confronted. 
 
The issue of increased politicisation in plan making raises some 
interesting questions about leadership and scrutiny. Gains et al (2005) 
demonstrated how the potential exists for local authorities to be 
independently strong and weak on the two dimensions of leadership and 
scrutiny. This led to the identification of four broad paths for 
implementation to move down. These included the low scrutiny/high 
leadership model where there has been a move from collectivist patterns 
of leadership to a focussed executive without adopting the other parts of 
the reforms. Gains called this the “executive autonomy model “ and this 
appears to have become the overwhelming form of governance in South 
Oxfordshire District Council and to some extent also in Oxford City 
Council which has adopted the “Strong Leadership “ role for the executive 
offered by central government, although a strong opposition of Lib Dems 
and Greens exercise there a scrutiny role. 
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Many councillors in South Oxfordshire District Council evidenced concern 
that Sub-regional targets had been too prominent in the production of the 
Core Strategy. However, Oxford City councillors demonstrated a much 
stronger support for regionally set housing and employment targets, and 
greater collaboration between district councils than was evident in the 
replies from South Oxfordshire District councillors. Oxford City 
Councillors observed: 
 
“Co-operation important in principle, but party political differences can 
create deadlock, and impede agreement, if neighbouring councils have 
differing plans/ core strategies.”  
 
“…In practice, with differing objectives it will be very difficult to achieve 
greater collaboration.” 
“Difficulty in Oxfordshire – Labour-run Oxford City with tight boundary and 
wish to see growth in housing/ jobs, but surrounded by councils hostile to 
these policies. Targets are better made regionally; then, no opportunity 
for authorities to duck their responsibility to contribute to housing and 
employment needs in region.”  
 
There was strong agreement, as had been the case with South 
Oxfordshire District councillors that councillors will pursue local interests, 
and not give sufficient weight to wider requirements, but it was not agreed 
that councillors do not have sufficient knowledge to make these 
decisions. Again a majority thought that the pursuit of political aims would 
tend to predominate. There was less support for locally produced 
Housing Needs Assessments than had been the case with South 
Oxfordshire District councillors. Oxford City   Council has used Housing 
Needs assessments as the driver for determining numbers and partly to 
validate the regional statements. CPRE pointed out that the major 
influence on the policies being followed by the Oxford City Council was 
the Oxford Strategic Partnership on which both Oxford University and 
Oxford Brookes University were represented: “A major objective of the 
Council was to achieve unitary status and their growth agenda was part 
of this campaign” Within Oxford City Council the six area planning 
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committees that had met monthly across the city were being replaced by 
two larger planning committees. The justification for replacing them was 
that some of the committees had a poor record of decision-making 
However, because of Oxford’s political geography, the Lib Dems and 
Greens had been able to lead these smaller area committees, whereas 
the two larger area committees would be politically balanced to reflect the 
political make-up of the whole Council, thus giving Labour a majority on 
both. Evidently localism in Oxford had proved uncomfortable for the 
political leadership of the Council: “They are over-influenced by local 
people.”The new approach was welcomed by a local developer who 
thought the “area committees were very parochial and inexperienced, 
and lost a lot of appeals”. 
 
Leach and Copus (2004) examined the introduction, via the Local 
Government Act 2000, of political executives held to account by 
influential overview and scrutiny committees, which would challenge 
fundamentally the traditional operations of the party political group 
system. The researchers concluded that the success of the overview and 
scrutiny experiment was by no means assured, and faced with the 
intransigent nature of most party group behaviour, the future of effective 
scrutiny hung in the balance. Neither in Oxford City Council or South 
Oxfordshire District Council did overview and scrutiny exercise a 
significant role in the preparation of the Core Strategies. Their role was 
predominantly procedural and effective scrutiny came from back 
benchers and third party interests such as CPRE. 
 
Gyford (1984) had stressed the positive aspects of political parties in 
local government as representing genuine divergences of view, and 
giving coherence to the work of local authorities. He saw them functioning 
as a means of political recruitment and election organisation, and they 
represented the demands and interests of differing social groups both 
organised and unorganised. Twenty years later Copus (2004) concluded 
that although the presence of parties had long been recognised as 
introducing new elements to local authority decision – making , what 
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political parties do to local representation and wider local politics is less 
well understood . 
 
Moreover the role of the party group – the cohesive organisation of 
councillors from a single party – has received scant attention by 
comparison with that given to the political party generally. His research 
strove to show that both party and the party group play an important and 
discrete part in the representative processes, interposing themselves 
between the electors and their representatives and generating their own 
distinctive claims to commitment. Vital to the interplay of politics locally is 
the fact that party members and councillors interpret representation and 
democracy differently from those they are elected to represent. They also 
have very distinct ideas about the role of the citizen and the party in local 
political activity and decision –making. 
 
Copus concluded that political parties have little or no loyalty to 
recognisable local communities as such. Rather they are concerned with 
capturing control of a council – a specific local government unit – the 
boundaries of which are more likely to be drawn for administrative 
convenience and to meet technocratic and managerial needs rather than 
reflect communities of place. The focus political parties have on capturing 
control of, or securing representation in any council chamber, results in 
the loosening of the bond between the councillor and the community and 
a strengthening of the ties between the councillor and his or her political 
party, for it is the party that can guarantee or withhold election to the 
council. The Central Oxfordshire Sub –region and the means by which 
both the ruling political parties of Oxford City Council and South 
Oxfordshire District Council strove to adopt Core Strategies that would 
reflect the growth agenda for the Sub – region provides illustration that 
the conclusions of Copus regarding political parties in local government 
are also applicable in the specialised area of spatial planning. 
 
I commented on the limited role of Scrutiny Committee in both of the 
councils in examining and monitoring the progress of the Core Strategies. 
Effective scrutiny did not occur until the Examination in Public by an 
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independent Inspector. The participants at the EiPs consisted principally 
of landowners and developers and their legal representatives, members 
of parish councils, amenity and environmental groups and senior officers. 
District councillors were conspicuous by their absence and appeared to 
have handed responsibility to the officers. The participants were chosen 
by the Inspector on the basis of their written representations submitted to 
the EiP programme Officer so the likelihood is that other than one or two 
district council members concerned at the impact of the strategy on their 
wards, other district councillors saw no reason to become involved. The 
format of an EiP is similar to public scrutiny elsewhere. Topics are 
chosen by the Inspector and participants invited each day based on the 
programme of topics. The style of debate is more investigative than 
adversarial with no formal cross – examination of participants. The 
Inspector in a written report summarises the issues and makes 
recommendations to the council. Despite all the changes to the format of 
EiPs in recent years, the forum is still perceived as one where those with 
land interests can challenge the strategy, and its land allocations rather 
than a wide ranging review of the strategy from the perspective of the 
district and its residents. 
 
Full and effective scrutiny earlier in the process by Scrutiny Committee 
over a number of days similarly inviting a wide group of participants could 
both better engage councillors and other stakeholders and simplify the 
procedure meaning that reviews of Core Strategies could be more timely 
and less protracted. The task of the EiP Inspector could then be 
essentially that of an administrative check that procedure and protocols 
had been adhered to. Such a change would better reflect the principles of 
Localism than the present quasi – judicial review and allow a community 
–led scrutiny of local decisions so that the public can challenge local 
authorities and public service providers. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusions 
  
 Introduction 
  
In this final chapter the important conclusions emerging from the study 
and some key recommendations are made. Reflections are made on the 
study methodology, its limitations, and the study’s contribution to 
knowledge and the potential directions for future research. At the outset it 
is helpful to set out the original research questions: 
a) Has the lack of local government autonomy inhibited the adoption 
of an innovative form of collaborative planning, 
b) Have councillors understood the central tenets of collaborative 
planning and acted upon them, and 
c) Can local politicians who are not members of the council`s 
executive play a more effective community leadership role by 
becoming more involved in the scrutiny of policies for space and 
place- making. 
  
  
Key Conclusions 
 
To answer these questions the broad themes which provided a 
conceptual – analytical framework for understanding the role of the 
councillor in local government, and more specifically that role in spatial 
planning are employed. 
 
a)  De-politicisation in local government  
Although councillors welcomed greater collaboration with stakeholders, 
there was nonetheless, particularly amongst junior councillors, a desire to 
ensure that their political role was not minimised. The need to prepare 
and adopt a Core Strategy for a district council had, on the one hand, 
encouraged the collaborative approach, but on the other had politicised 
policy and plan making to a significantly new degree. The main finding is 
that the Core Strategy is a clear expression of the aims of the Council 
and its ruling group. 
It is therefore a further demonstration of the political party acting as a 
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consistent and permanent pull on the activities of the councillor (Copus 
2004). The policies contained within the Core Strategy and the various 
stages of consultation leading to its eventual formal adoption are viewed 
by councillors as no different from other forms of political activity within 
the council and axiomatically party political activity. Electoral success 
enables a ruling group to claim a mandate to govern an area and in turn 
claim public support for its planning policies, even when these are 
seriously challenged by local residents or business groups. In tandem 
with the legal and procedural advances of the Core Strategy, the ruling 
party manages the political support for these policies within the party 
group and where necessary will grant an element of local autonomy to 
councillors at ward level but only within a strictly controlled framework 
agreed at the informal group meetings 
 
The political management of the Core Strategy contrasts with the 
autonomous nature of the planning committee. Reflecting its regulatory 
purpose and quasi- judicial status, councillors who are members of the 
committee can display a fiercely independent character. By contrast a 
party approach to planning policy is as evident as in any other form of 
administrative activity within the council and this, in turn reduces 
concerns and issues to party political ones. 
 
 
b)  Core Strategies as expressions of political aspirations for the district   
The Leader of South Oxfordshire District Council, who was also a 
member of the Local Enterprise Partnership and the County Spatial 
Planning and Infrastructure Planning Liaison Group (SPIP) had a clear 
idea of the Core Strategy as a document setting out the political vision for 
the future development of the district. This, together with collaboration 
with other councils and agencies, involved senior officers and members, 
but it was difficult to engage backbenchers in policy formulation. There 
was likely to be an increased emphasis on economic development, and 
within the council senior management was trying to re-focus professional 
planners to become more aware of the overall activities of the council, 
and not just development control. 
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c)  Do councillors welcome the opportunities afforded by the Localism Act 
to determine their own requirements for housing and employment within 
the district?  
From the questionnaire results there was support for this approach, and a 
number of interviews (Appendix 1) revealed support and evidenced 
concern that Sub-regional targets had been too prominent in the 
production of the Core Strategy. Evidently localism in Oxford had proved 
uncomfortable for the political leadership of the Council: “They are over-
influenced by local people”. The new approach was welcomed by a local 
developer who thought the “area committees were very parochial and 
inexperienced, and lost a lot of appeals”. Conversely it can be concluded 
that by abandoning the area committees, the leading party had shown 
itself a force for inertia and the status quo (Copus 2004) when examining 
the ways in which the politics of the council was conducted. 
 
d)  In addition to membership of the planning committee, are there 
opportunities for councillors to become involved in “place- making” ? 
Senior councillors had more confidence in the opportunities to be 
involved in place making, but overall nearly all councillors were positive 
about these opportunities. Junior councillors were slightly more emphatic 
that councillors should still be those who should make the major planning 
decisions, but were also more positive about playing a collaborative role 
in bringing stakeholders together. For the Leaders, it could hopefully 
empower councillors who otherwise might either not become engaged in 
policy formulation, or alternatively challenge it. 
 
e)  Councillors as the people who should make the major decisions, and 
collaboration with stakeholders  
Councillors are supportive of a more collaborative role, but the junior 
councillors particularly, are also concerned to ensure that their traditional 
role as decision makers in planning is not diminished. Senior members, 
through their involvement in external organisations and consortia, already 
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play a collaborative role and it is in this way that these agencies exert 
their influence on the councils. 
 
f)  Community Leadership  
The most pronounced difference in attitudes between senior and junior 
councillors was evident in their responses to this issue. Junior councillors 
indicated both their willingness to go against their party’s policies, and 
their wish for a more flexible approach to Local Plan policies. This follows 
a familiar pattern noted by Gyford (1984)) who cites Newton (1974) who 
found that the delegate role appealed particularly to the member for a 
marginal ward, whilst trustees were more likely to come from safe wards. 
 
g)  The value of the preparation of Core Strategies within the planning 
system  
There were significant differences between junior and senior councillors 
in their perception of the helpfulness or otherwise of the Core Strategy 
system and the opportunity to contribute. For a number of ward 
councillors, the process had been particularly difficult. Chairmanship of 
the Council meetings had also been difficult. For both Oxford City Council 
and the South Oxfordshire District Council, the preparation and adoption 
of their Core Strategy had pre-occupied them for more than five years. 
Such a protracted process invites all sorts of dangers, particularly that of 
being overtaken by events. 
 
h)  Institutional mechanisms for local authority and public agency 
collaboration  
The Leader of the South Oxfordshire District Council referred to a number 
of cross-boundary issues affecting the District and, given the 
geographical context of the District, this is hardly surprising. For the 
South Oxfordshire Sub-region there are now institutional mechanisms in 
place. For their effectiveness these rely heavily on collaboration between 
the political leaders and, other than Oxford City, these all now come from 
the same political party.   
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      Recommendations 
 
The major recommendation emerging from this thesis is the need for a 
greater role for the Scrutiny and Overview committee in the evolution of 
the Core Strategy within councils. When the cabinet or executive 
structure was introduced into local government with its concentration of 
power in the executive, as compared with the earlier committee structure, 
emphasis was placed on the important role of scrutiny as a counter 
balance to this concentration. 
 
The case study has demonstrated that scrutiny is poorly developed in 
both Oxford City Council and South Oxfordshire District Council. Both 
councils exhibit the low scrutiny/high leadership form described by Gains 
et al (2005) where there has been a move from a collectivist pattern of 
leadership to a focussed executive without adopting the other parts of the 
reforms. A strong scrutiny committee that also provided a role for public 
involvement could obviate much of the subsequent public consultation at 
the EiP stage, leaving the independent Inspector to concentrate on the 
competence of the Core Strategy, and giving scrutiny a stronger role 
within local government. This would not only introduce more transparency 
into the process but also lead to efficiencies through shortening the 
overall time taken for the adoption of the Core Strategy by the council. 
 
The dominance of the majority political party in formulating the Core 
Strategy is a feature unremarked upon in much of the literature on 
collaborative planning discussed in Chapter 2, but it poses an obstacle to 
public engagement and interest in planning policy. A process more 
orientated around a central role for the scrutiny committee, which would 
encourage contributions from individuals and organisations outside the 
council, would better reflect and address a range of views on local issues. 
The researcher`s experience of where scrutiny is firmly embedded in the 
culture of the council and where the chairmanship of scrutiny and 
overview committees is shared amongst the political parties represented 
on the council, is that councillors see their scrutiny role as over-riding 
rather than them being foremost representatives of their parties. This 
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focus of itself encourages other organisations and groups to engage in 
the discussion of the issues, as they perceive that the debates are 
structured around issues and not overly party political. By sharing political 
space, the collaborative approach to spatial planning advocated by so 
many can become a reality, but there is a need amongst researchers, 
which is often lacking, to understand the present political culture and how 
it constrains the evolution of the planning process. 
 
Limitations of the study 
 
In terms of the data collected and analysed, though every effort was 
made to ensure that the fieldwork used a robust and rigorous research 
methodology, there are inevitably a number of limitations to the study. 
The comments from councillors were not a representative random 
sample of the councils approached. A self- selecting group of councillors, 
many of whom the researcher knew, responded. However the aim of the 
study was specifically to understand the role of the councillor in a specific 
context rather than to develop a representative understanding of the role 
of all councillors. The councillors who responded were not necessarily 
representative of the more than 100 councillors approached, but they 
were representative of those councillors who had taken part in the spatial 
planning process. 
 
The in - depth interviews were small in number. It can be argued that a 
larger group would have increased the robustness and rigour of the 
interview findings and could also have allowed other insights to emerge. 
This criticism does not invalidate the findings from these respondents but 
does raise questions about the transferability of these findings to other 
contexts. However despite the small sample size, the interview findings 
are internally consistent and connect with the findings from the 
questionnaires, the observations at public council meetings, and the 
analysis of published reports. Overall, the study’s findings do provide 
important insights in to the role of the councillor in local government. 
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Contributions to Knowledge 
 
Promoting scholarship in the field of planning was discussed by Patsy 
Healey in her last editorial in Planning Theory & Practice (2008) .As with 
other fields of professional expertise, the focus of planning is on a field of 
action, of practice. Consequently if practice is the focus of attention in the 
planning field, then where does the cultivation of “scholarship “, of  
“academic inquiry” belong in the field?” 
 
Firstly, all professional fields need to maintain a rich connection to 
developments in the various academic disciplines relevant to their work. 
They introduce new concepts and strands of inquiry that may come to 
have relevance in practice contexts. Secondly, to challenge the 
introversion that often comes over professional fields dominated by the 
routines and institutional arrangements of particular parties. Thirdly, to 
encourage authors to write well and make clear arguments. Finally, to 
challenge a habitat often found in planning where authors concerned 
about addressing “ what should be done “ mix statements about what is 
going on and what should be going on, the descriptive and the normative, 
not just in the same section of a paper but sometimes in adjacent 
sentences. The two dimensions are interlinked but one of the important 
skills in planning work is to know which kind of statement is being made, 
and when a switch is being made between the two.  
 
The study has contributed to knowledge in a number of ways. It provides 
confirmatory evidence from other research exploring the role of the 
councillor in local government. There has however, been little work on 
attempting to place in context how the councillor behaves in the 
specialised area of spatial planning, notwithstanding its important role in 
local government. This study has shown how the politicisation that has 
affected local government, has also had an influence on the role of 
spatial planning in local government, and that the dominant role of the 
political party in local government also involves spatial planning. 
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In terms of the existing literature on the role of the councillor in local 
government and the evolving nature of spatial planning, the study links 
strongly with the work of Gyford (1984) who analysed the clusters of role 
orientations that characterise councillors, Newton (1976) who 
distinguished the roles of trustees, delegates and politicos amongst 
councillors, and Cole (2002) who drew attention to the tension between 
the role of councillors as ward representatives and party politicians. 
Clarke and Stewart (1998) identified a greater role for councillors in 
community governance arising from the “Modernising Agenda “in local 
government of New Labour. The methodological contribution of this study 
is to identify these differing roles for the councillor within the prism of 
spatial planning, and the responsibilities that decision - making in this 
specialist area places on councillors. 
 
This has allowed a review of the role of the political party in local 
government, linking in with the work of Cole(2002) who examined 
dissention within the party group, and Copus  (2004) who described how 
the party group plays a discrete part in the representative process, 
interposing between the electors and their representatives and 
generating their own distinctive claims to commitment. The study 
provides confirmation that these themes are as evident in the specialist 
area of spatial planning as they are in other areas of local government. 
 
In terms of professional practice, attention has already been drawn to the 
need for a stronger role for scrutiny in the evolution of the Core Strategy. 
The difficulties of councils co-operating together in order to resolve issues 
that cross administrative boundaries has also been illustrated. In Chapter 
2 there was an extensive review of the literature,that deals with the 
emerging theory about the purpose of spatial planning, and the 
opportunity for a more collaborative approach to place making. What is 
noticeable is that the roles of the political party and councillors are often 
not considered in these debates. A central question concerning the 
current enthusiasm for a localist agenda in spatial planning and local 
government, is to what extent local authorities will choose to exercise 
their residual autonomy so as to encourage locally specific policy making. 
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In terms of professional practice attention has already been drawn to the 
need for a stronger role for scrutiny in the evolution of the Core Strategy. 
Latterly the “duty to co-operate” has become an important test of the 
soundness of the new plans being formulated and means that local 
councils need to positively engage with neighbouring councils, often led 
by rival political parties, in order that cross – boundary issues are 
properly addressed and resolved, which provides a new challenge to the 
party dominance in the council.  
 
During the researcher`s career as a planning consultant the main contact 
with local government councillors was with them in their role as members 
of the planning committee. Most viewed the independence of the 
planning committee within local government as particularly important and 
their own decision making as “quasi – legal”. Policy- making was, 
however, different. During the researcher`s time as a councillor at South 
Oxfordshire District Council, there had been little work on the Core 
Strategy. The previous local plan had just been adopted, but the time 
spent there as a councillor, allowed an understanding of the role of the 
political party in all the areas of local government. Subsequently this 
research has shown that this over- riding control extended to the 
specialist area of policy making in spatial planning, but what is surprising 
to the researcher is the extent to which the political leadership wanted to 
ensure that there was no dissention amongst ward members. 
 
Methodology 
 
Methodology was discussed in Chapter 3. The methodological 
contributions of this study are the need to use a multi-theoretical 
approach to understand the full complexity of the role of the councillor, 
the need to study all the stakeholders in the spatial planning process and 
the value of a qualitative approach to understanding what autonomy a 
councillor displays in the decision making process. 
 
Turning to the use of a case study Flyvbjerg (2006) suggests a typology 
of strategies for the selection of samples and cases which distinguishes 
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between A. Random selection and B. Information – orientated selection. 
This latter selection is separated into four categories including as a fourth 
Paradigmatic cases which are defined as those where a metaphor can be 
developed or to establish a school for the domain which the case 
concerns. The researcher suggests that this case study falls within this 
latter category for it examines the problems for governance and 
collaboration in an area – the Central Oxfordshire Sub – region – where a 
discourse of further growth needs to be stabilised in the local government 
system and allied agencies responsible for infrastructure. In the literature 
review, other areas where such a discourse has begun were examined 
and there is some commonality but the strength of the approach is that 
the discourse described in the Central Oxfordshire Sub-region can be 
read as a narrative in its entirety and it is from this that hypotheses can 
be generated which can be examined elsewhere. 
 
Suggested Directions for Future Research 
 
The policy importance of this research is three - fold. Firstly, on 
democratic grounds it is important for researchers, policy-makers and 
decision – makers to understand the role of the councillor and the factors 
that influence this role. Secondly, by understanding how and why 
councillors hold the views that they do there is an opportunity to develop 
approaches to bridge gaps in trust, communication, values and 
democratic accountability. Thirdly, it could lead to more effective policies 
and programmes that could work in partnership with local communities 
and have a greater positive impact locally and nationally. 
 
It would be worthwhile doing a larger study that examined a broader 
range of councils as Copus (2004) did in order to ensure that all the 
major parties were represented and across a contrasting range of 
locations eg: metropolitan, provincial and rural. This would allow insights 
into the role of the councillor in local government through the prism of 
spatial planning that might be more representative than this case study 
could be. 
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